Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

2019

Causes and Prevention of Electric Power Industry
Accidents: A Delphi Study
Ganesh Narine
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Engineering Commons, and the Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please
contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University
College of Management and Technology

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by

Ganesh Narine

has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.

Review Committee
Dr. Elizabeth Thompson, Committee Chairperson, Management Faculty
Dr. Nikunja Swain, Committee Member, Management Faculty
Dr. Kenneth Sherman, University Reviewer, Management Faculty

The Office of the Provost

Walden University
2019

Abstract
Causes and Prevention of Electric Power Industry Accidents: A Delphi Study
by
Ganesh Narine

MPhil, Walden University, 2019
MSc, University of the West Indies, 1995
BSc, University of the West Indies, 1986

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Management

Walden University
October 2019

Abstract
The electric power industry is very complex, dangerous, and challenging. The number of
workplace accidents declined over the last decade, but worker injuries and fatalities
continue to occur. The purpose of this Delphi study was to gain consensus regarding the
most feasible and desirable methods to prevent accidents and deaths. The research
question focused on gaining consensus from a panel of experts regarding the most
desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious workplace accidents in the United
States. The Bolman and Deal 4-frame model proved useful for understanding challenges
within the electric industry and how workers and leaders can work together to best
prevent accidents. Twenty-seven managers, trainers, supervisors, and workers, each with
more than 10 years of experience in the United States electric power industry, responded
to 30 items in the first round. The responses from the first round, where 70% or more of
participants agreed, were analyzed using the NVivo 12 Plus software. Consensus
occurred after each round: In the first round through the solutions participants provided.
In the second round and later rounds, consensus occurred through acceptance of items
with scores of 3 or higher on a 5-point Likert-type scale endorsed by 70% or more
respondents. Participants decided if the solutions were desirable and feasible in the
second round, and important and credible in rounds third and fourth. Participants
concurred that organizational leadership, managers, supervisors, and workers were in
different ways responsible for accident prevention. Supervisors and managers who
communicated organizational priorities, and demanded strict compliance with policies,
rules, and procedures, promote social change in a highly specialized industry.
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Dedication
My mother would be smiling in heaven, and she will never stop.
Safe working is a necessity and not a benefit. To all my colleagues and friends in
the electric power industry always remember that in the work safe message, there is a me
who is you.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
In 2017, five electricity industry employees, including a manager, died in a single
workplace accident in Florida (Bedi, Capriel, Dawson, & McGrory, 2017). That same year, a
lineman in Minnesota was seriously injured when the boom arm of his bucket truck fell off when
it became detached from the vehicle (Staff, 2017), and in Fairmont, North Carolina, a lineman
died while moving a fallen power line from across a roadway (Sinclair, 2017). Although
infrequent, accidents have a high impact and were dangerous in the electric power industry. In
this study, I focused on determining how to mitigate accidents in the electric power industry and
the prevention of severe injuries and death to workers. This workplace experience was necessary
to research since the electricity industry is one where sophisticated safety workplace
arrangements are employed, yet accidents still occur. Manuele (2014) highlighted the increased
emphasis on workplace safety while indicating that the worst accidents continued to happen.
These were the ones where workers became severely injured or killed. Chapter 1 contains the
background for this research, a problem statement, a purpose statement, the research question,
the conceptual framework chosen for this exercise, and a section on the nature of the study.
Sections on the assumptions I made, the scope and delimitations, limitations, and significance of
the study also form part of this chapter.
Background of the Study
White et al. (2016) considered worker beliefs about the effectiveness of workplace safety
arrangements that Australian electrical workers experienced. That study was similar, in ways, to
this current research to determine ways to prevent accidents which were happening in the U.S.
electric power industry. The prevailing impression was that electric power industry workers
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were proficient at recognizing hazards, capable of evaluating the risks, and of mitigating them.
Aboagye-Nimo, Raiden, King, and Tietze (2015) studied on-site workplace training and accident
prevention at construction worksites in the United Kingdom and considered how tacit knowledge
resulted in improved safety performance. Aboagye-Nimo et al. reported that knowledge is
essential to successful business organizations. Active learning, team building, interpersonal
communications, self-learning, and critical thinking were all bolstered by tacit knowledge
(Aboagye-Nimo et al., 2015). Fordyce et al posited that with an understanding the learning
techniques, trainers could better prepare workers to appreciate the dangers of electrical work and
how to mitigate hazards. These hazards were either unrecognized or misunderstood by trained
and untrained workers in electric utilities (Fordyce et al., 2016). Worker knowledge about the
dangers of working on electrical systems grew from working arrangements and situations, and
social reality and exposure. Explicit knowledge come from organizational procedures,
equipment manuals, manufacturers instructions, classroom exercises, and books. Tacit
knowledge is a mixing of explicit knowledge and on-site experience gained from actual work
exposure; the individual’s skill, expertise, and personal trait. Aboagye-Nimo et al. found that
construction workers relied more on tacit knowledge than explicit knowledge as they were
trained on-site more often than in classroom settings. This experience led to better appreciation,
understanding, attitudes, and behavior and improved workplace safety performance (AboagyeNimo et al., 2015). Laberge, MacEachen, and Calvet (2014) studied how young workers and
inexperienced persons were frequently injured at work and found that ineffective safety
programs were linked to workplace accidents. Safety training was more focused on teaching
strategies and objectives and not concentrated on learning activities and plans.
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Laberge et al. (2014) found that learning strategies allowed participants to strengthen
their abilities and competence. They also found that dangerous situations and inconsistent
application of workplace rules occurred when there was an absence of learning initiatives. These
included inconsistent use of safety rules and in some cases absolute disregard to getting work
done (Laberge et al., 2014). Nye, Brummel, and Drasgow (2010) posited that employees found
organizational change, when built on a platform of validity and reasonableness, was tolerable
and doable. The instances where workers recognized organizational change as valid and
acceptable, however, were unlike other cases where the change was introduced by topmanagement without worker involvement, even if these were superior (Nye et al., 2010).
Aboagye-Nimo et al. (2015), Laberge et al. (2014), as well as Bordia, Restubog, Jimmieson, and
Irmer (2011) supported this finding.
Volberg et al. (2017) estimated that there were over 200 investor-owned electric power
industry companies in the United States. Recorded instances of electric industry workplace
deaths in the United States declined over the 10 years prior to the Volberg et al. (2017) study.
Despite a decline in worker fatalities, accidents still occurred as there were 63 fatalities including
21 line workers from 1995 to 2013 in 18 power companies that contributed to the database used
by Volberg et al. (2017). Individuals working around energized power systems were particularly
vulnerable since they were exposed to other dangerous and hazardous conditions which ranged
from working at heights, working in confined spaces, to working in remote locations (Fordyce et
al., 2016). Volberg et al. indicated that the risk of falling was highest in winter when working
conditions deteriorated.
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Research studies into workplace accidents were focused mainly on the identification of
causal factors that primarily addressed human errors and worker performance (Dekker, 2006;
Manuele, 2014). None of these have explained how accidents occurred and how to prevent
them. The researchers assumed that better worker performance, supported by workplace
training, promoted a safer working arrangement and a reduction of accidents. With on-the-job
and workplace training, workers were better informed and more likely to assess workplace
situations and to remain safe (Drupsteen, Groeneweg, & Zwetsloot, 2013).
Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) suggested that workers were motivated by managers, at
both the individual and the group levels, to work safely and to adopt attitudes that synergized
with prescribed safe work arrangements. The top management of an organization was therefore
mainly responsible for existing safety arrangements and performance (Tucker, Ogunfowora, &
Ehr, 2016). Manuele (2014) found that accident investigations focused more on identifying
individuals as accountable for breaches than on the deeply embedded issues that required indepth problem-solving knowledge. Incident investigators looked for causes that were consistent
with their own beliefs about how the accident happened (Dekker, 2006; Manuele, 2014). That
focus was akin to investigators applying accident modeling consistent with their understanding
and analysis of failure. That perspective often resulted in confusion and other negatives which
prevented correction of the real cause of the accident (Dekker, 2006; Manuele, 2014). Failure to
identify all of the pertinent and relevant factors that contributed to an accident may explain why
accidents continued to happen.
Mathieu, Neumann, Hare, and Babiak (2014) posited that workplace job satisfaction
influences performance outcomes. Hayek, Thomas, Milorad, Novicevic, and Montalvo (2016)
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explained that worker job satisfaction and work commitment linked to how leadership impacted
organizational culture and social norms. Volberg et al. (2017) found that workplace training
enhanced worker commitment, job satisfaction, and safe work. White et al. (2016) suggested
that worker beliefs were advantageous in bolstering individual and group–level safety. White et
al. also indicated that these beliefs were tested when customer outages and outage durations
increased; directly due to workplace safety measures, taken to minimize errors and accidents..
Wong and Laschinger (2013) and Volberg et al. (2017) suggested that organizational leadership
should focus on addressing fundamental problems and encourage meaningful worker
involvement, change in organizational resilience, preventative measures, and monitoring
arrangements that could be employed to prevent accidents. Volberg et al. (2017) and Fordyce,
Kelsh, Lu, Sahl, and Yager (2007) conducted similar studies on electric industry worker injuries
and concluded that insufficient data was available to effectively analyze accidents in the electric
power industry across the United States. Understanding the lessons from previous workplace
accidents and existing workplace conditions, and ensuring the placement of useful measures to
prevent employee-injuries are critically dependent on proactive management (Dekker, 2006;
Manuele, 2014). I conducted this study to determine how to prevent workplace accidents,
serious, and fatal employee injuries in the North American electric power industry.
Problem Statement
No More Must Die. Let him be the last was the first line of a newspaper article that
highlighted the death of an electric utility lineman; this heart rendering plea seemingly a neverending note (Patterson, 2012, para 1). The general problem that I addressed in this study was an
increase in electric power industry related fatalities across the United States. In 2015 there were
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800 fall victims and 22 electric utility related fatalities in 4,836 fatal work injuries across the
United States (OSHA, 2017).
The specific problem was that although management in the electric power industry in the
United States has placed heavy emphasis on workplace safety, fatal and serious accidents
continue to happen and there are no clear solutions to prevent these accidents (Fordyce et al.,
2016; Schwarz & Drudi, 2018). Manuele (2014) believed that workplace accidents are
symptoms of significant safety management system problems and that accident investigations
presented opportunities for the identification of system deficiencies that could be corrected to
prevent future accidents. Fox (2014) reported on two linemen being killed in a lift truck accident
on an electric power line roadway in Bourne, Massachusetts, USA. I conducted this research to
identify and understand issues that may guide on how to prevent future accidents.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this normative Delphi research was to prevent workplace accidents
resulting in serious and fatal worker injuries by gaining consensus on the reasons why these
occur and desirable and feasible solutions from a select group of experienced U.S. electric power
industry experts including trainers, employees, supervisors, and managers. Participants I
selected for this study possessed technical knowledge and electric power industry work
experience. The results from this study may help guide actions to prevent future accidents. The
focus of this study was two-fold. First, I sought to determine what trainers, employees,
supervisors, and managers experienced with electric power industry accidents, attributed as the
real causes of workplace accidents, worker fatalities, and serious injuries. Second, with an
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understanding of the real causes, my focus was on identifying ways to prevent future accidents,
worker fatalities, and serious injuries.
Research Question
What is the consensus of opinion of a panel of experts in the electrical power industry
regarding desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious workplace accidents occurring in
the United States?
Conceptual Framework
Manuele (2014) suggested that workplace accidents usually are due to a combination of
different work factors. Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) reported that managers and supervisors
influence actual work procedures and arrangements. The belief was that an understanding of the
structural functions, authority, and planning arrangements in any organization revealed how
workplace accidents occurred (Manuele, 2014). Bolman and Deal (2013) described a framework
to look at social interactions, cultural dynamics, ethical consideration, and organizational
resilience from four different lenses; Structural, Human Resource, Political, and Symbolic.
Bolman and Deal’s four frameworks were used to facilitate a holistic method for examining
organizations from the perspectives of knowledgeable participants with electric power industry
experience, and to view how the organization was and what the organization could become
(Bolman & Deal, 2013). The Bolman and Deal model provided a better understanding of the
underlying deep-seated reasons for fatal and serious electric power industry accidents in the
United States.
The four-frame model allowed me to better understand work challenges and how
workers mitigate and prevent errors and accidents. Each of the frames provided me with
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opportunities to view problems through lenses that promoted particular visions and voices from
that perspective. Bolman and Deal (2013) indicated that no single frame was superior to the
other, but they were complementary and allowed for an individual to gain knowledge and to
understand how to best address complex organizational problems.
It is common for leaders and managers to worry about flagging organizational
performance, which may increase worker insecurity and fears about job stability and tenure
(Dekker, 2003; Probst, 2015). Managers had first to know that a gap existed between the
expected performance-level and the actual outcome: A better realization covered the closing of
that gap. Discipline was a crucially relevant factor if the gap closure were to happen. This
discipline extended into data identification and analysis and a linking of the results of the data
examination to the desired outcomes, especially in regards to details of what was to be done, by
whom, and how that could happen (Albert & Hallowell, 2013). In this situation, data was a
representation of micro aspects of the activities, and systems that needed to be improved or even
entirely revamped if performance outcomes were to develop. Trust was a necessary ingredient in
this process as individuals had to be confident that other individuals who work together towards
targeted results were able to synchronize on the belief that they all contributed with the same
enthusiasm (Tucker, Ogunfowora, & Ehr, 2016). Gladwell (2007) indicated that speed must
augment trust. In a high-trust environment, communication errors never deliberately became
misinterpreted (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017). The opposite is true as well.
In a low-trust environment, even good communication is, at times, interpreted as weak and
untrustworthy (Bolman & Deal, 2013).
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Trust among individuals in a work environment promotes influence. Influence grows
into power. Any individual who influences others in the workplace by encouraging and
supporting trust eventually develops a powerful impact on the other individuals in that
environment (White et al., 2016). This influence can then elevate into the organization at
different levels. The broader influence carries symbolic significance akin to the Symbolic Frame
purported by Bolman and Deal (2013). When the influence brings authority, either formal or
through respect, that signified individual political strength within the organization; akin to the
Political Frame suggested by Bolman and Deal (2013). The formal authority that an individual
exercised at work come from the Structural Frame, as positional strength gives the office holder
organizational jurisdiction for directing functions sanctioned by the organization (Bolman &
Deal, 2013).
The structural frame provided me with opportunities to understand teams and individuals
within organizations from the depiction of individual and group roles, working arrangements,
formal manager-supervisor-worker relationships, and work coordination. From these managersupervisor-worker relationships, the work rules, procedures, regulatory systems, were managed
through the representation of influence from the Structural Frame. Working problems were very
often due to structural issues that went unaddressed: It was important that organizational
structures remained current and relevant to the demands made, for superior organizational
outcomes. Organization charts were set to cover the working environment, systems, and
technology. When problems occurred, it usually surrounded a mismatch of the organization
structure with the existing circumstances (Bolman & Deal, 2013).
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The Bolman and Deal (2013) human resources frame is rooted in the relationships that
exist among individuals who work together. These relationships become almost family-type,
especially when individuals work together for long periods and develop lasting trust and
togetherness. Researchers can develop a better understanding of individual feelings, issues of
trust, skills development, prejudices, and other human type challenges by considering this
perspective. In effect, the human resources frame provides insight into how people conduct
work, their feelings about the work itself, and all of the influences that impact the activity (Uehli
et al., 2014). A natural form of interpersonal contest exists even if it remained silent and almost
invisible. Different departments, judged on their outputs and efficiencies, compete with other
teams for supreme recognition as the best outfit in the organization. Individuals in the same
group often attempt to climb to the top to become recognized as the leader of the pack (Bolman
& Deal, 2013). Individuals in these circumstances employ many different techniques as they
negotiate, coerce, convince, and even outsmart others in organizational politics (Scott, Fleming,
& Kelloway, 2014). Conflicts and other negatives reflect the real downside of the political
frame. The Symbolic Frame deals with organization culture, the spirit of success, and social
stories about the organization as caring, ethical, and supportive. Problems from this perspective
arise when there is a disconnection between social reality and the picture of a caring
organization.
Nature of the Study
The Delphi technique originated in the 1950s at RAND Corporation (Dalkey & Helmer,
1963; Linstone & Turoff, 1975). Research conducted with the Delphi technique is any
qualitative, quantitative, or mixed approach formulated on group interaction where the

11
participants are not known to each other and communications are limited to each of the
participant and I. The Delphi technique is a useful research design when there is participant
disagreement on the research subject or when there is a lack of knowledge regarding the research
subject or problem. Dalkey and Helmer (1963) contended that research success depends on
participant ability, opinion, experience, and speculation. A distinct and significant benefit of the
Delphi technique was the anonymous nature of the exercises which removed the need for faceto-face meetings. The Delphi design, as in this study, also promotes the inclusion of individuals
whose participation in traditional research is, at best, remote and limited. The electric power
industry participants in this study were an example group of individuals not usually selected in
studies and analyses of this kind. The Delphi technique enabled me to study research
participants in a wide-geographic space, and allowed for removal or filtering of issues usually
associated with face-to-face human influence and interaction (Brady, 2015; Cegielski, Bourrie, &
Hazen, 2013; Habibi, Sarafrazi, & Izadyar, 2014; Kerr, Schultz, & Lings, 2015; Lai, Flower,
Moore, & Lewith, 2015; Merlin et al., 2016).
Linstone and Turoff (1975) indicated that there was no single best or unique basis to
examine any scientific procedure or theory. Researchers can, therefore, draw from many
different research methodologies to conduct a study. A phenomenological approach was
possible, but that was not suitable for this research because my focus was on reasons for
accidents that happened and potential solutions rather than lived experiences of people who
experienced a workplace accident. A case study was also possible, but my focus was not on a
specific phenomenon bounded by time and space (Yin, 2017). A quantitative study was also
possible. However, the data for this study was not quantitative because my focus was on expert
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opinions rather than on numeric data. Hsu and Sandford (2007) indicated that the Delphi
technique is suitable for research participants who are knowledgeable in their expert domain.
The normative Delphi technique and approach allowed for possible consensus on why fatal and
serious accidents were happening in the electric industry from a group of industry experts
selected from experienced and knowledgeable electric power industry trainers, employees,
supervisors, and managers and who had experience with workplace accidents in the United
States. Using the Delphi technique, I systematically honed the expert input by use of a series of
questionnaires with controlled participant feedback (see Linstone & Turoff, 2011). Novakowski
and Wellar (2008) and Yousuf (2007) described a normative Delphi as a consensus Delphi that
focused on establishing desirable goals and priorities and not on what was probable. The
normative Delphi technique and approach aligned with the specific problem that workplace
accidents continued to occur in spite of management's heavy emphasis on safety. The Delphi
technique allowed for the generation of consensus about situations which were not entirely
understood (see Heitner, Kahn, & Sherman, 2013; Linstone & Turoff, 1975).
Linstone and Turoff (1975) indicated that three rounds could prove sufficient for result
stability and consensus from participant responses. Linstone and Turoff further suggested that
additional rounds would likely not be beneficial and might only serve to delay completion of the
study with no measurable change when compared to stopping the process at the end of three
rounds. Hsu and Sandford (2007) espoused a different view by indicating that a fourth round
was at times necessary for consensus. Delbecq, Van de Ven, and Gustafson (1975) concurred
with Hsu and Sandford and even suggested a fifth-round if that became necessary to achieve
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consensus. Without consensus, they contended that the entire study effort could become wasted.
I aimed to reach consensus in four rounds.
For the first round, I forwarded a list of reasons why accidents happen and invited the
research participants to add to the list and to provide solutions to those reasons. The participants
each had two weeks to respond. This information and feedback from the research participants,
were summarized into themes, coded, and used to generate questionnaires for the second and
subsequent rounds in the research exercise. Items that were mentioned by the respondents
moved to Round 2. These items, incorporated into 5-point Likert-type statements, formed the
basis for Round 2. In Round 2, participants responded to two different and distinct 5-point
Likert-type scales; one for responses that they considered as desirable and another they
considered as feasible. Where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a score of 3 or
more on both Likert-type scale for the same item, that item remained for inclusion in the Round
3 questionnaire. I used these responses to determine the degree to which the respondent agreed
or disagreed with a particular item (see Novakowski & Wellar, 2008). Responses from Round 3
where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a score of 3 or more on the 5-point
Likert-type scale were treated as important and extracted for Round 4. In Round 4, participants
rated their confidence in the overall findings of consensus-based solutions emergent from Round
3. Information provided by knowledgeable individuals, about how to prevent accidents
followed. My goal in this study was to explain how to prevent accidents that happen in spite of
safety precautions employed in the electric power industry in the United States.
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Definitions
Approved practice: Work procedures employed when no isolation of energy
sources occur before performing skilled work. This practice is to provide safe work
measures for individuals completing the task (ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017).
Authorized worker: A person formally recognized, sanctioned, and competent to
perform work listed on the company recognized list (OSHA, 2017).
Competent person: (a) An individual trained, possessing knowledge, and
experienced in arranging and performing work; (b) an individual who was aware of and
knowledgeable on the safety regulations, rules, and procedures regarding work; and (c)
an individual capable of recognizing and mitigating hazards and dangers in the work
environment (ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017).
Competent worker: A skilled individual who performed specific work and
satisfied the conditions listed for a competent person. The company determines the
particular task which is known to the skilled worker (ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017).
Delphi expert/panelist: A knowledgeable and experienced individual who is
familiar with the study topic and willingly participates in the exercise (Skulmoski,
Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).
Expert panelist: An individual who satisfied three criteria: (a) was a manager,
supervisor, trainer, or worker in the electric power industry; (b) had more than 10 years
of industry practice and experience; and (c) had knowledge about accidents in the electric
power industry in the United States.
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Hazard: A condition where a potential for uncontrolled interaction with energy
sources could cause injury or death to individuals (Capelli-Schellpfeffer, Floyd,
Eastwood, & Liggett, 1999).
Incident: An event, situation, or condition, which has the potential to cause an
injury or illness (OSHA, 2017).
Isolated: Device or equipment that is separated or removed from energy sources
(ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017).
Job plan: A work arrangement that is known to and agreed by all individuals at
the worksite. It identified hazards that are known and mechanisms to abate hazards or
control them when elimination is not possible. The responsibilities of each workgroup
member are itemized and individually identified (ISHA, 2014).
Personal protective equipment: Approved safety equipment used by individuals
for reducing the risk of becoming injured while performing work (ISHA, 2014;
Mitropoulos, Howell, & Abdelhamid, 2005).
Proximity: The limits of approach to an apparatus that is not safe to touch. It does
not apply to in-service equipment that is intrinsically safe for human touch (ISHA, 2014;
OSHA, 2017).
Safe work area: A specifically identified and designated area for work where all
known hazards or danger are removed or controlled (ISHA, 2014; OSHA, 2017).
Safety interlock. A device or system which is designed to operate in a particular
manner and where the non-designed sequence of operations is prohibited (ISHA, 2014;
OSHA, 2017).
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Sociotechnical system: A grouping of interacting social and technical processes
and subsystems that impact one-another and evolve into a complex overarching system
(Kroes, 2015).
Supervisor: A person designated by the employer as the individual who is in
charge over a workplace and has authority over a worker (ISHA, 2014).
Work procedure: A detailed, step-by-step description of how to perform the task
approved by the company (ISHA, 2014).
Worker: A person who performs work for monetary compensation (ISHA, 2014).
Workplace: Any premises or location upon, in or near which a worker worked
(ISHA, 2014).
Assumptions
In this study, I assumed the participants where knowledgeable of workplace conditions
and systems. These participants were U.S. electric power industry managers, supervisors,
trainers, and workers: They may not have possessed the training as workplace safety
professionals, but their experiences with working arrangements and procedures proved crucially
relevant to this study. Manuele (2014) suggested that workplace accidents usually occur when
several different workplace factors contributed to breached barriers and safeguards. That
information could have been vital and sufficient to prevent injuries and deaths while at the same
time, made the workplace safer (Weber & Wasieleski, 2013).
Second, I assumed that research participants, as Delphi panelists, provided honest and
truthful answers in the different rounds of questionnaires I distributed. Kim and Kim (2016)
indicated that panelist bias sometimes leads them to misrepresent the information that they
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provide by exaggerating the importance of issues and also understating the effect of the other
problems.
Third, I communicated with research participants through consistently formatted
questionnaires in language that was unambiguous, not misleading, and simple to understand (see
Novakowski & Wellar, 2008). The main aim of a Delphi technique was to gain consensus
among the Delphi experts. It would be difficult to achieve this if the expert panelists were
unsure about the meaning of questions I asked as the researcher.
Scope and Delimitations
The research scope of this exercise was delimited to the electric power industry and how
to prevent accidents that were occurring in the United States. The primary focus was to
understand the contributing factors for situations where electricity industry workers became
severely injured or even killed while performing work. The strategy was to employ a four-frame
model espoused by Bolman and Deal (2013) to understand the electric power industry and to use
this to promote working arrangements where employees were not injured or killed while
performing work. It proved a helpful model for further studies in the electric power industry as
well as other industrial sectors.
Understanding how accidents occurred was preliminary to the deliberate taking of steps
toward the prevention of future electric industry workplace accidents and to keep workers safe
and uninjured. For this study, a specific delimitation surrounded the intention to use the Bolman
and Deal four-frame model. The different perspectives described in the four-frames allowed for
a better review of organizational and people issues and dynamics that contributed to workplace
accidents. No previous study of this kind, using this model, was conducted in the electric power
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industry. Study-success depended on a heavy reliance was on the research participants from the
electric power industry and the detailed data that they provided during the Delphi rounds. That
placed significant researcher responsibility on the strategies used to select the participants
(Brady, 2015). Individuals with little or limited knowledge and experience might have caused
the research not to be meaningful, even if there was a consensus.
Another specific delimitation was the decision on the normative Delphi technique, what a
Delphi expert was, and how that aligned with the actual selection of participants. It was possible
that overlooking of suitable and relevant experts occurred in spite of best efforts to choose from
the best potential candidates. Participant identification, on the LinkedIn social medium, was be
done through experts in the electric power industry in the United States (Brady, 2015). It was
not expected but possible that the selected participants, even over the vast geographical space,
may have proven unhelpful because they were personally-linked to the sequence of activities in
the electric power industry and which led to accidents.
A delimitation condition surrounded the research question being too pointed and possibly
contentious for experts to admit to issues in the electric power industry freely. That could have
resulted in worker participants blaming managers and supervisors. The reverse may also have
happened. Without genuine interaction and contribution from the participants, actions, systems,
group politics, structural inadequacies, technologies, and techniques that factored in the accidents
occurring in the electric power industry could have remained unidentified. The period for
conducting the study was a delimitation because accidents that likely occurred during this
timeframe might have influenced participant responses. If there were no accidents, participant
response might be different from situations where serious and fatal accidents happened. There
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was no evidence of this, and none of the participants indicated that accidents were occurring
during the Delphi rounds.
A delimitation condition involved the geographical area from which research participants
came, the scales selected, and the choice of measurements for consensus. The research
methodology was another delimitation as this was deemed suitable by me as the researcher. This
research methodology provided opportunities for me to delimit the scope of the questions for
Round 1 and for the themes and codes that I used as the researcher. The scales and measurements
chosen worked well in previous research, and I anticipated a similar result in this study.
Limitations
The first limitation was that the study results proved useful in the electrical power
industry only, because of the uniqueness that existed in this industry. The use of the Bolman and
Deal four-frame approach to analyzing data and participant feedback provided for an
appreciation and real understanding of the issues that contributed to serious and fatal accidents in
the electrical power industry may be advantageous. This advantage might be a limitation as it
can prove challenging to extend the lessons beyond the realm where the participants were experts
and to extend the findings to other industries and workplaces: that was not an expectation
(Moore, 2016).
The second limitation was that the Delphi panelists as research participants could have
brought very pointed views prevalent only where the individual worked. Researcher tact and
skill to ensure that the research remained on-course was essential because, in the end, the
electrical power industry might become much safer than it is (Clibbens, Walters, & Baird, 2012;
San Su, Wardell, & Thorkildsen, 2013).
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The third limitation could have been that the best candidates declined participation even
though the selectees possessed the necessary experience and knowledge to satisfy the research
requirements and criteria. This selection included experienced and knowledgeable electric
power industry managers, supervisors, trainers, selected from the across the United States and
who knew about serious and fatal accidents that occurred in the industry (Volberg et al., 2017).
Participants were able to describe work arrangements, procedures, environments, and issues that
were pertinent and vitally connected to workplace safety management in the electrical power
industry. The participants were willing to share information that contributed to new learning and
for an opportunity to understand what went wrong. The participant identification process on
public social media provided more significant opportunities for suitable panelists as experienced
and respected industry practitioners for this study. That way, each participant were interested as
contributors to accident prevention efforts and to make the electric power industry safer than it is
(Volberg et al., 2017).
A fourth limitation was the my personal and professional bias, as the researcher, which
influenced the strategy used to conduct the literature search, data collection, and analysis in this
study. The Delphi technique preference in this study allowed me to include one question in the
Round 1 questionnaire to encourage the Delphi panelists to suggest other information they
considered as pertinent for this study and which was not covered by the questions set by me.
The identification of relevant issues represented a significant effort to improve the research
trustworthiness as well as the data derived from the process (Yin, 2013). Inclusion to the Delphi
panelists as research participants for confirmation of the information they provided enhanced the
likelihood that the data was correct (Patton, 2015).
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The fifth involved my management of the Delphi study. The iterative process that the
Delphi technique required was a possible disadvantage as research participants could have
chosen to drop out before the end of the study. Attrition by participants may have affected the
research and highlighted credibility issues in the overall findings (Annear et al., 2015; Willems,
Sutton, & Maybery, 2015). Twenty-five (25) participants was felt to be acceptable but only if
the attrition rate remained less than 25 % over the entire study; to this end, the intention was to
use more than 25 Delphi panelists as research participants (Brody et al., 2014; Sinclair, Oyebode,
& Owens, 2016). I remained meticulous and exercised all available opportunities to keep the
research exercise free of administrative delays and inefficiencies (De Loë, Melnychuk, Murray,
& Plummer, 2016; Patton, 2015).
A sixth limitation involved a possible social desirability bias that could have resulted
when Delphi panelists responded in ways that misrepresented their real position because they
preferred to behave in ways considered as socially acceptable (Heitner et al., 2013; Kim & Kim,
2016). Removal of bias due to individual social desirability bias, the questions did not require
Delphi panelists to reveal or recount their behavior, contribution, or influence on any particular
accident or workplace issue directly related to the study. I also ensured the strictest controls on
participant anonymity and research confidentiality (Heitner et al., 2013).
Significance of the Study
The first consideration of individuals at work should be the avoidance of accidents, the
prevention of personal injuries, and the safeguarding of life. Workplace safety arrangements
were regulated, and organizations included safety as among the highest values, sufficient for its
inclusion in the mission, vision, and policy statements. Employers set safety procedures and

22
rules that managers were to implement and monitor for compliance. Workers were expected to
follow set work procedures and to do all that could be expected to prevent errors, workplace
accidents and injuries to themselves and others at work. OSHA (2017) stipulated specific duties,
roles, and responsibilities for employers, employees, and workplace safety committee members.
OSHA also had the power to conduct random checks in different workplaces and to instruct
employers to initiate mandatory compliance orders when substandard safety conditions existed.
Despite these arrangements and safeguards, accidents still occurred, sometimes with fatal
consequences.
Individuals went to work each day with the intent of returning home after contributing to
organizational outcomes and success. Sadly, that did not happen every day for each person at
work. Each year more than 4000 individuals in the United States did not ever return home at the
end of the workday (OSHA, 2017). In the electric power industry, where significant emphasis
and resources are committed to safety at work, and safety management systems, worker injuries
and deaths were occurring (Fordyce et al., 2007; Volberg et al., 2017). This study was about the
search for deep underlying causal factors that evaded the safety barriers in the electric power
industry and contributed to workplace accidents where workers became severely injured or killed
while doing work. The Bolman and Deal (2013) conceptual framework chosen for this study
allowed for consideration of organizational issues from leadership, to internal politics and group
dynamics which spanned across technical challenges, professional boundaries, and social
dimensions (Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017; Vassiliou & Alberts, 2013).
Electricity was dangerous, but it was not the only danger that electric power workers
faced. There were electrical, fall, and other hazards in the working environment. Individuals
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who worked in these conditions must maintain an awareness of hazards. These workers must
understand the dangers and be competent at initiating actions to mitigate the associated risks.
Individual and personal safety was only as effective as the protective measures employed to keep
the workplace safe. Death or severe injury was a frequent reminder of breached workplace
safety barriers. Volberg et al. (2017) indicated that an average human could die with a current
flow of less than one (1) ampere. Power lines can carry up to 2000 amperes (Fordyce et al.,
2016). In one organization where a fatal accident occurred in which four employees died, the
organization approved and set safety rules indicated that safety rules were mandatory and
required full compliance at all times (Cameron, 2017). The safety rules covered situations where
employees were to involve their supervisors if circumstances existed where the work instruction
was not specific or not fully understood: consistent with the leadership view espoused by Tucker
et al. (2016). There was another fatal workplace accident in this company despite organizational
prevention efforts (Vanmeer, 2019). This study was significant as it represented a real
opportunity to determine why electric power industry workers became injured or killed at work
and what could be done to prevent future accidents.
Significance to Practice
Understanding issues that contributed to workplace accidents might provide opportunities
for organizations to revise work procedures, to update working systems, and to adopt more
suitable arrangements to mitigate accidents. This understanding might also allow for better
monitoring and enforcement of safe work arrangements developed from the lessons learned from
previous accidents. The study may be sufficient to extend current knowledge and strategies for
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optimal work designing, planning, and execution while meaningfully contributing to accidentfree electric power operations in the United States.
Significance to Theory
Understanding the causes of accidents that occurred in the electric power industry was
important because of the dangers and hazards associated with working near or on electric
systems and because of how often workers were required to work in dangerous and hazardous
conditions. This study was significant as it could contribute towards theory by pinpointing areas
of focus and extending current knowledge about risk mitigation efforts on how to curb and to
prevent workplace accidents. This study might provide information for a better understanding of
the issues that contributed to electrical power industry accidents.
Significance to Social Change
Promoting social change from this study might come from the identification of
operational, organizational, regulatory, and contributing factors to supplement the already known
causal factors of workplace accidents. Understanding the reasons that preventable accidents
occurred might result in the implementation of new strategies to overcome these issues, help to
prevent injuries to workers, and to help industry practitioners better understand what can be done
to remain safe while conducting work. Surviving victims of workplace accidents and other
workers who were on-site when accidents occurred undergo prolonged periods of doubt and
apprehension (Beus, Dhanani, & McCord, 2015; Manuele, 2014). A possible social benefit from
this study could be the sharing of experiences from individuals with knowledge and
understanding of previous workplace accidents: This could be used to remind workers,
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supervisors, and managers that safe work was better for long-term organizational success where
workers were not killed or injured.
Summary and Transition
A Delphi approach was the preferred research methodology, with experienced and
knowledgeable electrical power industry managers, supervisors, trainers, and workers as the
research participants; this was an opportunity to explore the working arrangements in the focus
industry and to get feedback from individuals who knew this business from a first-hand
perspective. The conceptual framework choice in this study, based on a Four-Frame model
(Bolman & Deal, 2013), allowed for analysis of safety practices in the electrical power industry
from a logical strategy that was easy to understand. That way, questions about how accidents
occurred and whether the causal influencing factors were isolated and addressed to answer how
to prevent future accidents and worker injuries and deaths. The Delphi technique supported the
conditions where group consensus could be realized among experts as research participants
especially when there was no well-established history of previous studies (Afshari, 2015; Wester
& Borders, 2014). The possible research limitations, assumptions, and delimitations were
included in Chapter 1 together with a definition section for terms relevant to this study: This was
in addition to a section on the purpose of this research and another on the significance of this
effort.
In Chapter 2, there is an in-depth exploration and review compilation of the pertinent and
current literature on workplace accidents where workers become severely injured and killed at
work. These are synthesized and compared for similarities in accidents where the lessons can be
applied to provide opportunities to prevent future accidents. Preventing workplace accidents in
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the electric power industry and pre-empting situations that can result in severe worker injuries
and deaths is an attempt to promote social change in a highly specialized and complex industry.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The general problem was that there is an increasing problem of electric power industry
related fatalities across the United States. The specific problem was that although management
in the U.S. electric power industry has placed heavy emphasis on workplace safety, fatal and
serious accidents continue to happen and there are no clear solutions to prevent these accidents
(Fordyce et al., 2016; Schwarz & Drudi, 2018). Workplace safety challenges range from
physical hazards that are always difficult to recognize and to mitigate, interpersonal interactions
that complicate hazard abatement, and organizational factors driven by technology aided
business horizons and stakeholder demands (Andel, Hutchingson, & Spector, 2015). The electric
power industry, in this regard, is no different from many other business realms. The reach and
impact of the electric power utility might match and even surpass other critical sectors such as
water, communication, and energy. The general arrangements for managing in these industries
are aligned in many ways, even if each sector has unique priorities. In these sectors, complex
dynamics give rise to surprising results and organizational flexibility (Osborn, 2008). Managing
workplace safety is, therefore, a complex responsibility that mirrors other business activities that
impact the success of the organizations (Andel et al., 2015).
Chapter 2 contains a description of the literature search strategy, the conceptual
framework I adopted for this study, a review of previous studies, a discussion of literature
relevant to this research, and a summary and conclusion. The previous studies on the electric
power industry were few and not exhaustive. Data were difficult to source, and where available,
the information was incomplete (see Fordyce et al., 2016; Volberg et al., 2017).
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Literature Search Strategy
The strategy I used for this literature review involved exhaustive searches of EBSCOhost,
Emerald Management Journals, SAGE Premier, Thoreau Multi-Database, and ProQuest
databases that I accessed via Walden University’s library.
Table 1
Outline Strategy of Literature Search
Vital search terms

leadership, workplace accidents, worker injury and fatality.
Safety management, accident investigation, electrical power,
electric power line safety, safety training, behavior, attitudes, safety
culture, safety climate, safety theory and models, worker
performance, supervisor safety, and management safety roles.

Strategy for Literature
search

Walden University databases EBSCOhost, Emerald Management
Journals, SAGE Premier, Thoreau Multi-Database, and ProQuest.
Google Scholar, relevant industry, regulator, and professional
organization websites, peer-reviewed journals, magazines, news
media and books.

Emphasis on literature from 2013 and on crucially relevant papers before that.
Source of information
Since 2013
Before 2012
Total
books

0

2

2

Non-peer-reviewed

1

3

4

Dissertations

18

0

18

Peer-reviewed articles

275

35

310

Other Reliable Sources

4

0

4

Total
%(peer-reviewed/total)

298
88

40
12

338
100
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This strategy extended to Google Scholar, relevant industry, regulator, and professional
organization websites, peer-reviewed journals, magazines, and books. My primary intent and
focus was on sourcing literature published inside a 6-year window that began in 2013. I also
included older articles that included vital information. Key search terms and phrases included:
leadership, workplace accidents, worker injury, and fatality. Other search words and phrases
were safety management, accident investigation, electrical power, electric power line safety,
safety training, behavior, attitudes, safety culture, safety climate, safety theory and models,
worker performance, supervisor safety, and management safety roles. From the selected articles,
I developed a comprehensive understanding of different approaches to workplace safety and
accidents, the methods of determining how best to find the underlying and direct causal factors,
and other compelling and relevant reasons for use as part of this particular study.
Conceptual Framework
Bolman and Deal (2013) indicated that individuals used first hand knowledge to guide
them in addressing challenges. They termed this tribal knowledge. Workplace success grows on
long-lasting traditions referred to as the culture of the organization. Problems are, at times,
introduced into the workplace even when individuals focus on making or causing change with
positive intent. Bolman and Deal described different well-known cases where leaders and
managers introduced change only to see failing results. Described by Bolman and Deal as the
curse of cluelessness, it was akin to not seeing the entire picture when handling problems and
issues. Cluelessness also aligns with an endemic problem that many individuals experience in
situations where they have the right picture but incorrectly chose the solution option.
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Sometimes these problems are new, not very well understood, and even require skills that
individuals do not possess or have not mastered. As an example, if an individual who is not an
expert swimmer is caught in a situation that required them to survive in water, situation would be
very challenging, but not impossible. There may be a flotation device that the individual uses
until help arrives. In those situations, the individual may survive despite not being able to swim
well or not at all.
Table 2
Overview of the Four Frame Model

Metaphor
for
organization
Central
concepts

Image of
leadership
Basic
leadership
challenge

STRUCTURAL HUMAN
RESOURCE
Factory or
Family
machine

FRAME
POLITICAL
Jungle

Rules, roles,
goals, policies,
technology,
environment

Needs, skills,
relationships

Power,
conflict,
competition,
organizational
politics

Social
architecture

Empowerment

Advocacy
and political
savvy
Develop
agenda and
power base

SYMBOLIC
Carnival,
temple,
theater
Culture,
meaning,
metaphor,
ritual,
ceremony,
stories, heroes
Inspiration

Attune structure Align organizational
Create faith,
to task,
and
beauty,
technology,
human needs
meaning
environment
Note. Adapted from L. G. Bolman, & T. E. Deal (2013), Reframing organizations: Artistry,
choice, and leadership (5th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Reprinted with permission.
If, on the other hand, the individual attempts swimming to a safe location, that decision could be
fatal. Making decisions in such situations is complicated. The individual may be unaccustomed
and there would not be a long time for the individual to contemplate their response however
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careful they believed they were. Even for smart people, cluelessness is a fact of life (MoffattBruce et al., 2017). Bolman and Deal (2013) suggested reframing as a concept that individuals
and teams employ to understand problems better and to decide on possible ways of addressing
the issues or situations that required correction or fixing. Bolman and Deal described four
frames for analyzing different conditions: the Structural, Human Resource, Political, and
Symbolic frames.
Table 2 offers an overview of the Bolman and Deal four-frame model I used for this
study. Bolman and Deal (2013) indicated that managers and leaders must focus on multiple
frames to effectively manage in complex working environments. Table 3 shows their key claims
about managerial thinking.
Table 3
Expanding Managerial Thinking.
HOW MANAGERS THINK
They often have a limited view of
organizations (for example, attributing almost
all problems to individuals’ flaws and errors).
Regardless of a problem’s source, managers
often choose rational and structural solutions:
facts, logic, restructuring.

HOW MANAGERS MIGHT THINK
They need a holistic framework that
encourages inquiry into a range of significant
issues: people, power, structure, and symbols.
They need a palette that offers an array of
options: bargaining as well as training,
celebration as well as
reorganization.
Managers often value certainty, rationality,
They need to develop creativity, risk taking,
and control while fearing ambiguity, paradox, and playfulness in responses to life’s
and “going with the flow.”
dilemmas and paradoxes, focusing as much
on finding the
right question as the right answer, on finding
meaning and faith amid clutter and confusion.
Leaders often rely on the “one right answer”
Leaders need passionate, unwavering
and the “one best way”; they are stunned at
commitment to principle, combined with
the turmoil and resistance they generate.
flexibility in understanding
and responding to events
Note. Adapted from L. G. Bolman, & T. E. Deal (2013), Reframing organizations: Artistry,
choice, and leadership (5th ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Reprinted with permission.
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In successful organizations, leaders use sophisticated systems and technically skilled and
competent employees to negotiate these new demands. A pertinent feature of these systems is an
increasingly challenging demand for superior outcomes. These demands are usually associated
with less time to pre-plan, contemplate alternatives and other possible solutions, and stressful
working arrangements and conditions. Operations in some organizations involve 24-hour
processes each day with regular schedules—something that was not very common before.
Working different shifts, the use of changing technologies, and increased work demands could
make interpersonal interactions at work difficult and may contribute to workplace errors (Griffin
& Curcuruto, 2016). Bolman and Deal (2013) likened this to smart individuals committing
stupid acts and attributed these to sense-making that failed. Such failure is likely to occur in
cases where the individuals sometimes do not know or realize that the way they viewed issues
may be incorrect (Salguero-Caparros, Suarez-Cebador, & Rubio-Romero, 2015). In these cases,
individuals do not fully understand why the results are not what they hoped for (Bolman & Deal,
2013, p.8). That, according to Bolman and Deal is locking onto a single frame and not
appreciating the other frames as valid and which could allow for the individual to understand
issues from a different perspective. These are mental models used by individuals as maps or
labels that allow for cognitive thinking or referencing in such a way that makes sense to the
individual.
Gladwell (2007) described decision making as non-conscious, fast, and holistic. That
idea extends to a fast-paced sporting decision where the player would scan the environment,
calculate the possible moves, and make the selection in time to prevent another player from
intervening or blocking the progress. The combination of the different components, non-
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conscious, fast, and holistic actions, result in skilled judgments even though the individual might
at times be incorrect. Bolman and Deal (2013) extended this type of decision making to doctors
who were required to diagnose patients--many times without having a full diagnostic
understanding of symptoms--only relying on skilled judgments based on training and their
practical experience. In these situations, judgment errors may occur. These could be
investigated from the different frames to understand what the doctor considered when identifying
all possible factors equally relevant and not treated in a particular instance. Bolman and Deal
(2013) suggested that mental maps that did not allow individuals to look at problems from more
than one perspective were very often the reasons why errors in judgments occurred. An ability
to view the same problem from different angles and to make quick and correct decisions
afterward is a fluid-expertise that requires sufficient time for its development, exposure by
experience, and the continued ability of the individual to learn and apply the teachings (Bolman
& Deal, 2013).
Framing involves the development of mental models that allow individuals to consider
issues from particular perspectives (Manuele, 2014; Weber & Wasieleski, 2013). Equally
important is for that individual to examine different perspectives and to amalgamate the best
options from different views and positions that allow for holistic management of a challenge and
for the best opportunities to remain error free. Reframing is the ability to move seamlessly from
one perspective or frame to the next without losing the ability to keep the best options for
problem resolution or results.
Frames and maps are similar as they represent windows to view different perspectives
and tools to navigate that territory (Bolman & Deal, 2013). Each frame is distinct from another
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and provides strengths and limitations to the individuals who use it as a mental model to decipher
any issue. Just as the right tool makes any job more straightforward and simple to accomplish,
the proper perspective on a topic allows for the best appreciation of the problem and to provide
successful solutions. Tools can make completing a job more manageable, but if they are the
wrong ones, the task becomes much more difficult (Labib, 2015; Murata, 2017). Individuals
using the wrong tools are more likely to make errors. These tools are not only the high precision
and well-engineered devices; it includes the different perspectives that individuals use to
understand fully and to address challenging problems.
Solving simple problems with a single tool or from only one perspective is common, but
more complex issues require the use of different tools for success. Solving problems and
handling challenges in the complicated business place is unlike any other experience. The
electric power industry is an excellent example of a complicated business where technological
systems and devices are managed together with different demands from the various stakeholders
requiring maximum returns on their investments (Bedi et al., 2017). It means, therefore, that
individuals who work in the electric power industry are ideal candidates for viewing problems
and challenges from different perspectives and frames before opting for suitable means of
addressing them (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Fordyce et al., 2016). When decisions are incorrect,
errors occur (Dekker, 2015). In the electric power industry, if that error occurs on a power line,
the result is usually a fatality or serious injuries suffered by the victim.
Managers and other individuals, as experts, usually focus on these expert strengths in a
myopic manner without exploring the different ways of addressing problems (Brody et al., 2014;
Capelli-Schellpfeffer, Floyd, Eastwood, & Liggett, 1999). The result is that many of these
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individuals assume that a one-size-fits-all approach always has the best results. However,
individuals who critically assess problems from different frames are better equipped to
understand, appreciate, and negotiate problems. Using them allows for successful outcomes,
individual experience, confidence, and wisdom (Bolman & Deal, 2013).
Regulating Electric Power in the United States
The U.S. electric power regulatory set-up is a layered one where there are federal,
regional, state, and industry accepted arrangements for operating and managing the electricity
grid and all connected constituent systems (Slayton & Clark‐Ginsberg, 2018). Volberg et al.
(2017) suggests that the electricity system has for its entire history broadly consisted of
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution (G, T, & D). Significant changes occurring in the
electric power industry that makes for radically different operating modes, players, business
arrangements, and competition focused primarily on technical and financial efficiencies and
customer satisfaction (White et al., 2016; Zohar, 2014).
At the federal level there are three different regulators; the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). FERC, NERC, and OSHA primarily
focussing on technical, operational, and safety capabilities of the electric power companies
which operates in the G, T, & D aspects of the business (Slayton & Clark‐Ginsberg, 2018).
State-level regulators set financial operations criteria. FERC, empowered by the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, is the regulator for setting NERC arrangements as the reliability regulator of the
electric grid. FERC also regulates inter-state bulk power connectivity otherwise called the
Transmission System, in the same manner as it does oil and natural gas pipelines in the United
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States. FERC is vested with the responsibility for licensing hydropower projects throughout the
United States (FERC Overview, 2018, April). NERC is the primary regulator of the North
American Electric Power System with direct authority to mandate reliability and system security
standards and procedures. Their area of control covers the entire United States, all of Canada,
and a section of Baja California (Mexico) for electricity reliability, seasonal and long-term.
NERC also provides certified training for operators and industry personnel. NERC is
empowered through its Rule of Procedure (ROP) to require Transmission Companies, also called
Transmission Operators or Bulk Power Companies, to comply with operating requirements
according to the ROP (About NERC, 2018, April). Organizations not complying with these
requirements are obligated to provide acceptable reasons or risked being sanctioned and are fined
by NERC for the non-compliance. There are instances where the Regional Reliability
Organization (RTO) assume responsibility for reliability and security oversight in place of
NERC. In this event, NERC citing the RTO for violations of operating compliance not met for
their region of control occur. Demeritt, Rothstein, Beaussier, and Howard (2015) posits that
regulation is the common most way to enforce governance and policy for risk management in
systems that require experts and knowledgeable personnel in particular industries. One example
ROP is NERC Blackout and Disturbance Response Procedures which is in effect from July 01,
2014 and where reactive power and electric load are defined to be consistent with two previously
existing procedures ( NERC Blackout and Disturbance Response Procedures, 2014, July).
NERC provided leadership, technical advice and expertise, and coordination in the US and
Canada when major blackout events occurred (Abraham et al., 2004). For the efficient, reliable,
and sound operation of the power system, it is critical to establish a clear delineation of roles and
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other coordination requirements among industry participants and governments. Analysis of
investigative findings from significant system blackouts and other major high-impacting system
emergencies, just as that which happened in 2003 in the North Eastern United States and Eastern
Canada, and following-up on recommendations promoted this (Abraham et al., 2004).
United States Safety Legislation
Regulating Safety in the workplace happen in a layered manner from the federal level to
regional regulatory agencies, and State managed systems (OSHA, 2017). The Federal Agency
that regulated workplace safety throughout the United States was the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA). State-managed safety and health regulators oversee safety
management in 22 different states. Each of these is OSHA approved for similar or superior
arrangements than what exist for OSHA. State-managed safety programs for public and private
sector workers occur in Michigan, Maryland, Tennessee, and Vermont, for example. In some
states like Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Illinois, state-managed safety programs only
cover public sector workers through OSHA approved state-managed programs. Federal OSHA
regulations cover private sector workplaces and workers.

38

Figure 1. Composite of NERC and OSHA regulatory arrangements. Adapted from OSHA
(2017), NERC (2017)
OSHA is a legally formed entity originating from the US Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSH Act of 1970, 2017, October). The OSH Act 1970 does not cover workers
engaged in self-employment or in specific industries which were regulated by other federal
institutions or agencies like, for example, the American Coast Guard, the Department of Energy,
and the Mine Safety and Health Administration (OSH Act of 1970, 2017, October). The prelude
to the OSH Act 1970 was an average of 14000 worker deaths per year (or 38 worker deaths per
day) in US workplaces. Since 2003, more than 4500 worker deaths per year (or > 12 worker
deaths per day) has been the real workplace experience. From 2003 to 2009, more than 5200
workers died at work each year. In 2016, 5190 fatalities occurred. For each year from 2009 to
2015, more than 4500 workers were victims of fatal workplace accidents (National Census,
2017).
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Figure 2. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics on Workplace Fatalities. Adapted from NATIONAL
CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES IN 2016 dated December 19, 2017.
The United States Bureau of Labor (BLS) estimated that in 2016, the workforce was
double that of 1970 and that severe workplace accidents and illnesses reduced from 11 to 3.6 per
100 000 workers in the same period. Worker accidents in the electric power industry are lumped
in a category called Utilities and amounts to 2.8 in 2016. OSHA credited the reduction in
workplace accidents and severe injuries to the enforcement of the OSH Act 1970 and the efforts
of employers, safety professionals, worker unions, and primarily the workers themselves. These
all culminate in a 66% reduction; but not an elimination of workplace mishaps, deaths, and
injuries. The BLS estimates that worker compensation for workplace injuries and illnesses in the
United States directly amounts to approximately $1 billion per week. Indirect costs are
appreciably higher as that cost include lower productivity outputs and outcomes, worker training,
replacement costs for damaged equipment, and lost time in delayed start-ups after workplace
accidents. OSHA, from the OSH Act 1970, is expected to develop, promulgate, and enforce
workplace safety standards for which employers are to comply. Example work standards
includes fall protection, machine guarding, and handling of chemicals in the workplace: these
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and other safety standards are aimed at ensuring that proper safeguards and safe working
conditions are sufficient to prevent workers injuries or illnesses. OSHA assists companies,
employers and workers' training, and provides information on workplace safety so that workers
and employers have an understanding of their workplace safety duties, rights, roles, and
responsibilities. The 2015-2016 BLS reported worker deaths in the selected (as examples in this
study) states of the United States as captured in Table 4.
Employers are required, by the OSH Act 1970, to comply with OSHA safety standards, to
identify and abate workplace hazards, to provide employees with necessary training and
information regarding dangers at work, and to notify OSHA of workplace accidents where
workers are killed or injured. For safe workplaces, employers are also required to provide
workers with necessary personal protective equipment (PPE), to keep workplace safety records,
and to desist from retaliatory actions against workers who reports safety infractions to OSHA.
OSHA is vested with the power, through the OSH Act 1970, to conduct workplace
inspections, even without advanced notification. These inspections happen when there are risks
of worker deaths or severe injuries. Citations for workplace safety violations as well as financial
penalties for these violations and failure to curb further violations usually resulted from OSHA
inspections and investigations. The OSH Act of 1970 make employers responsible for
maintaining safe workplaces so that workers are not injured or even killed. To this end, workers
are required to support employers in ensuring the maintenance of workplace safety measures and
that individuals do not misuse safety equipment, tools, and systems. Workers aere, therefore, to
be trained to understand and to handle dangers that might be present in the workplace. For
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denial of this right or any other safety provisions permitted by the OSH Act 1970, workers have
recourse in whistle-blowing to OSHA.

Table 4
State

Counts (Fatalities)
2015
44
8
8

Rates (Fatalities/100 000 Workers
2015
2016
2.6
1.6
1.9
2.6
2.4
1.4

2016
Connecticut
28
Delaware
12
District of
5
Columbia
Indiana
115
137
3.9
4.5
Kentucky
99
92
5.5
5.0
Maine
15
18
2.5
2.4
Maryland
69
92
2.4
3.2
Massachusetts
69
109
2.1
3.3
Michigan
134
162
3.1
3.5
New Hampshire
18
22
2.7
3.2
New Jersey
97
101
2.3
2.4
New York
236
272
2.7
3.1
Ohio
202
164
3.9
3.1
Pennsylvania
173
163
3.0
2.8
Rhode Island
6
9
1.2
1.8
Vermont
9
10
2.9
3.2
Virginia
106
153
2.8
4.0
West Virginia
35
47
5.0
6.6
Wisconsin
104
105
3.6
3.6
Note. Adapted from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Release NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES IN 2016 dated December 19, 2017 (p.10).

Worker Safety Beliefs
White et al. (2016) considered a framework based on the theory of planned behavior, to
explore underlying worker beliefs about workplace safety among electrical workers in Australia.
White et al. treats beliefs as advantages, disadvantages, referents, barriers, and facilitators of
workplace safety compliance. Individual and co-worker personal safety are the advantages of
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safety compliance; disadvantages involve workload and customer inconvenience; referents
represents customers, supervisors, and worker-teams; cost and time constitute the barriers and,
equipment availability, worker knowledge, and training are the facilitators. White et al. (2016)
believe that identified worker beliefs could are an essential catalyst to initiate safer workplaces
and better electrical safety decisions.
Albert and Hallowell (2013) describes the working environment that electrical workers
negotiated as high risk and where live power systems sometimes lead to serious workplace
accidents, worker injuries and even death. White et al. (2016) captures that when electrical
worker injuries occurred, the calculated hospitalization rate is 4 cases in every 100 000
individuals cared for in these facilities. That is serious enough to cause a renewal of focus on
electrical work and how workers use work systems, procedures, and personal protective
equipment to ensure that they remain safe throughout work exercises (White et al., 2016).
Comparing workplace electrical data on accidental deaths, White et al. indicates that annually
there are approximately 350 electricity-related deaths in the United States and that almost 34% of
these victims would be electrical workers. In Australia, electrocution is third on the list of
leading causes of workplace deaths. Nearly 50% of electrocutions occur on live power lines or
from contact with these lines. Contact with energized transformers, electrical wires or other
circuit components by electricians are also a leading cause of electrical worker injuries and
deaths.
White et al. (2016) identifies that within Australia, just as in many other countries
worldwide, there are regulatory frameworks and policies for managing safety in the workplace.
These are intentional and developed so that workplace safety can build upon a framework where
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worker rights, roles, and responsibilities are in line with the employer’s roles and responsibilities.
White et al. (2016) are unconvinced that regulatory control alone, is sufficient to provide a
positive safety response from individuals at work. Probst and Graso (2013) and Probst, Graso,
Estrada, and Greer (2013) examined worker attitudes and workplace safety barriers and posit that
many times, managers and supervisors are the catalyst for a failing safety management system
and not the facilitators of successful safety outcomes. Tucker et al. (2016) felt that
organizational leaders and top management influence positive safety outcomes by convincing
managers and supervisors that it is necessary to endorse safety in the workplace positively.
Vaughan (1997) showed that normalization of deviance happen by compliance, proactive
safety behavior, and that management failure leads to significant safety negatives. Lievens and
Vlerick (2014) showed that consistent management demand for safety compliance results in
positive safety participation from workers with a lessened likelihood of workplace accidents and
injuries; Probst et al. (2013) likened this as an exhibition of citizenship behavior by workers
towards the organization.
White et al. (2016) believes that this citizenship behavior informs workplace training,
worker engagement, and a positive working environment where worker attitudes and behavior
are conducive to safe and accident-free work. That, according to White et al. (2016), is the
opportunity to understand better how worker behavior impacted on safety outcomes and the
identification of possible ways to eliminate conditions and situations that encouraged a diversion
from that course.
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Safety Theory
Planned behavior.
Worker choice involves a process of decision-making that individuals are intrinsically
motivated by and adopt. The 1991 Ajzen Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) is such a decisionmaking model (Ajzen, 1991). White et al. (2016) used this model to examine safety behavior
and the direct and indirect determinants of decision making among electricity workers. White et
al. (2016) described that intentional influences are deliberate plans that describe actual individual
behavior while indirect influence align with the individual’s beliefs. From TPB, there is support
for thinking that intentions are a direct and proximal catalyst for personal behavior. White et al.
believe this to be true and extend the logic to the willingness of an individual to exhibit a given
behavioral response or subjective norms. Antecedents or background of intentions have roots in
individual attitudes whether positive or otherwise (White et al., 2016). Social pressure from
working groups and co-workers lead individuals to either perform and sometimes to desist from
performing tasks that can be dangerous or risky. White et al. believe that this risky behavior can
be a subjective norm that is catalyzed by social group pressure at work. TPB crucially link the
predictors of behavior and belief with attitudes, perceptions, and subjective norms such as
thinking and response. Attitudes result from beliefs - as ideas and assumptions - about the
advantages or disadvantages of the desired behavior. Attitudes, therefore, likely make a
difference in whether an individual takes undue risks or believe that safety rules are cosmetic and
not relevant to the tasks at hand (White et al., 2016). Subjective norms, such as individual action
and response, are dependent on normative beliefs or merely the individual’s expectations of
approval or disapproval from particular groups or individuals. It implies that a worker’s
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response links to ideas of acceptance or criticism from supervisors, managers, or coworkers and
work-groups (White et al., 2016).
White et al., also feel that behavioral perception of control is influenced by controlling
beliefs linked to individual motivators such as recognition and rewards. That logic extends to
negative motivators such as barriers, restrictions, prohibition, and rules which inhibits positive
performance outcomes and behavior. White et al. (2016) concur with Ajzen (1991) that
information about beliefs can shape interventions designed to encourage positive behavioral
performance. That happen if the altering of existing beliefs become possible. White et al. feels
that exposure to new beliefs is a reasonable way of changing attitudes. With an understanding of
TPB, researchers can explain variability in behavior and intentions especially when applied to
predict workers’ safety behaviors towards workplace safety practices (Ponnet, Reniers, &
Kempeneers, 2015). White et al. (2016) investigated these variabilities among electrical workers
in Australia to better understand underlying beliefs about safety decisions in the workplace and
to identify the full range of different safety beliefs that resulted. That included behavioral
advantages and disadvantages, individual and group-level normative behavior, and barriers and
motivators as control beliefs. These were to identify the different effects of individuals who
influence others at work, the hurdles that can prevent optimal workplace safety and the impact of
an individual thinking about other individuals in the workplace. White et al. (2016) indicates
that they aimed to understand how electrical workers beliefs and approaches to workplace safety
lead to the prevention of injuries and fatalities. The feeling is that with the identification of
underlying beliefs that influenced safety behavior; strategies could be adopted to teach and to
encourage safe behavior and therefore better outcomes. White et al. postulates that consolidating
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proactive-safety beliefs and a working environment which facilitates open-challenges to unsafebeliefs lead to the development of better safety attitudes and normative behavior as well as
improve control perceptions. White et al. found that in some cases, there is concern about legal
and work consequences of reporting workplace incidents, near-misses, and accidents and that
this negatively influence safety because of vulnerabilities induced by the uncertainty about
liabilities.

Figure 3: From “The Theory of Planned Behavior “Adapted from Ajzen,
https://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.background.html and as captured by White et al. (2016,
Section 1.2.2). Reprinted with permission.
White et al. (2016) found that there are cases where supervisors and managers discourage
the reporting of accidents, but these were a minimal number when measured against the overall
response from managers and supervisors. Worker knowledge and training are critical to
individuals being able to identify hazardous conditions and to mitigate the associated risks. Most
participants acknowledge that the training and experience gained are relevant but expressed
concern about insufficient and infrequent follow-ups, especially regarding younger electrical
workers. Participants also indicated that at times, there was inadequate time to conduct full work
pre-planning and that added safety challenges and compromise (White et al., 2016).
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Self-determination theory. Scott, Fleming, and Kelloway (2014) indicated that selfdetermination theory provides a good indication of individual work motivation. Scott et al.
(2014) described the human problems frequently associated with personal protective equipment
use. These devices, are uncomfortable, slows work processes, and therefore conflicts with
productivity levels (p.281). Intrinsic motivation is an internalization done by an individual. If
personal protective equipment use is irritating and cumbersome, then individuals internalize that
safety is not designed to be enjoyable. As a result, safety is not an excellent intrinsic motivator
since it is in place to ensure that errors do not occur more than to keep the employee
comfortable. Scott et al. (2014) suggests that for the best safety outcomes, managers shall
reward individuals for safe behavior and deal with situations in cases where undue risks are
taken to get tasks done as that constitute unsafe behaviors.
Social learning theory. Social Learning theory describe how people learn by observing
the behavior of high-status and significant individuals and how that behavior is reinforced and
recollected in the future (Tucker et al., 2016). Social learning can be an individual experience or
a collective experience for a group of individuals. Tucker et al. (2016) suggests that a CEO who
engages executive management through shared intent and observations to facilitate a positive
safety culture at work is involved in a collective social learning process. The executive team that
follows the CEO in espousing a safety climate encouraged by the CEO is itself vicariously
learning from the CEO and explained in the social learning theory. The learning process
continues through the managers and supervisors to the front-line workers. It implies that the
safety focus of the leader percolates through the organization to the front-line workers; a safety
conscious leader can impact a safe organization (Tucker et al., 2016). Also, the supervisor can
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impact workplace safety outcomes by ensuring that work procedures and safety rules are fully
integrated to influence individual worker learning, collective learning among groups of workers,
and actions to ultimately prevent errors and accidents by the maintenance of safety margins
(Tucker et al., 2016). Conchie, Moon, and Duncan (2013) indicates that work demands can
positively engage worker safety behaviors and involvement depending on the context of the
instruction. This context can be set by the leadership of the organization especially if a strong
safety climate is supported by the leadership if there is a traceable record of meaningful
employee engagement and supervisor support for safety. Conchie et al. (2013) explains that
workplace demands are the combination of physical and other aspects of the job which result in a
worker’s physical and mental engagement and which can result in exhaustion. Conchie et al.
(2013) further describe exhaustion as physical, emotional, and psychological.
Heinrich theory. Figure 4 is a depiction of Heinrich’s theory (Capelli-Schellpfeffer,
Floyd, Eastwood, & Liggett, 1999). From the depiction, there is a significant amount of at-risk
behaviors usually interpreted as unsafe acts by individuals at work (Dekker, 2006). These
generally are undetected until a near miss, or first aid event occur. Assuming that this model is
correct, even if unsubstantiated, there is a ten-fold situation of undue risks taken before an
opportunity to learn from these become available through a recorded near-miss event. CapelliSchellpfeffer et al. (1999) found that near misses are generally not investigated and if they are,
the findings and other pertinent information is not available from an accident and near-miss
events repository that organizations and workers could benefit.
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Figure 4: How we can better learn from electrical accidents. Adapted from M. CapelliSchellpfeffer, H. L. Floyd, K. Eastwood, & D.P. Liggett(1999). Reprinted with permission .
Fordyce, Kelsh, Lu, Sahl, and Yager (2007), Salguero-Caparros, Suarez-Cebador, and
Rubio-Romero (2015), and Volberg et al. (2017) echoed the same opinion about the nonavailability of near-miss data in the EPRI OHSD and other databases. According to CapelliSchellpfeffer et al., interpretation of Heinrich’s theory, a workplace injury occur after more than
30 000 near misses. If correct, it means that conditions where the likelihood of equipment
damage or injury to individuals exist and are not investigated for each of the 30 000 incidents.
Understanding the real causal factors that contribute to near-misses are as relevant and essential
opportunities to learn from and to prevent accidents which can result in worker injuries or deaths.
Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. (1999) indicated that once the conditions necessary for an
incident event exist, whether an accident or a near-miss, the eventual outcome is determined only
by chance. That chance outcome is equivalent to an injury, fatality or a near-miss. When nearmisses occur, false understanding that there is no real danger is common. Work arrangements
that contribute to the incident can become accepted as good practice. That is akin to deviance
described by Albright (2017); normalization of deviance would require a real understanding of
the causal factors of near-misses, just as those for accidents (Price & Williams, 2018; Vaughan,
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1997). The analysis of causal factors can be opportunities to identify the underlying latent and
systemic reasons for near-misses and accidents.
The self-regulatory resource theory. Kao, Spitzmueller, Cigularov, and Wu (2016)
used the self-regulatory resource theory of individual self-regulation to show that insomnia
lessens safe-behavior and this lead to an increased risk of injuries in the workplace. Insomnia is
an issue that individuals regulate on their own: supported by self-control and personal behavior
(Uehli et al., 2014). Kao et al. (2016) believe that safety behavior is a self-regulatory act
specifically aimed to prevent injuries and the avoidance of unsafe actions. Safety behavior,
therefore, can be a complex sequence of behavioral activities which requires volition,
determined, and deliberate individual control. The results of this investigation substantiates that
insomnia causes unsafe behaviors in cases where the individual suffer from the condition. Also
confirmed is that behavior describes the relationship with workplace injuries. Kao et al. (2016)
extended understanding of insomnia and its impact to how supervisors can recognize workers
inflicted with this condition, and still encourage safe work operations by setting up work
arrangements and barriers that will prevent any possible unsafe behavior. Kao et al. (2016)
found that when supervisors are safety proactive and aware of particular individuals inflicted
with insomnia, the likelihood of workplace injuries lessens: This study links workplace safety
outcomes with individual behavior and organizational factors such as the quality of supervision,
and supervisor safety consciousness. It describes how organizational-factors can align to
mitigate safety outcomes; in this case, the effects of insomnia on safety errors and worker
injuries. It also raises the possibility of other conditions, medical or otherwise, that would affect
a worker to the extent were behavior can be impacted and how that impact would influence work

51
outcomes, safety, and worker injuries. Clarke (2013) supported the thinking that supervisorbehavior can result in improved worker safety performance and posited that supervisor safety
training is critical to individual-level supervisor appreciation of their effect on safety at work.
Kao et al. (2016) extends this logic to introduce a concept of worker engagement by supervisors
and suggests that a lack of this is more an explanation of why insomnia results in accidents and
worker injuries; supervisor effect is more significant than the impact of hazardous work
conditions leading to worker errors, inattentiveness, and fatigue. Kao et al. (2016) described
sleep as a process whereby an individual restores cognitive or attentive capability, and
rejuvenates physical strength, with the result as the individual becoming alert and energetic. A
lack of sleep, insomnia, is the leading cause of a person growing fatigued and restless; and a
diminished individual capacity to maintain safe behavior.
Safety models. Labib (2015) suggested a modeled approach to analyzing accident events
and used it to explain what happened in Bhopal; Figure 5 – The second model of FT below is the
reproduced model. In this Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Labib introduced accident-causing factors
as a system and plant design, workforce training and performance, inadequate and unsatisfactory
maintenance, and management decisions. Any combination of these is logically analyzed and
deemed as crucial to the accident event.
Labib (2015) indicates that the concept of learning is a prominent research posit, but the
idea of un-learning is particularly important; the fact that un-learning went unnoticed is likely the
main reason for repeat accidents. Labib describe disasters and significant industrial accidents as
low frequency and high impact events. Two inferences come from this perspective. First,
disaster events are usually infrequent but severe, and second, the likelihood of un-learning is
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high. It means that for prevention of recurring accidents, organizations would be best served by
arrangements where individuals are often remind about the accident experience.

TE - Release of toxic gases to
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workforce
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Labib, A. (2015). Learning (and
unlearning) from failures: 30 years
on from Bhopal to Fukushima an
analysis through reliability
engineering techniques. Process
Safety and Environmental
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3- Poor Health
and safety culture

Figure 5: Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from Bhopal to Fukushima an
analysis through reliability engineering techniques. Adapted from Labib, A. (2015). Reprinted
with permission.
Labib noted that NASA experienced two accidents that are similar in many ways; the
Columbia and Challenger. The nuclear power industry disasters at Chernobyl and Fukushima
Daiichi and the Piper Alpha, Deepwater Horizon and Bhopal are comparable experiences from
the oil, gas, and chemical processing industries. The similarities identified by Labib (2015)
supports earlier comparisons done by NASA (2013) and Singh, Jukes, Wittkower, and Poblete
(2010). There are cases identified where, just like NASA, the same organization experienced
more than one significant accidents; Air Malaysia and British Petroleum (Allen & D’Elia, 2015;
Huber, 2013; Sienkiewicz, 2015; Lee & Han, 2016). The MH370 flight on March 08, 2014
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disappeared from radar and was never found, and all 227 persons on the aircraft are presumed
dead. This aviation disaster is unlike the 1989 Dryden crash where Moshansky (1992) found a
compounding of problems because of issues that rested with the regulators, airline industry, the
organization, and individuals who worked on that particular aircraft on the day of the accident.
Lee and Han (2016) describes many different challenges that stems from transnational
cooperation, the technological capability to track an aircraft that lost communication with air
traffic control, and possible individual actions that went unsubstantiated but factored and
promote skepticism.
Malaysia Airlines in 2014 experienced another incredible event: On July 17, MH17 with
298 persons on board was downed in Ukraine by a Russian-made missile (Sienkiewicz, 2015).
From this disaster other considerations are brought into focus: Was MH17 a coincidental victim
of an unrelated tragedy, either orchestrated or by chance? That, however, does not explain
whether the aircraft was on its scheduled flight path and whether that path was one traversed by
other airlines. The lessons from that experience can be used to prevent future aviation disasters.
The two incidents that Malaysia Airlines experienced in 2014 left significant doubt about what
went wrong.
Huber (2013) indicates that the 2005 explosion at the BP Oil Refinery in Texas City is a
major indication of inadequate safety management. It is well-known that safety arrangements at
the refinery were outdated and required re-engineering and upgrades (Huber, 2013). In this
accident, 15 individuals died, and another 170 were injured (Huber, 2013). In 2010 the
Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster, in the Gulf of Mexico, there were 11 fatalities and 17 injured
victims. BP managed the Deepwater oil rig. Huber (2013) recounted another accident in Alaska
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where an explosion in 2002 resulted in multiple subsequent oil spills; one in 2006 was the largest
in the history of operations in that area in Alaska.
Allen and D’Elia (2015) describes the oil spill that resulted from Deepwater Horizon as
the worst in maritime history and that the biological ecosystem after-effects are still not
conclusively known. The social negatives, mental anguish, and the fallout that resulted are
apparent and understood. The social impact of the Deepwater Horizon accident very likely is
compounded because of hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the devastation that these
meteorological phenomena superimposed on the population in the Gulf Coast of the United
States. Allen and D’Elia (2015) calls attention to the regulatory ability to effect appropriate
compensation in light of the apparent shortcomings of the existing legislation that governed the
management of this disaster and compensation for the affected third parties. It is a point
emphasized by their feelings of disenfranchisement by the legal system and its apparent
shortcomings in addressing this issue (p.587). The point about regulatory ability is consistent
with the views of Moshansky after the Dryden accident (Lecture, 2007).
Allen and D’Elia (2015) posits that the disaster management main aim from the BP
Deepwater oil-spill seems to be on remedial attention such as containment and saving fauna
rather than the long-term consideration for the severe human and emotional consequences.
Affected parties received small financial settlements to claims against the Responsible Party, BP
(p.588). Human issues of neglected communities, mental health problems, anxiety, PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), suicide, drug, and substance misuse directly attributed to this
oil spill are of particular interests (Allen & D’Elia, 2015). Mac Sheoin (2015) and Singh, Jukes,
Poblete, and Wittkower, (2010) shows how different this was in Bhopal and Piper Alpha. That
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difference referred to the more than twenty years that surviving victims of Bhopal had to wait for
compensation adjudicated by the legal system in India: The different ways that the human issues
are handled in the Bhopal case when compared to the Piper Alpha case makes a referencing of
the non-attention of human and emotional consequences of accidents. Allen and D’Elia (2015)
went further to identify the effects that industrial accidents have on responders; especially those
who are injured or suffers long-term health effects afterward. Allen and D’Elia also examined
the impact on families and friends of responders and victims killed in industrial accidents.
Family members of a Flight Attendant who died at Dryden in 1989, had to petition the Canadian
courts for relief against the two deceased pilots, the airline, and the regulator. These are among
the corporate secrets that remain untold from industrial accidents (Lecture, 2007). Allen and
D’Elia (2015) suggests that legal constraints add to the challenge and that government and
regulator intervention are required for appropriate relief to affected individuals and communities
after industrial accidents.
Sociotechnical and safety management models. Manuele (2014) developed a
sociotechnical model which caters to the human element consideration and interaction as well as
the other system elements for assessing safety management systems, especially when
investigating accidents in the workplace. Manuele believes that workplace accidents are
symptoms of significant safety management system problems and that accident investigations
presents opportunities for the identification of system deficiencies that when corrected can
prevent future accidents. Manuele called this an opportunity to employ root-cause analysis to
determine the system weaknesses. Manuele reviewed reports from about 2000 accident
investigations and indicates that there are definite gaps between how to do accident
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investigations and what the procedures for these investigations require. Manuele suggests that
the average report would receive a grade of 5.7 out of a possible 10 representing significant
missed opportunities to learn from accidents and to mitigate against similar future accidents.
The accident investigation procedures come from the ANSI/AIHA/ASSE Z10-2012, Standard
for Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems and from specific organization and
industry developed arrangements. Labib (2015) and Murata (2017) suggests that a similar Safety
Management Systems (SMS) existed in the Piper Alpha accident and the Lord Cullen Report
from that investigation was instrumental to the development of SMS in other industries.
Manuele (2014) highlights two very critical issues; these surround the bias by
investigators. First, Manuele suggests that supervisors are more than often required to
investigate accidents and this is usually not adequately done, and second, there is an
overwhelming focus on finding the unsafe acts committed by the employee or employees
involved in the accident. By focusing on the unsafe act committed by individuals just before the
accident event is a shortcoming and a blind-eye turn on the other systemic problems that
contribute to the single or “last” error before the actual event. Manuele’s view is supported in
other studies such as Dechy et al. (2012), Singh, Jukes, Wittkower, and Poblete (2010), Labib
(2015), and Murata (2017).
Swiss cheese model. The Swiss Cheese model is a simple model built to analyze the
reasons for accidents (Singh, Jukes, Poblete, & Wittkower, 2010; Wahlström & Rollenhagen,
2014; Murata, 2017). The Swiss Cheese shown in Fig 6 below is a popular linear accident
causation model developed by James Reason (1970 – 1977). For an accident event to occur,
several breaches of different organizational barriers occurs. The last gate before the accident is
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usually one that likely involves the individual or individuals at the accident site or breach when
the accident happen. This barrier can include worker training deficiencies or workers’ failure to
follow work procedures correctly (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012).

Figure 6: Human error: Models and management. Adapted From Reason, J. (2000).
Workers not following procedures or not applying training on the frontline is what
Manuele (2014) feels are the significant predominant investigative findings from accidents.
Stopping at this point or accepting these as the real cause for appropriating responsibilities
usually, lead to deficiencies and lost opportunities to identify the deeper organizational problems
that are breached up to the final barrier. The barriers reflect breakdown and breaches on warning
and alarm systems, issues on other automatic technical systems and devices, unsafe design, poor
work planning and permit to work violations, unsafe conditions, inadequate supervision or
supervisory failure, organizational failures at the management level (Hosseinian & Torghabeh,
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2012, p.58). Manuele (2014) believes that frontline workers and operators inherit work problems
compounded in different ways. These include poor design, incorrect installation, inadequate and
reduced maintenance.
Manuele (2014) suggests that accident investigations conducted by supervisors are substandard and at times only focused on the human error on the frontline just before that accident
event occur. The barriers as in the Swiss Cheese model include supervisors as deep and latent
barriers to prevent accidents (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012). When supervisors are untrained,
incapable of lending assistance, or tardy in not following up on active supervision of workers,
the occurrence of accidents in these situations can be due to breakdowns initiated by the
supervisor (Manuele, 2014; Dekker, 2006). It is, therefore, difficult for the supervisor to focus
elsewhere but on the frontline breaches and to associate these breaches with workers not
following procedures or not applying the knowledge gained through training (Lee & Dalal,
2016).
Accident causation and prevention. Mitropoulos, Howell, and Abdelhamid (2005)
described an accident causation model that offers a better understanding of the different
influences that can impact a workplace accident. Figure 7 shows how work processes can
become complicated and difficult to manage, even if it remains simple at each stage in the
workflow. Individuals in the different stages of the work process will be skilled and technically
proficient to function at that stage in the process (Miller, Raysich, & Kirkland, 2016).
Supervision remains a critically important glue for the effective and efficient management of
work processes (Mills & Koliba, 2015). Mitropoulos et al. (2005) focusses on the work
considerations from technical skills of individuals to work arrangements that can be influenced
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from the very top of the organization and impacted at the frontline where the work activity
occurs. There are definite advantages with this model as it is sufficiently generic for application
in different workplaces, working environments, industries, and complex conditions while not
removing or lessening the requirements of any safety management system, work procedures,
work design, or working arrangements. That is an advantage when compared to the Swiss
Cheese model.
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Figure 1 Accident Causation Model
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Figure 7: Accident prevention strategies: Causation model and research directions . Adapted
from P. Mitropoulos, G. A. Howell, & T. S. Abdelhamid (2005). Reprinted with permission.

The impression from the Swiss Cheese is that it is a linear profile of breached barriers
before an accident will occur. These barriers can spatially exist over long time-periods, and
therefore it can become complicated to manage effectively and to appreciate (Dekker, 2006;
Manuele, 2014). An example of how difficult the Swiss Cheese model can become is in an
accident where design occurred in year A, construction occurred in year B, and an accident
occurred in year C. This become difficult to track if the difference in years increases. If a power
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transformer is designed in 1990 and installed at a substation on the electric grid in 2005, this
transformer can realistically remain in service until 2055. It implies that if an accident occurs in
2035, then the accident can be because of a design flaw that went undetected until the event in
2035. If the design flaw is recognized earlier, a decision can be taken to keep the unit in service
but to operate it within limits set by the organization (Mills & Koliba, 2015). These procedures
can be detailed but not adequately archived. The point is; it could become a tough challenge to
trace the failure of the transformer back to the original design flaw problem. It, therefore,
lessens the usefulness of but it did not remove the apparent validity of the Swiss Cheese model.
The Mitropoulos et al. (2005) model provides opportunities for tasks to be less unpredictable by
impacting the importance of individual awareness; it promotes safe production behavior by
supporting hazard identification while mitigating safety risks due to these hazards. It also allows
for feedback systems to initiate control of new safety challenges that can develop as work ensued
(Merlin et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2016). This feedback system is analogous to the feedback
control of closed-loop systems. It represents the opportunity to manage errors and to prevent
unplanned events from developing into unmanageable situations (Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017).
Mitropoulos et al. (2005) suggests the focusing on compliance to reduce hazard
exposures. That is consistent with Vaughan (1997), Albright (2017); Price and Williams (2018),
and Murata (2017). Mitropoulos et al. (2005) further suggests that compliance promotes a
limited view of accident causality. It leads to unnecessary attention to and on individuals at
fault, not on system factors that fails to address hazards, and eventually encourages unacceptable
worker behaviors. Price and Williams (2018) counters this thinking, just like Vaughan (1997)
and Albright (2017) do, in positing that compliance promotes normalization of deviance and
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focuses on safety margins instead of risks that lead to system reliability, service continuity, and
product availability. Mitropoulos et al. (2005) acknowledges that safety compliance conflicts
with production and operating cost factors and that the resolution of the conflict is usually in
favor of productive activities. Murata (2017) suggests that the KLM4805/Pan Am 1736 crash at
Tenerife may have been due to production conflicts with safety and where safety margins
became sacrificed. Singh et al. (2010) suggests that production schedules led to the Piper Alpha
accident as the permit to work system, safety arrangements for blanking critical pipes and other
safety systems became breached to allow for production activities; it promoted a series of
assumptions before confirmation. Murata (2017) discusses the production approach at NASA in
favor of safety margins despite the issues with the O-rings. Labib (2015) notes that in Bhopal,
numerous safety breaches by operators such as the shutting down of refrigeration contributed to
the accident. None of these example studies explains why the safety breach happened; the
emphasis, instead, was on confirming that it happened.
Mitropoulos et al. (2005) explains that work production factors and pressures influence
workers to take shortcuts, disregard safety procedures and apparatus to get jobs done faster. A
fallout of this is a safety climate where the attitude that supports risky-behavior is acceptable. It
encourages individuals to become overconfident and to become complacent. Murata (2017)
describes this as the worst possible consequence; a cultural difference or even a groupthink bias.
Murata confirms that cultural difference is a crucial consideration if accident prevention are
possible and for a real alignment of cognitive bias with optimal safety performance. None of the
studies examined led to a belief that making work arrangements more efficient and reducing
times taken for tasks were specific indicators that safety requirements are bypassed or ignored.
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The skill levels and expertise of individuals who conduct work cannot be undervalued or
disregarded in favor of work arrangements that do not allow for their genuine involvement and
input. Therefore from the perspective that workers are skilled, technically proficient, and
knowledgeable, reducing the time taken to do tasks cannot automatically be equated to risktaking and irresponsible behavior (Mitropoulos et al., 2005). It may be understood though, that
skills and knowledge are excuses for the deliberate reduction of safety margins where errors,
accidents, and failures are possible and likely outcomes. Instead, it will very likely be acceptable
if workers can recognize hazards and initiate appropriate mitigating responses. If errors or
underestimation occur, then workers shall be sufficiently competent and capable to avoid further
problems and to recover from the error conditions while trapping and containing the problem or
exposure to the problem. None of this will be acceptable when the outcome can result in
significant danger and possible injury or loss of life. In these situations, reasonable safety
margins should be maintained (Mitropoulos et al., 2005).
Complex linear model. Toft, Dell, Klockner, and Hutton (2012) suggests that a
successful approach to accident prevention hinges on an accurate understanding of accident
causation. The early causation models allows for the identification of a single cause of the
accident. This single-cause is the result of a linear and almost regimental sequencing of
activities and actions until the accident event occurs. This causation methodology was accepted
until the 1980s when a series of serious industrial accidents such as the Piper Alpha, Bhopal, and
the Challenger caused a major rethinking about the appropriateness of the simple linear accident
causation model in the era of complex technological, industrial operations. The complex linear
accident causation models started from the 1980s up to the 2000s when the next generation of
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super technology made previously tricky operations possible. Business conducted in the 21st
century is different; this difference is possible because of advanced communication ability
especially in the online arena. That became the age of emergent technology where the workplace
requirement is for individuals with different skill sets that in times before were unavailable.
Technologies that previously were only available in the advanced workplaces like in NASA, for
example, are now commercially available and within reach of smaller organizations and different
industries. The accident causation models, suitable for previous eras, are replaced by complex
emergent non-linear models more ideal for the changing workplace. Complex emergent nonlinear models are considered suitable for multiple influencing factors that interact and evolve to
lead to the accident event.
Manuele (2014) indicates that accident investigators shall be trained to develop the
necessary skill and for the real causes of accidents to be determined. Dekker (2006) feels that
investigations are entirely the result of investigator focus as it is individual bias that guide
investigators more than procedures and standards; this is likened to an invisible accident model
imagined by the investigator and which supported the investigator’s pre-conceived belief of the
accident and events surrounding the accident.
Dekker (2006) describes three different accident causation models: sequence-of-events,
epidemiological, and systemic sequence-of-events which treats accidents as the failure outcome
of chain-events of events. Dekker believes that this is equivalent to one domino causing the next
in a chain to fall. Hosseinian and Torghabeh (2012) equates this domino chain to the Domino
theory developed by Heinrich.
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Heinrich. Heinrich developed his thinking on the relationship, as understood in the early
1950s, between human and machine. This model was used to determine some of the most
widely used safety statistics, accident severity rate, frequency rate, and reasons for unsafe acts by
individuals at work. Heinrich’s theory was and still is popular; especially by individuals who
believe that accidents due to human error are caused mainly by frontline workers. Heinrich
suggests an 88:10:2 causal relationship to workplace accidents: 88% of all accidents caused by
workers, 10% were due to equipment failure while 2% were unexplained and considered as acts
of god (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012). Manuele (2014) and Dekker (2006) counters this
thinking as outdated and not in line with the current reality in the workplace. Manuele used the
Deepwater Horizon accident to explain why the teachings of Heinrich are outdated. The
investigation team did not identify one party or reason for the Deepwater Horizon accident: They
found complex situations that evolved from an interlinking of poor designs, operational
inefficiencies, mechanical failures, and human judgments (Manuele, 2014). Manuele conducted
a survey in 2014 among safety professionals and found that more than 73% of safety
practitioners searched for unsafe acts committed by workers which they treated as the latent or
real cause of the accident.
Human error. Reason (2000) suggests that the human error accident causation view
supports two distinct problems, one as an individual issue and another as a system problem.
Reason further indicates that each perspective presented different views which results in
diverged resolution philosophies and methodologies. The impact of these different directions are
that opportunities to prevent accidents go unaddressed and similar accidents follow when the
conditions reoccur (Holland, 2018; Miller et al., 2016).
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The focus on the individual perspective to find human error problems is prevalent and
concentrated attention on the individual responsible for the last-act before the accident event
occur. The last-act usually equates to an unsafe act, error and even violation, sometimes willful,
of work procedures with individuals tagged as being forgetful, inattentive, careless, reckless,
negligent, and poorly motivated (Reason, 2000). Corrective actions are, as well, aligned to
suppression of negative behavior through the adoption of disciplinary actions against the
involved employee, instituting revised work procedures, and retraining of employees who
perform similar tasks (O’Donnell, & MacIntosh, 2016). Reason (2000) associates this focus on
an intent by management to blame deviant workers for the failure and loss as if the worker is
morally obligated to be error-free and that the failure is only due to the untrustworthiness and
negligence of the worker (Paludi, 2015). It does not factor that the problem can be an error in
judgment despite the worker taking the steps that were believed to be sufficient to prevent injury
or even death. It also places a moral barrier between the involved worker or workers and the
remainder of the organization; as if separating the bad from the remaining good.
Reason (2000) indicates that it is more satisfying for some managers to blame workers
for accidents than to focus on fixing the organizational problems and issues. The prevailing
impression is that individuals are capable of making decisions and therefore should have chosen
a safe work approach rather than the method they adopt before the accident event. That runs
contrary to the thinking that the accident event can happen in a quick time and the individual
may not have sufficient time to reconsider any decision that contribute to the event (Dekker,
2006; Manuele, 2014). Reason (2000) suggests that it is in the manager’s interest to de-link
responsibility for any accident from the organization. Probst (2015) aligns this impression to
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managers’ bonuses and supervisors encouraging workers to underreport accidents. Manuele
(2014) explains how this thinking influence the conduct of accident investigations and what
findings result from these exercises. Reason (2000) reveals that in medical incidents individual
doctors or other healthcare professionals are blamed for and held personally liable for medical
accident events. Whereas, in the aviation industry, it is common to interpret maintenance-worker
errors as linked to systemic problems connected with an events chain and which culminate with
the final act as the accident happen. Judgment errors and lapses in concentration in the aviation
industry are treated differently for the same issues in the medical industry. Reason (2000), just
like Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015), Dekker (2006), and Manuele (2014) consider the analysis of
accidents and near misses as critical to averting recurrent accidents and opportunities to
recognize situations and conditions when these can happen.
Human error thinking. McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) notes the prevalence of holding
individuals accountable for accidents happening is significant in industries where outcomes are
high-consequence, and that remains a significant barrier to a favorable safety climate at work.
McCall and Pruchnicki further posits that other pressing organizational requirements such as
production find favor over safety behavior. Workers in these settings are required to recognize
and observe different accountability boundaries as part of the regular working arrangements.
McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) indicates that these accountabilities are: political, hierarchical,
professional, and legal. These can explain why it is common to misinterpret accountability
boundaries. The difference between political and professional may become blurred if the issue is
one where human influence is more significant than other system components.
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On the other hand, in cases where organizational games, such as departmental or
divisional rivalry, are prevalent, legal accountabilities can be shrouded in professional and even
political machinations. These blended well with the complex evolving workplace that was
common today. McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) describes these challenges while explaining the
events that contributed to the 1998 Swiss Air Flight 111 Airline crash in Nova Scotia, Canada
and how these led to different and shifted employee response versions and behavior. McCall and
Pruchnicki (2017) indicates that operator conflicts occurs as individual priorities directly impact
accountability boundaries which result in safety breaches that cause the accident. McCall and
Pruchnicki (2017) also notes that operators are negotiating across accountability boundaries to
the extent where errors are reported on a timely basis and contributes to mitigation efforts which
add to positive safety performance and organizational success. In effect, McCall and Pruchnicki
describes a new culture, which they called just culture that can aid safety management in
abnormal situations.
Epistemological model of accident causation. Dekker (2006) describes the
epistemological model of accident causation as one where a search for the cause of the accident
is possible from a management decision-making perspective, an equipment design criteria, and
consideration of work procedures. Dekker (2006) also suggests that the systemic accident
causation model incorporate the view that accidents are caused by an interaction that occurs
when different components of the system are designed to coordinate activities and processes that
links different working units and elements of the system. Dekker believes that these interactions
overshadow the internal-to-individual component or segmental failures. Manuele (2014)
supports this Dekker perspective of systemic accident causation and suggests that this was an
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opportunity to view workplace errors that lead to accidents as the consequence of a mismatch
between worker-demands and their capabilities, and the existence of a less than appropriate
safety culture within the organization. These, Manuele stresses, were the responsibility of and
could be managed by the leaders of the organization. The safety culture in an organization can
explain the underlying conditions due to design problems, unrecognized material and equipment
flaws when purchased, inadequate or inefficient supervision, and work procedures that
complicated working requirements without adding to safety margins. Maintenance failures
including non-maintenance and automation make it difficult for operators to manage processes
and devices that are otherwise functioning properly; training that do not prepare workers for the
challenges they face at the workplace but links to organizational safety culture. Each of these
factors influence worker attitudes and opinions and encourage a safety culture where suppressing
of cognitive bias occur in favor of heuristic bias (Labib, 2015; Manuele, 2014; Murata, 2017;
Dekker, 2006). Manuele extends the original Heinrich thinking about humans and machines by
adding that these relationships are integrated, inseparable, interdependent, and shapes a
sociotechnical arrangement that provides for organizational success and the facilitating of worker
needs.
Multi-cause models, ferrel, and arctm. The Multiple Cause Model is a simple
arrangement where several different factors are deemed to influence either an unsafe act or
produced an unsafe condition. The accident, in which injury or death, equipment damage or
process loss occurred, or even a near miss incident, is the result of an unattended unsafe
condition and unchecked unsafe act (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012). The Multiple Cause
Model, just like the Domino theory and Reason’s Swiss Cheese, were not sufficiently versatile to

69
cover for accidents like Piper Alpha, Fukushima, and the other significant accidents identified in
my study.
Ferrel’s Theory of accident causation is one that focuses on human errors. The logic
applied to this model is a good one to understand the principle of how to pinpoint the individual
or individuals who have direct and indirect impact on an accident event (Hosseinian &
Torghabeh, 2012). Despite this, the model offers an opportunity for investigators to only focus
on the last error and to treat that as the underlying cause of an accident. Manuele (2014) and
Geller (2014) shows how this thinking likens to safety bullies and for the deep causing problems
to go unnoticed.
There were other accident causation models: One example is the Accident Root Causes
Tracing Model (ARCTM). The ARCTM model is a hybrid built from the Swiss Cheese.
ARCTM grew upon the following underlying assumptions; unsafe condition, worker reaction to
a dangerous situation, and unsafe act by the worker (Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012). The base
assumptions are the same as for the theory of multiple causes except for a definite focus on the
reaction of employees to an unsafe condition. Fundamentally, this accident causation model can
be critically analyzed and deemed to have the same flaws as the other models that formed the
basis for this hybrid. The main weakness, however, is the opportunity to still focus only on the
frontline worker and the actions of the frontline worker.
Behavior-based safety. Behavior-based safety (BBS) techniques can enhance safety
management but only if implemented in a supportive environment. Management will hold
significant responsibility for setting the right safety climate for worker behavior to positively
reflect the tenets of BBS. If leaders resort to error- finding and to attribute blame to frontline
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workers only, the result of a BBS system will not be as desired. In many workplace settings,
production and operational challenges and demands easily escalate into a blame game and tit for
tat sequence of finger-pointing that reduce the BBS to reflect the Multiple Cause Model even
though not envisaged (Albright, 2017; Geller, 2014; Hosseinian & Torghabeh, 2012; Manuele,
2014). Albright (2017) notes that deviance must not become treated as the usual. Deviations,
however, are a fact of life as people are prone to making mistakes. Procedures, if not tightly
enforced can be easy to breach. Management must afford appropriate supervision and change
deficient work procedures when these become known. Safeguards design must be so that it
would not be simple to infringe or violate. No single individual at work should possess the
autonomy to singularly divert from set procedures and not be found wanting; even if an accident
did not happen. This desire to enforce compliance might be the real test to the normalization of
deviance.
Behavior based safety management. Jerie and Baldwin (2017) shows that behavioralbased approach to safety management (BBM) is a successful approach if an organization’s
management will actively encourage this initiative. It is possible to influence worker attitudes
and behavior when managers and supervisors show support for meaningful worker involvement
in safety arrangements at work and a resultant reduction in the number of workplace accidents
(Jerie & Baldwin, 2017; Miller et al., 2016). In each case, the success superimpose on
developing a working environment where workers are able to intervene and mitigate accidents
by causing the removal of risks posed by hazards that previously went unidentified and
unaddressed. Jerie and Baldwin (2017) further highlighted the procedural support that workers
have; if the task was unsafe, the worker had a right to refuse to do it. Miller et al. (2016) stressed
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not being another statistic. Both studies promoted working arrangements where workers were
allowed to be the eyes and ears of the organization and were expected to help in the removal of
dangerous conditions that could result in injuries and even death. Jerie and Baldwin (2017)
describe BBM as focused on worker behavior link to or as causal factors in safety-related
problems including near misses and accidents. Miller et al. (2016) describes this as an
opportunity to move from an employer-centric to an employer-employee-centric mode of safety
management where workers can impact on work arrangements especially when the risk of injury
or death is high. BBM is different from a familiar model for behavior-based safety (BBS)
management. BBM is integral to the involvement of all individuals at work in the safety
management arrangements at work; BBS is about the use of personal protective equipment (PPE)
and the range of available PPE for the job (Jerie & Baldwin, 2017). BBM results in meaningful
involvement, worker buy-in as keepers of the system and employees caring for one another while
BBS is more aligned to compliance and non-compliance with set procedures and job
requirements (Jerie & Baldwin, 2017). BBM is, therefore, transformational while BBS is
transactional. Transformational as postulated by Jerie and Baldwin and Miller et al. is superior
and preferred; both studies show that a significant number of workplace accidents and injuries
occur because of causal factors link to human factors and individual behavior, hence their focus
on behavior modeling. Worker training and reorientation are integral to successful outcomes in
both studies. Jerie and Baldwin (2017) promotes worker incentive for correct behavior. Miller
et al. (2016) raises the issue of preventing worker distractions and conditioning by the Balance
Incentive; this is not financial, but the medical and social benefits are evident. An adverse effect
of BBM is underreporting of accidents and near misses. Miller et al. (2016) allude to this by
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describing cases where the causal factors of injuries are unknown when the victim can be
distracted by the use of cell phones. Jerie and Baldwin (2017) recognizes that accidents go
underreported because of the financial incentives offered to workers for safe behaviors. Probst
(2015) also indicates that accident underreporting can occur when management and supervision
bonus are affected and negatively impacted. Another critical aspect of BBM is the availability of
an appropriate database of accidents and near misses (Jerie & Baldwin, 2017; Miller et al.,
2016).
Safe is safe – right. Price and Williams (2018) notes the difficulty experienced in
organizations when deviance occur; once entrenched, it was almost impossible to turnaround and
to revert to the normal. Price and Williams (2018), unlike Manuele (2014), Huber (2013), Singh
et al. (2010), Dekker (2006), and others feel that high-reliability organizations automatically
infer that these organizations were safe. Labib (2015) shows that unless un-learning occur, these
high-reliability organizations are prone to repeat accidents and disasters.
Murata (2017) describes two crashes where cognitive bias factored; the 1977 KLM Flight
4805 crash and the 1986 Challenger explosion. Neither of these is due to or attributed to cultural
difference. The contributing factor is loss aversion. A terrorist bomb at the scheduled
destination airport on the Canary Islands influenced a diversion of the aircraft to the Tenerife
airport. The KLM airline landed at Tenerife. The accident occurred on its take-off from
Tenerife. The terrorist action led to air traffic congestion at Tenerife Airport. KLM 4805 and
Pan Am 1736 collided on the single runway killing 583 people. There were 61 survivors. Pan
Am aircraft. It did not have sufficient time to move off the runway when the KLM 4805
commenced its takeoff. Murata (2017) believes that a combination of possible factors may have
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influenced the KLM crew to begin the takeoff. These include reasonable costs due to delays,
passenger accommodation, and other factors that started a chain reaction similar to what
Moshansky (1992) found at Dryden. In both cases, it is possible that these factors caused the
flight crews to lose a reference to safety and were more focused on operating cost. Murata
(2017) attributes the Challenger explosion to groupthink that prevented confirmation but
encouraged a consensus type thinking based on an illusion of unanimity.
Workplace culture, new influences, and bias. Murata (2017) describes a cultural
difference between individual and group behavior and how that influence cognitive reasoning,
judgments, and decisions that contribute to inadequate safety margins and the occurrence of
accidents. Murata is cognizant that most times, there exists time-constraints that cause artificial
needs to factor quickly and seamlessly; this requires a form of intuition and almost automatic
thinking that generally do not always align with diagnostics and technical verifications necessary
to confirm maintenance of safe work arrangements. A heuristic approach to decision making
almost always suffers in preference to a cognitively biased decision. Murata supports similar
arguments as posited by Vaughan (1997), Singh et al. (2010) about group-think and how that
contributed to the Challenger explosion. Murata also highlights a hindsight bias which explains
how after a series of accidents, individuals cognitively overestimate the likelihood of accidents
and the future possibility of the event reoccurring. Hindsight bias is a form of cultural
difference; just as social loafing, a fallacy of plan, an illusion of control, and groupthink bias
(Murata, 2017). Dekker (2006) and Manuele (2014) in a different way suggest that hindsight
thinking do not allow investigators to appreciate the real experience or for a correct diagnosis of
an accident event. Lee and Han (2016) independently conclude, just like Murata (2017), that
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passengers tend to shy away from airlines that were involved in accidents: A direct inference to
an overestimation of the possibility of future accidents.
Murata (2017) believes that cognitive bias lead to poor judgments, intentional violations,
and unsafe conditions. Heuristic bias grows on a confirmation and verification process that is
generally slower than cognitive bias. Overconfidence tendency become ripe in cognitive
arrangements; this usually escalates to an illusion of control and that plans are adequate when
that was not so. Gladwell (2007) indicates that this is not always negative and many times quick
thinking is spot on correct; this is acceptable as a form of adaptive thinking that lead the brain to
make conclusions quickly, like a super-computer. Gladwell describes the possible action of an
individual seeing an approaching truck and jumping out of the way. This action is the correct
one, quick, and made cognitively. Gladwell believes that quick decision making can be as good
as cautious and deliberately made decisions. It does not mean that errors will not occur. It also
does not infer that slowly made decisions, based on diagnostics and elaborate calculations are
always correct.
Safety culture and safety climate. Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) differentiates the terms
safety climate and safety culture; Safety climate involves a sharing of perceptions whereas safety
culture depends on values and resultant behavior. Safety culture is, therefore, more implicit and
process related while safety climate is about the interpretation of people reactions and attitudes.
Safety climate is more likely to be situational and time-stamped while safety culture can be a
more long-term and deeply rooted in the mission and vision of the organization. Therefore
safety climate is akin to an immediate view of organizational safety culture. From this
perspective, Lee and Dalal (2016) shows that group interaction is situational and therefore do
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factor the safety climate as an influence on employee behavior. Lee and Dalal studied the impact
of safety climate, on organization construct, employee conscientiousness, employee construct,
when predicting employee behavior. Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) indicates that there is no
generally accepted consensus or theoretical approach to measuring safety climate even though
there are distinct directions; attitudinal and perceptual; beliefs, risks, and work stressors as
elements of measurement. Lee and Dalal (2016) found that safety climate is strongly influenced
by situations that encourage desirable individual and group behavior albeit without profound
influence on individual conscientiousness and other personality traits. A strong safety climate
weakens the relationship between safety behavior and individual personality traits (Lee & Dalal,
2016). It is imperative to understand how personality traits become motivational and lead to
individual and group behavior. Lee and Dalal postulates that for a condition where the
widespread belief among workers was that the management is more focused on production than
on employee safety, safety behavior will almost uniformly be unacceptably low. That condition,
for example, will remove the likelihood of employee conscientiousness affecting safety
outcomes or behavior. If, for example, the reverse is true and management show definite signs
of treating with safety as necessary as other organizational outcomes, conscientious and other
workers will operate safely; if only because of management attention. In both scenarios, safety
climate attenuate personality trait and its influence on behavior. It is unclear whether this result
will hold if the study is repeated to reflect supervisor to worker interactions and relationships and
how that impact on worker safety behavior. Lee and Dalal (2016) indicate that strong
organizational safety climate can be used to maintain compliant employee safe behavior.
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Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) indicate that in testing a multi-dimensional safety climate
model to determine safety outcomes, management values, safety communication, and safety
training are necessary to operate safety systems for optimal safe work performance. Management
values are indicative of the importance of safety in the workplace. There is a preference for open
exchange safety communication arrangements. Safety training is necessary, expected, relevant,
and adaptive to meet the working needs of employees and in the conditions that they operate.
Safety climate. Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) describe safety climate as an
organizational phenomenon that comprise of perceptual, collective and multidimensional
influences that impact individual and group behavior. The influence is a subjective-normative
sense-making one superimposed on individual differences, level of understanding, appreciation,
feelings as well as group dynamics. Work team members share similar perceptions concerning
safety in the workplace. Murata (2017) indicates that safety behavior commensurate with
performance and safety outcomes. It, therefore, means that if Murata is correct, that the
organizational safety climate is a critical catalyst to organizational success, safety in the
workplace, and productivity. The idea of enhanced productivity in an excellent safety climate is
not one that was universally accepted; productivity is negatively affected by enhanced safety
arrangements is popular. Lee and Dalal (2016) posited that organizational climate, meaning
safety climate, is a situational factor in organizational performance. This Lee and Dalal posit
aligned with Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) in the thinking that safety climate can impact on
organizational performance in a bi-directional manner. Lee and Dalal (2016) further suggest that
safety climate influence individual consciousness and moderate safety behavior of individuals in
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a positive safety climate. Lee and Dalal accept that in organizations where work is usually in
hazardous conditions, there is an interest in employee safe-behavior.
Measuring safety climate and new norms. Zohar (2014) highlights two ways to
measure safety climate. One approach is general, and for use, in different organizational
contexts. It involves the development of general safety climate considerations. The next
approach is organization-specific and make it possible to examine safety climate history and
concerns across diverse settings. Zohar (2014) indicates that industry-specific management
practices, structures, operational arrangements, and business make the safety climate
significantly unique. There exists cultural differences occurring from country to country as well
as in diverse workplaces. Differences influence personal perception and perception of risk can
change despite the recognition of hazards. Zohar (2014) notes that there is limited research
information on how diversity could impact safety in high-risk environments.
Organizations conduct business with foreign organizations in areas of specialized
technologies which impact safety at work primarily in the cases where energy sources exist. It is
essential that safety management commitment, safety-specific arrangements, and safeguards are
in place to prevent accidents and injuries to personnel. Different social and cultural orientation
can have significant implications for the understanding of and compliance with safety
procedures, safety training, risk mitigation strategies, and safety behaviors as these can vary in
diverse settings or across national contexts (Reader, Noort, Shorrock, & Kirwan, 2015). Some
national cultural traits promote the highlighting of mistakes and providing feedback. In this
environment, supporting others at critical times can be misinterpreted by individuals from other
cultural backgrounds. Reader et al. (2015) examined the aviation industry safety culture in
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diverse cultures and environments by employing multigroup analysis. Reader et al. (2015) found
that specific industry safety culture can successfully support different workgroups in different
countries. Reader et al. (2015) also found that cultural traits from different nations can influence
organizational safety culture even if the organization is multi-national.
Workplace bullying. Rockett, Fan, Dwyer, and Foy (2017) describe bullying as
composing of three different elements. These are repeated incidents that involve the same
individuals; the episodes occur over long periods that extend into months, and where there exist a
power imbalance between the individuals involved. The implication is that the individual with
significant power is the person with authority to instruct and to direct the other individual who
had less or no workplace authority. Salin (2015) indicates that the victims of bullying in the
workplace are more prone to be less committed and to experience lowered productivity levels
and outcomes. Paludi (2015) identifies that supervisors and managers are three times more
likely to instigate workplace bullying of individual workers than their coworkers. It implies that
coworkers are the catalysts for workplace bullying episodes in one out of every four situations
where this occurred (Paludi, 2015). The effect of bullying on individuals who witness incidents
against other workers is also a significant problem (Hansen, Hogh, Garde, & Persson, 2014).
O’Donnell and MacIntosh (2016) examined workplace bullying, how organizational culture
promote it and the resultant behavioral challenges among the workforce and actual work
outcomes.
Safety bullies. Geller (2014) describe safety bullies as individuals who only search for
employee behavior issues and unsafe acts in accident investigations. Geller further indicates that
safety bullying inhibits worker engagement and negates the best opportunities for injury
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prevention. Geller (2014) notes that placing blame on worker behavior which contribute towards
and result in injuries, deaths, and equipment damage remove focus on supervisors and
management: In fact, workers behave in ways that reflect the work culture of the organization,
the system as well as societal, individual, environmental, and engineering or technological
factors. Manuele (2014) added that if individuals and teams performing accident investigations
and safety practitioners within the organizations are not up-to-date on the current philosophy
regarding the systemic approach to investigations, these individuals are unfit to perform such.
Manuele suggests that these individuals are not allowing for the best opportunities to prevent
similar future accidents. Manuele further indicates that errors committed at the management
level present particularly tricky challenges for safety professionals within the organization.
Manuele (2014) describes different instances when accidents are likely to occur. These include
situations where work activities are non-routine or unusual and if the operation is not job-related.
Workplace accidents are frequent when significant modifications are necessary or if critical units
or systems are being shut down or re-started after work activities. Manuele also suggests that
when doing work in hazardous conditions or when energy sources are present, accidents can
occur. One critical type of accident situation involve work arrangements where a routine change
occur. This change, considered as an upset or a work arrangement, move from a regular and
normal state to an abnormal state that workers are unaccustomed. The process of change present
a significant challenge to workers experiencing the situation (Manuele, 2014).
Insomnia. Insomnia is a public health problem described as a condition whereby the
individual has difficulty in falling asleep or staying asleep for a long enough time. It is
widespread and considered as a causal factor for worker injuries (National Institutes of Health,
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2014). Symptoms ranged from or included a struggle to fall asleep, frequent waking up during
the night, waking earlier than expected and not falling asleep again, and waking up without
feeling refreshed (National Sleep Foundation, 2014). Individuals afflicted with sleep problems
are almost two times more likely to be injured at work than for employees who are not affected;
this is an increasingly significant workplace safety and worker injury risk factor (Uehli et al.,
2014). Kao, Spitzmueller, Cigularov, and Wu (2016) accept that insomnia is common among
workers and that it can be a causal factor in workplace injuries. Cigularov and Wu attempted to
explain how and why that was happening.
Other contributing factors. Mathieu et al. (2014) found that job satisfaction convolute
on other real but almost invisible factors. These are the number of hours worked, work-family
conflicts, psychological distress, and interpersonal influence from leadership to colleagues.
Mathieu et al. (2014) agree that organizational induced psychological distress can be toxic,
disruptive, abusive, tyrannical, but at the same time did not find that this resulted in lower levels
of organizational commitment and job satisfaction.
Work-family conflict was a more significant influence on job satisfaction while leaderworker and worker-colleagues relationship influence individual attitudes and behavior at work
and organizational commitment. Long work hours lead to work-family conflicts. Organizational
culture impact leader-individual and individual-colleagues interpersonal influence and
relationships.
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Figure 8: Factors that influence the level of job satisfaction and organizational commitment.
Adapted from Mathieu et al. (2014)
Major accidents and lessons to learn. Accidents like the Piper Alpha, Bhopal, Dryden,
and Tenerife disasters are chosen in this review not to exaggerate the message but because of the
real opportunities that exist to learn from them and for these lessons to be applied for the
prevention of other and future accidents, worker deaths, and injuries (Kletz, 2007; Labib, 2015;
Mac Sheoin, 2015; NASA, 2013).
Dryden. On March 10, 1989, 24 persons died when a commercial airliner crashed on
takeoff at Dryden Airport in Canada. The victims were 21 passengers and three flight staff
including the pilot, co-pilot, and a flight attendant. The crash investigation involved a
comprehensive review of the Canadian aviation system and how that impacted and contributed to
the actual accident and the events on that day. Transcripts from interviews from 166 witnesses
totaled more than 34 000 pages. Other documentary exhibits and evidence reviewed in this
investigation amounted to more than 177 000 pages (Moshansky, 1992).
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Piper alpha. Nearly one year before, July 06, 1988, on an oil rig in the North Sea, 167
workers were killed when an explosion and chain reaction occurred on the night shift and which
also destroyed the oil rig. That was the deadliest oil industry off-shore disaster. The findings
from this accident investigation have been widely reviewed and found applicable even beyond
the oil industry (NASA, 2013).
Dechy et al. (2012) suggest that there are repeated accidents and that lessons from none
of these accidents are being learned and applied to other instances to prevent other accidents.
Singh et al. (2010) examined the piper alpha accident from a new paradigm; a safe design
concept and second-tier interest into corrosion and other technical problems that were not
adequately addressed and remain valid.
Piper alpha, challenger & cherynobyl. Singh et al. (2010) compared the Piper Alpha
accident with other major engineering disasters including the Challenger, Chernobyl, and Three
Mile Island. Dechy et al. (2012) conducted a similar assessment of previous accidents involving
the NASA space shuttles, Columbia and Challenger, and believed that possible lessons could
come from these accidents. According to Singh et al. the Lord Cullen findings from the Piper
Alpha resonate in the other widely known accident events; this is in spite of the difficulty that
encompass the specific knowledge, safety management arrangements, and industry-specific
terminology and practices that influence particular safety-related attitudes and behavior. That
did not lessen the impact of industry or organization specific factors which impact workplace
accidents. It more alludes to lessons learned from workplace accidents being used to make other
workplaces safe and for the prevention of future similar events. Singh et al. (2010) points to the
damning reasons for the piper alpha, from the Lord Cullen Report, which are fundamental and
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can factor in other organizations, industries and countries where major and epic accidents occur.
These include plant design, a factor that is also identified by Dechy et al. (2012) and Wahlström
and Rollenhagen (2014). Breakdown of work systems, also identified by Moshansky (1992),
less than adequate management control (described in similar frames by Dechy et al. (2012),
Wahlström and Rollenhagen (2014) and Moshansky (1992) are also listed. Poor or less than
adequate communications, emergency management, regulatory control, legislative relevance,
management fail-safe systems, training (content and arrangements), and attitudes and behavior
are shared findings from these accidents. Swuste, Groeneweg, Van Gulijk, Zwaard, and
Lemkowitz (2017) stress that human errors are still the dominant focus for investigators of
workplace accidents and that this prevent the more in-depth assessment and identification of
other dynamic and socio-technical factors that are more relevant and impacting. Swuste et al.
suggests that suboptimal system(s) are more likely to result in workplace accidents than any
induvial at fault. To improve knowledge about workplace accidents, promote management
initiatives, and lessen the likelihood of future problems, a database of relevant information on
near-misses, incidents, accidents, disasters can be developed and made available for use by
organizations. Regardless of the industrial sector or geographical location where operations exist
(Dechy et al., 2012).
Deepwater horizon and common accident problems. In a separate but similar paper
on the Deepwater asset integrity, Singh et al. (2010) focused on the likelihood of no single cause
of the accident and that it was more a confluence of several critical factors that evolving into a
perfect storm (p. 84); and made, comparisons with the Swiss Cheese accident causation model,
first proffered by Reason (1997). Wahlström and Rollenhagen (2014) investigated different
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management systems and models for safety management recognizing that risks exist from old as
well as new and contemporary technical systems. Wahlström and Rollenhagen recounted
lessons from previous large industrial accidents including nuclear power stations, chemical
facilities, and offshore oil facilities and summarized investigative focus on technological issues,
human factors, and safety culture. It is a clear indication in favor of a holistic review of
accidents rather than a focus on the events that surround any one specific accident event.
Moshansky (1992) scrutinized the relationship that Transport Canada, Air Ontario and its partner
organizations, as well as the aircraft handling and management at the Dryden Airport to identify
failings and safety-related problems in Air Ontario, the aviation industry and the industry
regulator Transport Canada. These, according to Moshansky, were the profound and latent
shortcomings that impacted the events of March 10, 1989.
Bhopal, fukushima & deepwater. Labib (2015) describes how accidents like Bhopal in
December 1984 share similar contributing factors to the Fukushima, and Deepwater Horizon
industrial accidents; all labeled as human-induced and which did not have to happen. Labib
further propose a hybrid reliability technique and fault analysis for the evaluation of the causal
factors of these events and to inform on how to prevent similar disasters. Labib (2015)
compared the Bhopal and Fukushima disasters, even though one was a chemical disaster not a
naturally occurring event; the March 11, 2011, 9.0 earthquake off Japan that led to the
Fukushima nuclear power disaster. Labib found similar areas where factors contributed to these
disasters. These similarities represent areas where learning opportunities exist. Labib (2015)
suggested the un-learning opportunities also exist; a pointed reference to what should change.
Labib attributed un-learning opportunities to the steadfast lock on organizations struggling to
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derive maximum profit margins and to sub-optimal and compromised arrangements for safety.
That lock is highlighted by leaders of these organizations initially not admitting to the extent of
the disaster and a delayed response that could have exacerbated the problem and caused further
loss of lives in communities and damage to the environment that surrounded these industrial
plants. Labib’s view is that pre-empting industrial disasters is a socio-technical problem that
require the involvement of policymakers, social and natural.
Bhopal 1984 is a multiplicity of the simultaneous breakdown of safety barriers and
compounded on the associated dangers not being fully known or appreciated by the victims of
the disaster. This situation was a convolution of regulatory, organizational, operational, and
management issues that were compounded by individual errors on December 02, 1984 (Labib,
2015; Mac Sheoin, 2015).
Electric power industry disaster. The effects of failure in the electric power industry
are similar to that in aviation. In 2003, for example, an electricity blackout in the northeast
United States and Canada resulted from the failure of critical components in the ClevelandAkron area in the United States. The consequences of an un-cleared tree from a power line
resulted in a cascading series of events that left approximately 50 million customers without
power for, in some cases, up to two days (Abraham et al., 2004). In aviation, hundreds of deaths
can occur in a single aircraft accident. In both the aviation and the electric power industries,
there are complex systems and high demand for customer satisfaction. These compound and
evolve in ways that are difficult to predict, mainly when there can be other situational factors that
co-mingle with other existing challenges and which developed into unmanageable situations.
Technical and human errors in these low probability but high consequence situations can
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compound and grow into problems that are not simple to address or easy to predict (Atak &
Kingma, 2011; Abraham et al., 2004; Moshansky, 1992). Organizational success and corporate
image are critical for survival, as such; there are almost constant tension and demand for system
reliability, availability, and production levels to satisfy customer demands.
Additionally, the public need safe organizations where high-quality products matched an
equally high level of safe operations are the paradoxical reality (Labib, 2015; Murata, 2017).
Objectively, it is challenging to exercise safety margins without impacting on an organizations
production targets and customer demands. The converse is also valid. It is equally challenging
to sacrifice safety and simultaneously to maintain customer satisfaction; Moshansky (1992)
describes this dilemma during the Dryden investigation. The result is entirely dependent on the
organizational values, human resource strengths, its safety arrangements, the technologies
adopted by these entities, and the prevailing business climate (Atak & Kingma, 2011).
Further, the sequence of events and connectivity between the point where significant
problems initiated and the time when the accident event occurred can prove extremely
challenging to identify and to manage in a fail-safe and high-reliability work setting. That is
primarily pertinent since a single human, or mechanical failure will usually not result in a
catastrophic event, except for the very last occurrence (Abraham et al., 2004; Labib, 2015;
Manuele, 2014). The Challenger disaster (Price & Williams, 2018; Vaughan, 1997), the
Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Reason, 2000), and the Piper Alpha disaster (Labib, 2015; Mac
Sheoin, 2015) all mirror the chain of events where the real influence for the accident began
elsewhere and before the actual event. These all support the focussed change from individual-
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level factors to organization-level factors as the core reasons for accidents (Labib, 2015;
Manuele, 2014; Moshansky, 1992; Murata; 2017; Price & Williams, 2018; Vaughn, 1997).
Electric power accident. Felmine (2012) describe an accident involving the
electrocution of a lineman which occurred while the individual was conducting hotline work on
an energized 12000 volts power line. That is a specialist type of lines work which require that
the lineman is specially trained to work on energized power lines. Work on energized power
lines required specific work arrangements and special permits for work to be done. It is not the
same as work conducted on lines which were de-energized, isolated, and grounded before
workers could perform work. In this accident, the investigating team found that the victim was
an appropriately trained worker. All other individuals on the job site when the accident occurred
were also appropriately trained. The technique adopted for the work on that day was one of the
approved methods for the job. The victim was, from workplace records of training and
experience, deemed as competent. Acceptable and appropriate permit to work and conditions
were correctly applied. The worker, despite all of the pre-arrangements, received electrical
shocks and died. The investigators were unable to determine a direct cause of the accident
except that better onsite supervision might have averted the workplace accident. The underlying
reason for this accident was that hotline work rules were being reviewed and was not completed
even after lengthy deliberation by another working team tasked with the review and development
of the rules. The Tucker et al., (2016) description of leaders influencing workers safety
performance through a layered arrangement whereby safety support through managers and
supervisors is apt. Work rules development is an organizational responsibility. Managers set the
climate where the setting of rules happened and work procedures set. The absence of appropriate
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work rules is a negative reflection on management commitment to safety (Conchie et al., 2013;
Probst, 2015). Onsite supervision is the last barrier that can be installed between workers and
accidents or near misses; there is no other defense if onsite supervision control is less than
adequate (Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al., 1999; Labib, 2015; Murata, 2018; Price & Williams,
2018).
Gaps in Current Literature
Training
Training cover a multi-level dynamic and workplace need which span from personal and
professional development, workplace safety, technical skills, and technology, to emerging policy
issues (Cascio, 2017). Cascio focuses on micro and macro details and policy issues and how that
impact effective-learning for superior work outcomes. A better understanding of and quality of
training sessions, the use of digital tools and lessons, the optimizing of knowledge for skills
development, and a continuous reflection of training content are significant training advantages.
Cascio (2017) also focused on ways to maintain trainee skills after individuals are certified as
trained.
Business today require organizations to support new technologies and arrangements that were
not possible before. In the electric power industry, technology-induced a similar change and
caused new demands for worker skills that were previously not required. Devices with
communication capabilities are now standard in the 2000s just as poles, transformers, and
overhead power lines were since the beginning of the 1900s. Electric power industry workers
must now possess training and proven skilled at the traditional requirements as well as to safely
and efficiently operate in a new environment where automatic and remote-operated devices are
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common-place, and electrical sources are more distributed than ever. Remote and automated
operability of the power grid is crucially necessary because of the newer and more sophisticated
devices that make customer demands stricter than in previous times (Cascio, 2017). Customers
interact with electrical company operators via mobile devices and systems. They even
proactively request service on electric grid components and systems that employees can be
actively engaged in work activities. That can either mean that the worker skills must be such that
work is possible on energized systems for the duration of the exercise and where customers do
not experience power outages.
On the other hand, remote operated devices can allow for the minimization of the number
of customers who may be affected if work is on systems that were de-energized and isolated
from the remainder of the power grid. In each case, the worker skills, training, knowledge, and
experience are critical and combined with the number and mix of employees to ensure that the
work activity is safely negotiated (Manuele, 2014). The technical skills necessary for work on
de-energized electrical power systems is paramount and to a significant extent, a precursor on the
skills essential for work on live systems (Fordyce et al., 2007; Volberg et al., 2017). Training is
a significant element available to organizations in the current work environment for the bestsuited employees to remain fully cognizant and capable of the existing demands (Friedman,
2016). Qi and Tapio (2018) further indicate that keeping skilled workers, especially in areas
where significant shortages exist, is vital in preventing situations where the shortfall could result
in unsafe working conditions and contribute to worker injuries and deaths and for organizations
to remain competitive. That challenge extends to promotion policies, review of employee
performance, and worker recognition arrangements. Abadzi (2016) blends technical skills
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training with personal development, responsible behavior, critical thinking, with worker ability
to take initiatives, to be flexible and to support collaborative efforts. Abadzi deems these as
necessary for workers to cope with workplace stress and customer demands.
Industry to industry – learning from experiences. NASA (2013) considered how
relevant the Piper Alpha Accident was to NASA as an organization. Organizational secrecy was
evident after the NASA Apollo 1 fire. It is a structural shortcoming of the organization that
prevented the transfer of critical information for decision making. The non-transferral of crucial
details lead to safety problems that are not adequately understood and addressed. Production
activities overshadow safety concerns and directly impact deliberations which occurred ahead of
the 1986 Challenger disaster. NASA leadership preferred to focus on reliability engineering over
safety concerns; paralleled in the Piper Alpha disaster (NASA, 2013). Both the Piper Alpha and
NASA were organizations where a risk-informed approach and methodology guided safety
response. The emphasis rested on thinking that systems were safe and that hazards that could
compromise reliability would improve safety, once abated: A belief was that reliable operations
would guarantee and maintain operating safety (NASA, 2013). It is a significant miscalculation
that support production in favor of safety margins. That will require a more conservative
approach to projects and operations as the premise is unproven. The Piper Alpha disaster remain
the beacon example of production overriding safety arrangements with the worst possible
consequence (NASA, 2013). The 1984 Bhopal experience concerning production is similar but
was different in design. The Bhopal design is a lingering question that is still unanswered as
other plants installed in the United States at that time were considered as superior designed (Mac
Sheoin, 2015).
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Labib (2015) indicates that there are similarities between Bhopal and Fukushima Daiichi,
in 2011, just as NASA (2013) found between Piper Alpha and NASA. The Fukushima Daiichi,
in Japan, and the Bhopal, in India, were organizations where reliability outdid safety (Labib,
2015). That is a standard feature of organizations in the oil and gas industry, just as those in
power, nuclear, aviation, and other industrial sectors where workers are accustomed to hazardous
working and ecological environments (Labib, 2015). Labib went further to suggest that, after
Bhopal, and despite new legislation in different countries worldwide, old habits were seemingly
impossible to break. Labib described a form of organizational loss of memory; this had
significant possibilities for repeat disasters unless an un-learning occur. Labib also highlighted
the insufficient and under-par handling of safety warnings, listed as accident warnings. Labib
stressed that training, improved communication and appropriate handling of issues surrounding
hazards are crucial to keeping organizations safe.
Society, legal hurdles, and geography. Mac Sheoin (2015) laments the lack of action
on the part of the Indian regulators and the organization responsible for operating the Bhopal
chemical plant to treat with the surviving victims and the families of persons who died in this
catastrophe. Mac Sheoin, further suggests that this response exposed the significant
shortcomings of the safety management systems employed at the Bhopal chemical plant. The
corporate and regulatory deficiencies only amplified their failure regarding appropriate
compensation for the survivors and to bring relevant regulatory restrictions on the responsible
parties effectively. Singh et al. (2010) indicates that the Piper Alpha accident amounted to
$3.4B(US), with no criminal charges initiated against anyone and legal proceedings taken against
the company. That Piper Alpha experience is in stark contrast to the Bhopal case as more than
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20 years elapsed before the courts in India delivered a definitive judgment. By that time twelve
persons from the company were committed to serving time in prison. The majority of the
persons found guilty were either not alive or outside of India at the time of the judgment. In
2007, Moshansky suggested that judicial, administrative roles in Canada for safety in aviation
were to guide on unresolved issues such as oversight, confidential and secrecy issues, and
accident causality Lecture (2007). Moshansky reviewed the aviation system as it was before the
accident, the unique challenges, and the direct actions that impacted on March 10, 1989. He
found that the Canadian legislative and regulatory arrangements were deficient and needed
revamping (Moshansky, 1992; Lecture, 2007). In the Bhopal case, Mac Sheoin (2015) found
that there is a deliberate reluctance by legislators and regulators to initiate acceptable and
responsible actions. Moshansky recommended a permanent judicial role in accident
investigations (Lecture, 2007). Moshansky also recommended a judicial-role in safety
management in aviation.
Legislation, enforcement, triangle, and cocoanut. Robinson and Robinson (2016)
describes how the emergency exit at a shirt-making company in New York in 1911, locked from
the outside, to prevent workers from stealing cloth and other textile material resulted in one of
the worst fires in history: A locked exit that prevent workers from escaping. As a result, 146
workers died. Robinson and Robinson (2016) recounted the 1942 Cocoanut Grove fire where
492 military and civilian personnel died because of locked emergency exits. Robinson and
Robinson (2016) notes that building safety is problematic and very difficult to fix. There are
different U. S, building codes models, for organizations and other workplaces. These are
industry-specific and not uniform across regions, industries, or on design criteria for fire
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prevention and safety. Lee and Dalal (2016) considers the possibility of hiring individuals with a
preference and biased disposition for safety consciousness and believe that this might encourage
safety behavior and enhance organizational safety climate. Lee and Dalal (2016) further indicate
that corporate control, practices, and regulatory arrangements are greater influences than
individual safety consciousness and behavior. Therefore, safety outcomes are a function of
organizational work arrangements more than employee influence.
Lee and Dalal (2016) did not rule out the impact of employees on safety outcomes
altogether. They examined individual behavior and explored how these affect safety outcomes in
cases where these individuals work and apply a measure of control. An individual’s safety
behavior, actions, and approach to workplace safety supports compliance with safety procedures
set by managers and organizational leaders. Lee and Dalal (2016) further separate this behavior
into task-related and context and explain how they impact on the maintenance of workplace
safety requirements set by the organization. Contextual safety is a safety helping attitude where
the individual advise others on safety requirements and help by accepting safety responsibilities.
Safety behavior, however, is built upon the individual’s trait of conscientiousness towards safety
performance and the safety climate in the organization. Lee and Dalal (2016) examined how
these two influences interact and describe the result of that interaction. Conscientiousness was a
safety goal and behavior (Lee & Dalal, 2016). This safety behavior was described further as
inclusive for the individual following rules and safety requirements. It encourages thinking
before acting and differing gratification before safely completing an exercise.
Conscientiousness, emotional stability, openness to experience, agreeableness, and extraversion
are the big-five personality traits that support safety in the workplace.
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Lee and Dalal (2016) examined previous research and believe that conscientiousness is
the most potent when compared to the other traits; it is socially acceptable and allow the
individual to remain focused on safety goals: conscientious employees are generally more careful
about how they perform work and exercise self-control when compared to individuals who are
not as meticulous. A positive indicator of organizational safety climate is vital since a strong
climate perspective is a consensus which indicates that the organization is safe and that workers
may remain unharmed. Lee and Dalal (2016) questioned about situations where a good safety
climate exist, but individuals experience bias difference; They describe that as variation in the
psychological environment. This mental variation premise on the thinking that individuals who
experience a similar stimulus should react or generally respond in the same manner. This
variation obviously depend on the stimulus. If there are a fire in a place where individuals are,
then evacuation would likely be their general response. It will be strange for someone, in that
setting, to remain in the location until instructed to evacuate, for example. Lee and Dalal (2016)
describe the act of staying in danger as a psychological variation and further indicate that when
groups of individuals worked together for lengthy periods, psychological variation tended to
diminish. Group dynamics involve not only similar influences but typical behavior. It meant
that not all everyday actions of a group are due to internal group dynamics and controls but due
to natural and social behavior where the responses result from automatic triggers induced by the
situation or condition (Lee & Dalal, 2016).
Near-misses and opportunities. Capelli-Schellpfeffer, Floyd, Eastwood, and Liggett
(1999) indicated that the benefits of a trustworthy and very comprehensive database on electrical
safety errors, near misses, and accidents is crucial to the effectiveness of organizational decisions
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on the choice of equipment, system design, workplace training, and improved work procedures
and practices. Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. recognized that investigation into near-misses are
opportunities to understand why problems occur. These opportunities are the prelude to
preventing accidents where workers become injured. Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. believed that
the findings from investigations into and analysis of accidents and near misses show that
workplace accidents and near misses impact on business operation, individual behavior, and
regulatory arrangements and oversight. The quality of findings from workplace accidents
investigations is dependent on the available data and the analysis conducted by the investigators
(Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al., 1999). Safety problems and accidents can occur if the introduction
of electrical hazards occur in the engineering design, procurement, installation or operating and
not recognized for the employment of appropriate protective measures to mitigate the dangers
(Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al., 1999).
Beliefs and attitudes. Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. posited that incorrect worker beliefs
and poor attitudes emanate from poorly conducted accident investigations which compound
situations where hazards are unnoticed and unidentified; and can contribute to future accidents.
The information derived from an accident investigation and the analysis can encourage the
continuance of worker held beliefs and the support of bad attitudes. The reverse is also valid as a
well-done investigation can be used to improve worker attitudes and for correctly referencing
understanding and beliefs among workers. Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. further suggest that
workers’ decisions can be deemed as unsafe when these may be influenced by perceptions and
opinions which are linked to poorly done investigations of previous workplace accidents; directly
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due to the poor-quality data sourced in the inquiry. That logic extends to the possible advantages
derived from a repository of information from previous accidents and investigations.
Optimal learning. Optimal Learning, from accident experiences, impact profoundly on
the likelihood of event recurrence and injury to workers. Knowledge come from improved
standards and regulations resulting from identified shortcomings, renewed training for
individuals involved and others who conduct similar job functions, as well as for all other
organizational personnel responsible for the design and procurement of related systems and
equipment. The most important learning would probably be with workers as an opportunity to
reflect on what went wrong and what could have contributed to that event; individual behavior,
attitudes, overwork, and any other human factor that could have contributed to the accident.
Near misses, according to early accident causation models that support Heinrich’s theory, are at
least 10-fold more common than accidents where the victims are injured. Capelli-Schellpfeffer
et al. (1999) believe that the frequency of near misses over actual events where individuals are
injured and that near misses are due to the same weaknesses that contribute to accidents, except
that there are no wounded human victims. The opportunities to learn from near misses is
premium in preventing worker injuries and fatalities.
Safety Culture and Workplace Accidents
Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. (1999) describe the undesirable chain of events that lead to
near misses and accidents as people factors that are explained by behavior and human-equipment
interface challenges; which are evident at the level of organizational culture, structure, work
design, safety management, system operations, training and maintenance functions (p.2). Figure
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9 is a replica of how Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. explained how organizational culture contributed
to accidents and near misses.
That thinking extends to the possibility of improving organizational culture as a latent
contributor to the prevention of near misses and accidents. Probst (2015) believes that safe work
arrangements and accident prevention are linked to actions by organizational managers and
supervisors to encourage the reporting of accidents and near misses. Tucker et al. (2016) posited
that organizational leaders set the safety agenda from top management level and can influence,
through managers and supervisors, the frontline workers to adopt a safe approach to conducting
work.
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Figure 9: How we can better learn from electrical accidents. Adapted from M. CapelliSchellpfeffer, H. L. Floyd, K. Eastwood, & D. P. Liggett (1999). Reprinted with permission.

In 2006, there was an explosion and fire at an electric power station in which two
employees died (Mohammed, 2006). This accident occurred when the workers were conducting
maintenance work. The investigation into this accident was done by a team which comprised
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experts, a representative from the workplace safety regulator, worker union representatives, as
well as management from two companies; the company that the victims worked for, and the
electric utility company that managed the electrical power system. This investigation occurred
over one month, and the team interviewed more than 18 witnesses including the lone survivor of
the explosion. Five of the individuals were re-interviewed as the investigation ensued. The
approach adopted in this investigation included:
An inspection of the physical evidence retrieved from the accident site;
A review of the electrical switchgear and its operating design parameters, using
schematic diagrams and manufacturer’s information;
A review of the relevant high voltage electric system configuration;
A review of all relevant documents;
Conducting interviews with all appropriate personnel;
A review of the autopsy report of each of the deceased employees;
Analysis of the electrical system protection scheme and all associated equipment;
The co-opting expertise or resources that the investigating team deemed necessary;
A gathering of photographs of all work permits, relevant to the job and other associated
plant and for instances where similar work activities were involved, for review,
comparison, and analysis;
An examination of the original equipment manufacturer’s manual for the failed apparatus
for specific information on the operating conditions necessary for activities of the type
conducted when the explosion occurred;
A review of employee training records and certification for confirmation that the
individuals satisfied regulatory and company requirements for the work activity;
A review of the company’s maintenance management system requirement for this work
activity. Performing a similar review and examination of other maintenance work orders
for similar past maintenance on this equipment and other similar units;
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A review and analysis of audio recordings of all communication between the electric
utility company and the power company where the accident occurred for specific details
of the process adopted in making the equipment safe for work were analyzed;
Reviewing all test results sanctioned by the investigating team after the explosion.
Among the interviewees were the power plant manager, senior managers and supervisors
at the power plant, the work planner, the individual who made the equipment safe for work, and
the individual who received the permit to work. Also interviewed were the electric utility
representatives who managed the equipment safe isolation process. Of particular importance
was the permit to work, the procedures for issuing the permit to work, the communication at
different stages and times when planning the work and when it was being made ready for
workers on the day. A comprehensive review of the previous history of work arrangements and
how these impacted, particularly those that required the electric utility involvement, the
individuals who planned the activity and those who worked on the day of the accident. CapelliSchellpfeffer et al. (1999) describe how full understanding of the circumstances and contributing
factors can result in accidents long before the final error event.
The main conclusions from this investigation are that there were immediate and
underlying causal factors that contributed to the explosion which resulted in two deaths. The
direct factors involved the inserting of a metallic component inside an oil-filled compartment
with energized conductors, and; where the permit to work issued for this job did not cover the
work done. The underlying causal factors were inter-departmental communication especially on
daily job assignments and supervision, work planning, scheduling, flow, permit to work
management, job safety briefings, and auditing of work processes and systems. These causal
factors are the underlying issues that went unnoticed and unaddressed and eventually became
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deviance that skewed the standard work requirements to a new norm (Price & Williams, 2018;
Vaughn 1997). Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al. (1999) allude to this as a behavioral pattern resulting
from the culture of the organization.
Difficulties experienced with permit to work systems. One way of making work safe
is the employment of a permit to work system. It represents a systemic approach; adopting
organization approved procedures, to make equipment or apparatus safe for workers to perform
their repair activities and scheduled overhauls. It involves isolating the device or workequipment from hazardous energy sources, described the safety measures and precautions
adopted for the exercise, and the responsible person who ensured that the energy sources were
locked off and tagged. The process of issuing the permit was usually clearly itemized and
documented in organization-approved procedures; so too the permit cancellation process. Many
times, permit to work issues arise when investigating accidents; the 1988 Piper Alpha explosion
is an excellent example of what happened in breached permit-to-work systems and procedures
(Dekker, 2006; NASA, 2013). To get a proper understanding of why workplace accidents
happened, investigators approach these challenges primarily in two ways. The first way, which
is born from the conventional safety management Heinrich-like thinking, was that the causes
would reside in the last moments and how those activities and the individuals contributed to the
event. These constitute the direct causes of the accident as the actual breach that resulted in the
failure event. The Swiss Cheese model indicated that the immediate causes of accidents were
just as significant a problem as the more profound underlying causal factors which reside at
levels where supervisors, managers, and the management would control (Kletz, 2007; Labib
2015; Reason, 1997).
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Kletz (2007) focused on the prevention of and the causes of accidents, not human interest
or superficial cleaning-up afterward. The repeat of accidents occurred because of and due to
insufficient knowledge; not because there was no desire to prevent injuries or death. Human
error could be due to a momentary episode of forgetfulness or overconfidence. If that weren't so
then, it would likely not be an error, but a deliberate act and injury would not have occurred as a
result of an accident but from a deliberate act of unsafe behavior. The problem was, many times,
the victim, injured or killed, were usually the party found to have committed the error especially
when only direct causes of accidents factored. Victims of workplace accidents typically raised
issues of design and operating methods which were answers to questions about what should be
done differently rather than pinpointing who did what or what caused the problem Kletz (2007).
Deviance and normalization challenge. Vaughan (1997) believe that technological
failure is not the underlying reason why the NASA space shuttle Challenger exploded on takeoff
on January 28, 1986. The brittle O-rings, pinpointed as the component that failed, led to the
explosion of the spacecraft. Vaughan felt that NASA, the organization through the leaders of the
1986 launch, knew about the likelihood of failure and decided it was not sufficient to stall or to
prevent for the expedition and many other previous expeditions. Vaughan (1997) indicates that
the earliest record of possible danger regarding the O-rings was dated back to 1977 and that its
use on space missions commenced in 1981. Vaughan (1997) coined a now familiar and common
term Normalization of Deviance about the production of the O-rings and also in the performance
after that (p. 78). These are referenced to work groups that normalize the statistical deviation in
accepting components, technical difference while forging a culture creation process through
group interaction. At the same time, Vaughan (1997) notes that once formed, this new culture of
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deviance is challenging to stop and it affects later group decisions and processes. Price and
Williams (2018) support Vaughan’s view that the repeated decision by NASA officials to
sanction shuttle flights was the potential latent cause that resulted in the Challenger disaster;
because of the overwhelming evidence that the O-rings were brittle and unsuitable. Price and
Williams (2018) also support Vaughan’s idea of normalization of deviance and suggested that
this involve feelings among persons in organizations where the impression of wrong is not as
clear. Price and Williams felt that this is an insensitivity that develops over time, even in years,
and with repeated situations where the worst consequence is unrealized. Price and Williams
(2018) also felt that the critical factor that align with major accidents and disaster event can
anchor in activities that are mutually exclusive and time-spaced in years. As an example, an
equipment design could result in accident years afterward and under circumstances and
conditions not anticipated when the model is accepted. Working conditions in which warning
and alarm systems become decommissioned, breached or removed from service and not
envisaged when the plant, equipment, and work procedures are developed, tested, and accepted,
contribute to dangerous conditions ripe for accidents to occur. Price and Williams (2018)
focussed on the health-care and medical profession and suggest that the Swiss Cheese model was
ideal for showing the effects of failure leading to death and injury; especially when
normalization of deviance occurs. Clinical procedures, procedural breaches, and less than
adequate arrangements for infection control are some of the factors highlighted by Price and
Williams (2018). Singh et al. (2010) expressed a similar view to other industrial operations.
Procedures and actual practice. Dekker (2003) suggested that it would be better for
individuals in organizations to understand the gaps that exist between procedures and actual
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practice. None of the studies examined show that there were deliberate efforts by individuals or
groups of individuals to act and cause a cascading, unmanageable situation, chaos, or accident
events. Price and Williams (2018) suggest that deviation that led to accidents occurred when
safety margins and barriers to prevent shifting away from procedural requirements were removed
or changed. Price and Williams believe that managers justified barrier removal to allow for
assessment of risk from a reliability perspective and not from a safety margin perspective.
Murata (2017) conducted case studies on accidents and concluded that cognitive bias,
mental predisposition, and cultural difference are trigger factors in severe accidents and crashes.
Murata attribute group bias and group-validation processes that promote social loafing as integral
to a cultural gap that contribute to accidents. Similar claims came from Vaughan (1997) and
Price and Williams (2018) through normalization of deviance, and from Dekker (2003) through
gaps between procedures and practice. Dekker (2003) examined situations where safety
procedures are accepted as the way to make the workplace safe. Dekker found that in
organizations, individuals could fail to adapt processes and systems when that became necessary,
or they implemented changed procedures when that was not necessary. These are mistiming
activities and emphasis that lead to an increase in compliance demands, workplace chaos, and
judgment errors. Murata (2017) went further to identify overconfidence as a bias which cause an
illusion that work plans and arrangements were feasible when they were, in fact, risky and
dangerous. Overconfidence is ubiquitous when factored in critical errors that caused accident
events studied by Murata. Murata found that framing and group confirmation bias, such as
normalization of deviance, distorted decisions to give the impression of maintained safety when
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production and system reliability were the influential motives. Murata (2017) then posited that
by preventing cognitive prejudice in favor of compliance, accidents might not happen.
Engineering design and confidence. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station
meltdown that occurred after a 2011 tsunami due to a 9.0 earthquake is attributed by Murata
(2017) as an insufficient design convoluted by cultural difference. One problem is that the main
power supply to the cooling pumps and a designed alternative supply were from the same source.
This design flaw is critical. The power source became submerged when the tsunami occurred.
Robust and redundant arrangements are necessary. Murata (2017) suggests that overconfidence,
optimism, and normalcy bias all influenced a confirmation bias that the system was safe. That is
despite a widespread belief that safety is a top priority in Japan. Envisaging that a tsunami
would have breached the safety barriers in place at the Fukushima Daiichi power station never
occurred. Dekker (2006) stressed that for the prevention of workplace accidents, it is imperative
to consider and factor lessons from other accidents. Murata (2017) reviewed the cultural
difference bias by comparing nuclear power station operations in Japan and the United States and
found that there are cultural factors that contributed to the disaster. A Japanese belief that
nuclear power plant safety was guaranteed is itself one of the critical cultural difference bias:
Skepticism in the United States caused by the Three Mile Island experience where a radioactive
leak, due to a loss of coolant, occurred in 1979. Lessons from this incident, according to Murata
(2017), are seemingly ineffective for Fukushima Daiichi.
Murata (2017) suggested that safety values, safety strategies, safety climate, and safety
activities (performance) should replace the orthodox, conventional safety culture. This
traditional thinking relied on underlying values and assumptions which are unquestioned,
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organizational strategies that are leader driven, and supported individual attitudes, and behavior.
Behavior was directly related to safety performance. All of the other parameters, whether
conventional or contemporary, supported this behavior or performance(Murata, 2017). Figure 10
shows how mistaken behavior result from cultural difference, distorted judgment, and cognitive
bias: It shows the standard, conventional arrangement where the apex result is behavior that
support safe work. For this to happen, organizational values, including safety, must be actively
built upon by leaders so that a stable base for supporting safety behavior is assured. This
foundation must also help and promote safety climate and attitudes that can evolve into the
expected behavior.

Traditional Concept
of Safety Culture

Behavior

Safety Activities
(performances)

Safety Climate

Attitude & Opinion

Organizational Mission, Leadership
Strategies, Norms, History

Safety Strategy

Underlying Values and Unquestioned Assumptions

Safety Values

<< Influence >>
<< Distortion of DM>>

Cultural Difference in Decision Making (DM)
Figure 4 Model on Safety Culture that takes Cross-Cultural Differences into account
Source: Murata, A. (2017). Cultural difference and cognitive biases as a trigger of critical crashes
or disasters—evidence from case studies of human factors analysis. Journal of Behavioral and
Brain Science, 7(09), 399. doi:10.4236/jbbs.2017.79029

Figure 10: Cultural Difference and Cognitive Biases as a Trigger of Critical Crashes or
Disasters—Evidence from Case Studies of Human Factors Analysis. Adapted from A. Murata
(2017). Reprinted with permission.
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Positive outcomes and openness. Favorable outcomes are possible only when social
workplace relationships are treated in the same light as technical challenges and facilitated by
non-rigid organizational structures aware of changing demands and situations. Bobabeau and
Meyer (2001) show how Southwest Airlines solved bottlenecks and inefficiencies in handling
freight by examining how ants followed simple rules and found efficient ways of getting
seemingly complex tasks done. Southwest found that flexibility allowed for a different form of
organizational robustness which led to organizational success (Bonabeau & Meyer, 2001). This
robustness is built on group performance even when individuals within the group may fail. That
happened because of the self-organization among individuals is not restricted by rigidorganizational arrangements. McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) describe these as shifting
boundaries of accountability. McCall and Pruchnicki (2017) acknowledge that managing safety
in high-consequence organizations where the work-environments are continually changing and
evolving is a very challenging task. That required a form of organizational resilience supported
by managers with the ability to address the safety challenging demands. McCall and Pruchnicki
(2017) believe that promoting openness in the free reporting of errors without reprisal and
encourage learning from mistakes and a just organizational safety culture can result. McCall and
Pruchnicki (2017) also believe that this would only happen if the organization support a
sociotechnical safety management arrangement. Collective perceptions, suggested by Griffin
and Curcuruto (2016) is a similar sociotechnical safety management arrangement: Organizations,
either directly or otherwise, influenced safety outcomes which included near misses, accidents,
and worker injuries. Griffin and Curcuruto found that shared personnel perceptions define the
nature of organizational safety climate, and this was not dependant on or specific to any
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particular organization or in a given country. Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) also found that safety
climate in an organization impact on the cognitive bias of individuals in the organization.
Murata (2017) found that the reverse was also true: individual motivation and behavior change
depend on the safety climate and eventually safety performance outcomes. Griffin and
Curcuruto (2016) further suggest that cognitive bias influence safety outcomes and productivity
levels. Murata (2017) show that cognitive bias is also a safety performance influence and
indicated that this could be both positive or negative. What is necessary is for organizational
values and vision promoted by active leadership support. Murata (2017) believe that this would
encourage a favorable safety climate and appropriate work behavior and safety outcomes.
Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) indicate that safety climate is not static: It is a dynamic
phenomenon that is always changing.
Difficult and strained relationships. Jiang and Probst (2015) posited that safety–
production relationship conflicts are negative influences on high-productivity arrangements and
that both these considerations reduce the likelihood of reported accidents. An improved
probability of accident reporting is possible if there is a reduction in safe working conflicts.
Probst (2015) found that supervisor-employee(s) relationship bidirectionally influence safety
compliance, accident reporting, and safety climate. Probst (2015) investigated three different
issues. First, on how organizational safety climate influence employees to report workplace
accidents. The second focus was on how transactional supervision encourage reporting of
workplace accidents and finally, how each of the two influencing factors interact and what that
impact is on accident reporting. An integral finding is that the influence of supervisor
encouraged underreporting is weakened when the organization safety climate is strong and
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positive. Probst (2015) suggested that when organizations treated accident reporting as
opportunities to correct safety-related problems, safety personnel had opportunities to assess
problems better and to propose corrective actions that could mitigate the occurrence of future
accidents. Fordyce et al. (2007) suggest that accident underreporting is supported by
management, especially with management bonus tagged to workplace accidents. Probst (2015)
linked accident underreporting to employee demographics such as tenure and age, and fear of
losing the job or job-related perks. Jiang and Probst (2015) tied this to individual perception of
adverse safety outcomes and how that can heighten feelings of job insecurity. Jiang and Probst
(2015) indicated that accident data reveal that nearly four in every 10 workplace accidents where
an injury occur, there are clear evidence of safety procedures not being properly conducted, or a
total case of safety procedures and practices being left out. Jiang and Probst (2015) explored
safety-related consequences in situations where effective job insecurity factored into safety
attitudes and behavior. Jiang and Probst accepted that insecurity strongly linked to workers’
safety, and safety outcomes. Injury underreporting as described by Jiang and Probst (2015) and
Probst (2015) is diametric to the position espoused by Tucker et al. (2016) where top
management and supervisory efforts could positively impact safety outcomes.
Leadership and Supervision
Epistemological and leadership from the top. Dekker (2015) describes the benefits of
investigating workplace accidents as epistemological by allowing for establishing details of the
accident, preventative by identifying how to avoid recurrence, moral tracing of the breaches that
occurred, for reinforcing work procedures, and existential to genuinely understand the suffering.
Dekker (2015) postulates that finding out what transpired when a workplace accident happens,
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allow for the best opportunities to learn from the event and to avoid recurrence. Dekker (2015)
also indicated that accident investigations could provide meaning-making opportunities for
organizations to develop a strong safety consciousness. Tucker et al. (2016) suggest that a strong
safety culture supported by top management can permeate the entire organization up to the frontline workers to promote worker safety and safe work outcomes. Conchie, Moon, & Duncan
(2013) indicated that workplace demands like the underreporting of accidents reduce worker
engagement, supported emotional burnout, and increase negative safety behavior. Conchie et al.
(2013) suggested that the downside of work demands is that it is particularly tricky for safety
management especially when supervisors time and energy are primarily into follow-up actions
from unplanned issues and requirements.
Indirect supervision and positive work. Huang et al. (2013) developed a safety climate
measurement guide for workers who operate from remote locations and use electric power
industry employees as exemplars to justify their technique. Perception of safety is a crucial
indicator of the multi-level safety climate which differentiated organizational focus from grouplevel safety priority. From this study emerged the advent of shared understandings from the
workers from remote locations (Huang et al., 2013). Huang et al. conducted a survey and
followed that with a 15-day observation of electric utility workers as these individuals performed
their regular duties. Among the electric utility participants were trainers, managers, supervisors,
and workers.
Safety climate is an instantaneous and discrete reflection of shared worker-perception of
the importance and value at the organizational level, especially with regards to policies, work
procedures, and accepted practices (Huang et al., 2013). Safety climate, in this Huang et al.
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study, is determined through self-reports by participants of safety behavior and injuries; these are
then analyzed and linked to near misses, recordable incidents, vehicular accidents, lost days due
to injuries. Organizational safety climate measured and analyzed through accounts of accidents
and safety behavior in six distinct ways; proactive safety acts, workplace training, equipment
familiarity, fieldwork orientation, investment finance, and scheduling challenges and flexibility
(Huang et al., 2013). Group-level safety climate determined from an analysis of three particular
perceptions are; the level of supervisor care, worker encouragement and participation, and
straight talk about and on safety issues. Huang et al. (2013) found significant statistical
relationships between safety climate with safety behavior and workplace injury at the
organizational level, and the group-level.
Huang et al. (2013) believed that organizational policies are formal, explicit, and visible.
Enforcement of these policies is implicit, effected through management actions and aimed at
maintaining work production arrangements, and there are consequences for non-achievement
production targets in favor of safety. It is therefore understandable when comparing safety
issues to the speed of conducting a given task or the production flow process. Managerial safety
commitment aligned with the relative importance of safety and production and how well the
leadership communicate these; in worker training, meetings, or workplace discussions. Safety
climate thrive when safety outcomes support the experience of infrequent accidents which are
not severe or serious. Huang et al. (2013) accept that electric power industry workers generally
work at different locations and when supervisors and managers are not present. The reduced inperson supervision, in an industry where working conditions are varied and hazardous, workers
need to be exceptionally capable of determining risks and mitigating dangers that could make
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safe work conditions unsustainable. These workers must be technically skilled and competent so
that if situations existed where safe work arrangements could not be developed and sustained for
the entire work task, then appropriate communication with the supervisor would become
necessary and imperative for individual safety. Factors which contribute to injury risk include
long and physically demanding working shifts and conditions, emergency work, a rapid influx of
technology, and driving long distances sometimes in dangerous terrain (Huang et al., 2013).
Huang et al. added that electric utility restructuring, increased competition, and profitability that
result from the restructured business, together with worker diversity and demographics are
challenging factors that also impacted on workplace safety. Huang et al. (2013) depended on
participant self-reporting of safety behavior as a critical input for analysis in this study.
Information derived from the self-reports include conditions on jobs before work tasks began,
arrangements for communicating work-related hazards and mitigating actions to workers on jobsites, how workers conducted work, and supervisor response to requests for assistance for safetyrelated challenges. Huang et al. (2013) indicated that workers were positively influenced and
exhibited safety behavior when organizational safety climate is strong; even when working in
situations where direct supervision is absent.
Leadership and safety outcomes. Tucker et al. (2016) recounted from social learning
theory and suggest that individuals who are high status and powerful could and did influence the
behavior of other individuals. Tucker et al. then extended the logic to organizational leaders and
their influence on workers behavior; especially the advent of worker injuries and workplace
accidents. The Top Manager’s (CEO) impact on organizational safety climate is through a series
of influential alignments from the CEO to the executive management team, managers, and
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supervisors before bearing on worker performance levels and outcomes. Collective top
management support for a positive safety environment lead to work arrangements where this
focus encourage and promote safe work behavior among front-line workers (Tucker et al., 2016).
Strong safety culture is dependent on management commitment and organizational support
(Huang et al., 2013). Tucker et al. (2016) postulate that supervisor safety support lead to a
lessening of worker injuries. Front-line supervisors are deemed crucial by Huang et al. (2013)
for encouraging workers safe behavior especially regarding workplace communications,
provision of timely feedbacks, flexible work scheduling, and encouragement of safety work
procedures despite other work challenges such as customer demands and productivity targets.
Leadership and sub-standard safety. Blinder (2015) describe a case where 29
employees died at work, and the CEO of that organization is held responsible but not liable for
the accident by a US Federal Court in Charleston Western Virginia and did not serve prison time.
That judgment held that the CEO is responsible for ensuring and maintaining safety standards.
In this case, the main point was that the leader of an organization is responsible for treating the
safety of workers as a high priority and that all reasonable measures were always in place to
prevent workers injuries and deaths.
McGrory, Bedi, and Dawson (2017) reported that the US Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) charged a Florida Power Company for willfully disregarding and
violating federal safety rules in an accident that killed five employees including a senior
manager. Charges of willful violations were associated with and tagged to organizations that
intentionally disregarded safety requirements and procedures designed to keep individuals safe at
work. OSHA indicated that the dangerous situation which led to the accident existed for 13
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hours whereas company rules required that the hazardous equipment was shut down after four to
six hours of the condition (McGrory et al., 2017).
Amorim and Pereira (2015) studied workplace accidents that were caused by the
improvisation of safe-work arrangements and breached safeguards and barriers. Among their
findings is that improvised work safety arrangements are creative and innovative means of
getting work done. That usually extend to disregard of work safety rules as these tend to make
the work activity longer and more cumbersome. The desire to overcome barriers is a natural
inclination of individuals and a product of the knowledge and ability of the workforce. The need
for shorter outage times, higher customer satisfaction, improved technologies, and work
procedures all added to the level of worker knowledge and the desire to even better that. Amorim
and Pereira (2015) indicated that this work mentality proved successful but the likelihood of
accidents always is elevated as changed procedures, and work sequence tend to introduce
different hazards in the working environment. Usually, these hazards are unrecognized before an
accident. Reason (2000) noted that sometimes the best people would make mistakes and this is a
commonly overlooked issue in situations where the cause of accidents is seen only from the
direct causal factors perspective. Reason (2000) further suggested that by considering direct
causal factors as the real cause of errors, near misses, and accidents opportunities to understand
systemic flaws and how they contribute to the last act before an accident are futile. These
strategies miss opportunities and are significant disadvantages. The systemic approach is built
on the premise that errors are symptoms and not the cause of workplace accidents and other more
relevant flaws normally attributed to working schedules, task assignments, and employee
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workload, all of which indirectly impact work outcomes (Dekker, 2015; Holland, 2018; Labib,
2015; Murata, 2017).
Atak and Kingma (2011) indicated that the safety culture in an organization is dependent
on the growth phase of the entity and this phase explicitly determined the safety culture and
production relationship. In this study, technicians highlighted how difficult and challenging it
was to balance the demands from maintenance managers, the quality assurance team, how that
resulted in stressful the working arrangements, and where a compromise always existed between
production and safety. Atak and Kingma (2011) recognized the challenges which are prevalent
in the aviation industry, the consequences of possible errors, and the high impact of adverse
work outcomes.
The mitigating role of supervisor safety priority. Barnes, Ghumman, and Scott (2013)
suggested that economic reality and social environments often encourage individuals to increase
waking hours; either due to expanded working hours or from other activities that the individual
may be involved. Kao et al. (2016) posited that organizational response should be to employ
situational control and to require individuals to conform to safety arrangements. Kao et al., also
suggested that supervisors communicate and enforce organizational policies and procedures; so
supervisors should remove individuals who were not capable of performing safety-sensitive and
challenging tasks. Kao et al. (2016) affirmed that supervisors are structurally well-placed to
influence worker attitudes, job behavior, and performance outcomes, and at the same time,
promote organizational values and policies (Tucker et al., 2016). Supervisor safety behavior and
attitudes are critical to the maintenance of safe working conditions. Probst (2015) countered that
supervisors could also encourage safety rule violations, unsafe employee behavior, and accidents
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by not enforcing organizational policies, rules, and work procedures especially when they
encouraged the underreporting of accidents and near-misses and if untrained and unskilled
workers were assigned difficult and dangerous tasks. Kao et al. (2016) looked at workers’
reactions to supervisors who enforced workplace safety arrangements and requirements and
believed that safe-work without undue risk-taking would result in accident-free conditions.
Supervisors who promoted safety at work were the ones who would review and monitor work
activities, understand the worker challenges, and intervene on a timely basis to avert near misses
and accidents. That also encouraged worker self-regulation and response where safe work
outcomes were realized (Kao et al., 2016). The results obtained from this study are two-fold;
insomnia affected worker safety directly by injuries sustained on the job and indirectly through
worsening individual behavior and its consequences. Insomnia also contributed to workplace
safety problems because of the effect of supervisor actions; a failure to address the issue led to an
increase in safety violations, risky operations, near misses, and accidents; A direct approach to
maintain safe work operations, resulted in worker self-regulation and compliance with
organizational safety requirements (Kao et al., 2016).
Leadership and Gaps
Mills and Koliba (2015) indicated about the Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig on April 20,
2010, that regulatory governance needed to be balanced with the democratic accountability of
elected officials especially when the existing arrangements convolute into safety challenging
situations. Tucker et al. (2016) supported this by adding that organizational leaders are very
much aware of their responsibilities for the prevention of workplace accidents, injury, and death
to workers, and environmental disasters that result from these accidents. Tucker et al. (2016)
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recounted the public confirmation by the British Petroleum (BP) CEO at the time of the
Deepwater Horizon industrial accident that organizations and its leaders had a duty of care to
ensure that operations were safe. The Deepwater Horizon accident resulted in 11 workers killed
and an oil spill that was and still is the worst in the history of offshore drilling operations: The
CEO at BP in 2010 was not able to positively impact on safety performance and outcomes.
Tucker et al. (2016) indicated that organizational leaders influenced workplace safety
performance in two ways: by measuring safety through managers and supervisors in the
organization and actively fostering a safety climate promoted by collective social priorities for
safety. Tucker et al., believed that the CEO had a significant responsibility to influence the
executive management on workplace safety and how this could be diametric to other
organizational demands; akin to use of positional power to drive organizational performance
through a strong executive management safety climate. Top management, once influenced,
would also engage the active support of managers and supervisors. Once set, supervisors and
managers arrange work in line with organizational safe work procedures and will encourage
workers to adopt safety at work. A safety climate supported by the CEO would likely promote
shared perceptions of safety by individual and groups of front-line workers, especially when
safety priority was on worker well-being; It was a form of social learning encouraged by the
CEO (Tucker et al., 2016).
Electrical Power Industry Experience
Fordyce et al. (2007) investigated employee-suffered burn injuries from information
contained in the Occupational Health and Safety Database (OHSD) for electric utility accidents,
managed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). They found that while burn injuries
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were infrequent, it was usually severe and resulted in more days away from work than for other
workplace injuries suffered by electric utility workers. Fordyce et al. (2007) separated the burn
injury data into different categories; thermal burns, chemical burns, and electrical burns.
Electrocutions or death due to electricity was in the group of electrical burn injuries. Fordyce et
al. indicated that the victims were predominantly electricians, welders, and line workers who
suffered injuries in the head, upper body, and hands. Line workers sustained the majority of fatal
injuries: Despite extensive state and federal regulatory oversight and organizational safety
management efforts and program, electrical hazards represented significant safety risks for
electric power industry workers (Fordyce et al., 2007).
Fordyce et al. (2007) lamented that the EPRI OHSD database used for this study
consisted of incomplete information and data from only 15 utility companies. That was a
significant disadvantage as the data was self-reported and contained several omissions. Fordyce
et al. suggested that accurate data on accidents were difficult to source and the information at
hand were challenging to code for useful analysis: this challenge was as a direct result of the
variation in injury-reporting requirements across the United States and the different requirements
for state-managed injury compensation plans. There were cases of non-reporting of accidents
which was supported by management. Fordyce et al. (2007) explained the advantage of
sufficient information on near misses, which were not available from the data used in this study;
and near misses were opportunities to appropriate actions that could have addressed problems
before accidents where workers became injured. Fordyce et al. (2007) found that line workers
frequently injured were experienced and in their 30s and 40s and inferred that younger workers
were still in training and likely not exposed to more risky and challenging tasks.
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Fordyce et al. (2007) described the working arrangements and conditions for some of the
cases they analyzed and suggested that despite line workers extensive training and
apprenticeships, there were instances where personal protective equipment was necessary,
available to workers, and not used as required. Some of these situations included working close
to energized conductors, non-use of flame-retardant clothing, and failure to detect hazards. To
this end, Fordyce et al. (2007) suggested that workplace training was a possible way of
overcoming the problem, and to address inappropriate worker actions.
Fordyce et al. (2007) recommended that workers must use personal protection and other
equipment to ensure safety arrangements at work; these included the use of flame retardant
apparel, insulating blankets, non-conductive ladders, and other safety devices. Training
improvements were to include provisions for ensuring that systems were safe to conduct work as
well as to include modules aimed at developing an excellent workplace safety culture.
Volberg et al. (2017) recognized the vast array of work tasks and the hazardous nature of
these activities and working environments that electric power industry workers regularly faced.
Volberg et al. (2017) conducted a similar analysis to Fordyce et al. (2007) and used the same
EPRI OHSD database. In this study, with the updated database, there were 18 contributing
utility companies instead of the 15 in 2007. Line workers and welders remained as the working
groups that were most times injured at work even though there was still a significant level of
uncertainty about accidents in the electric power industry. The EPRI OHSD was not an entirely
representative database of the US electricity industry: there were more than 200 different electric
power companies conducting business in the electric power industry. On the other hand, the
available data from the US Bureau of Labor was a combination of information from electricity
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distribution, transmission, and generation as well as from other utilities such as natural gas, and
wastewater and sewage companies. It was therefore complicated to filter information from this
database effectively for proper analysis (Volberg et al., 2017).
Volberg et al. (2017) indicated that there were 63, 194 recordable injuries reported by the
18 companies that contributed data to the EPRI OHSD database from 1995 to 2013 and that not
all of these companies provided information for each year. It meant that for the missing years,
there were accidents that occurred in these organizations that did not form part of the database.
Typically, safety statistics calculation was on a reference of 200 000 hours per year, often
referred to as the OSHA 300 rate, which reflected the working hours of 100 employees working
40 hours per week for 50 weeks (40 X 50 X 100 = 200 000). The frequency, severity, and other
accident rates were then determined. From the EPRI OHSD database, primary data for all the
contributing companies were used to determine a value for employee-years. Volberg et al.
estimated that the data represented a total of 1 977 436 employee-years; it also indicated that
60% of the workers came from five companies. It was not possible to link the accidents to
particular companies as there were missing data confirm that the larger companies provided data
for the entire period from 1995 to 2013. The data contained information on the location where
the accident occurred, the event description, the activity which resulted in injury or death, the
injured body part, and the nature of the injury. Additional information about the injured worker
and the arrangements for medical treatment and possible claims were also analyzed.
There were 21 line worker deaths and another 12 fatalities among electric power industry
workers from data used in this study: A total of 33 deaths among 18 companies that contributed
to the EPRI OSHD database. Volberg et al. (2017) indicated that only six of the companies
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provided information from 1995 to 2013 while another six provided data for the last decade. The
data presented were incomplete and therefore insufficient for exhaustive analysis. Fordyce et al.
(2007) were hampered by similar data integrity flaws a decade earlier. Just like Fordyce et al.
found, Volberg et al. indicated that welders were among the group of workers frequently
involved in workplace accidents. Younger welders, under-20 years old, predominantly suffered
injuries to the eyes or head. Older welders, over 65, were more likely to fall at the same level.
Generally, though, welders were less severely injured than line workers and therefore were less
often away from work due to injury. Meter Readers and line workers were the groups of
employees who mostly suffered from cuts and puncture wounds or sprains and strains. The
majority of meter readers were females while the opposite was true for line workers. Sprains and
strains injury victims suffered back and trunk type problems that tended to be long-term and high
cost. Contributing factors included overexertion, twisting, awkward motion, and task frequency
and duration. Most injuries occurred in summer while the least was in winter and linked to fewer
working days in winter. Slip, trip, and fall (STF) injuries occurred mostly in winter. Volberg et
al. (2017) found that Meter Reader injuries were difficult to explain and believed this was likely
a result of insufficient and ineffective training. Training in this context was both formal and
informal. Volberg et al. (2017) recommended further studies in this area. Office staff
predominantly suffered injuries to wrists and hands. That was not fully explained but could be
cumulative trauma disorders (CTD) and repetitive strain injuries; linked to office ergonomics.
Volberg et al. (2017) observed that the number of fatal accidents and injuries tended to
lessen each year from 1995 to 2013. It could have been due to higher safety consciousness
among workers, a proactive safety management approach, and improved workplace design and
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procedures. It could have also been a uniqueness of the database itself, underreporting of
accidents, the non-reporting of contractor related accidents, and the non-reporting of dangerous
near misses. Contractors in the electric power industry were usually hired to perform high-risk
tasks not done by the permanent workforce. Keeping and reporting of accidents involving
contractors were not a mandatory or compliance requirement for electric power companies
(Volberg et al., 2017). A significant shortcoming and limitation in this Volberg et al. study was
the voluntary nature of the reporting done by the companies that contributed to the EPRI OSHD
database and the incompleteness of that data. That was unchanged from the 2007 study
conducted by Fordyce et al. The different regulatory arrangements from different states and
regions in the United States also presented significant challenges and very likely led to critical
data being underrepresented. Underreporting of workplace accidents might even have occurred
because of management remuneration schemes that hinged the number of workplace accidents to
bonuses and other performance-related factors. There were other cases where an interpretation
of incidents as not recordable or near-misses when injuries occurred was not entirely ruled out by
Volberg et al. (2017).
Accident Investigation Techniques
Spain-wait, riatt. Accident investigations offered opportunities to discover the real
causes of workplace accidents for individuals at work to help prevent recurrence of similar future
accidents, and for proactive informing of workers about accidents that occurred. SalgueroCaparros et al. (2015) recognized that accident investigations were necessary for identifying the
contributing factors in an accident event. It was an essential input in the design and
implementation of barriers and other systemic protection against similar future accident events.
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Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) reviewed accident investigations conducted in Spain for the
period 2009 to 2012. These accidents occurred mainly in construction, agriculture,
manufacturing, and the service industry. Salguero-Caparros et al. identified omissions and
investigative flaws which they believed resulted in missed opportunities for regulators,
organizations, and managers to understand how accidents occurred and how best to mitigate
recurrence. There was an impression that with only the active fault identified, the investigations
were short on the in-depth latent organizational and management contributing factors. A
reasonable investigation was, therefore, one in which investigators extracted all the contributing
risk factors and analyzed them to determine how they combined to result in the accident event.
The control of these risks was critical to keeping workplaces safe from the effects of hazards.
Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) recommend the adoption of the European model for accident
investigations and access to accident investigation databases by investigators. SalgueroCaparros et al. ascribed that accident investigations should involve investigation planning, an
initial report, a data collection exercise, analysis of that information, report writing,
recommendations, the initiation of appropriate corrective action, implementation of
recommended actions, and follow-up activities for identification and evaluation of the
effectiveness of preventative measures.
Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) described the early accident causation model by Reason
(1997) as organizational accidents and another model by Hollnagel (1998) as human error.
These were two models that became widely used in accident investigations. There had been an
over-emphasis on the human error causes instead of the identification of systemic problems
outside the control of the accident victim (Dekker, 2006; Manuele, 2014). Salguero-Caparros et
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al. (2015) preferred the Jacinto and Aspinwall (2004) work accident investigation technique
(WAIT) as the systemic model that was simple to understand and implement even by
inexperienced investigators. Jacinto and Aspinwall (2004) posited that WAIT was a 9-step
process over two main phases of an accident investigation. Phase one involved legal and
regulatory requirements and constraints regarding the information about accidents and how that
information could be analyzed to determine the causes and factors that contributed to the
accident. These represented the what-happened observations about the accident. Phase two
involved an in-depth analysis of weaknesses and circumstances that were organizational
systemic and which contributed to the failure event. That represented the opportunities for
organizational control and for preventative action to be initiated.
Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) further indicated that the WAIT methodology later
evolved into a recording, investigation, and analysis of accidents (RIAA) model. SalgueroCaparros et al. (2015) found that in accident investigations, data collection was a significant
issue factored in the accident findings; if the data was congruent and homogenous, the findings
were credible; heterogeneous data were difficult to use in determining the exact cause of
accidents in the workplace. Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) forwarded a coding of data
recommendation for converting accident information into a homogeneous dataset. They found
that these codes led to the causal factors of accidents. Coding was also useful in understanding
the circumstances relevant to the accident. It was by following the factors that contributed to
accidents where opportunities for the implementation of adequate preventative measures to avert
other accidents existed.
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Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) suggested that the Phase one stage of accident
investigations was necessary to determine unsafe acts and unsafe conditions that actively
contributed as the immediate causes of the accident. The underlying causes, however, were not
found from the active, direct, and immediate reasons for accidents. These evolved from an
analysis of the reasons for the immediate factors which resulted in the event occurrence
(Salguero-Caparros et al., 2015). Latent causes from the evolving interactions of individual and
job factors with organizational procedures and work arrangements led to an understanding of
situations where errors could lead to a severe or fatal injury type accident. Salguero-Caparros et
al. (2015) proposed that direct, indirect, and ancillary cost estimates, of accident investigations,
could be used to indicate the monetary value of the effort. That way, the report, the financial
impact, and not only of the losses due to the accident event could be useful and help to determine
how best to prevent other accidents. Salguero-Caparros et al. (2015) also suggested that the
number of days that elapsed during an accident investigation should indicate a value of
opportunities lost, including time for other organizational activities.
Counting on everything for safety. Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) posited the thinking
that organizations through management and supervision application of safety values, policies,
rules, and procedures could influence workplace safety performance and outcomes in line with
expected organizational objectives. At the worker level, attitudes, behavior, and motivation were
shaped by the way that management and supervision implemented the safety arrangements;
considering the level of worker involvement and commitment to worker well-being. Safety
climate, in this context, represented the common perceptions regarding an organizational safety
program and the practical functioning of that program. It was a reflection of a shared
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understanding of organizational safety policies, safe work procedures and rules, and other safety
arrangements.
Miller et al. (2016) researched slip, trip, and fall (STF) in the workplace. STF was a
major workplace safety hazard and a causal factor in numerous cases where employees suffered
injuries. Miller et al. (2016) suggested a four-part model analyzing STF incidents stemming
from their company database, to determine hazard awareness among workers, an examination of
the effectiveness of preventive measures to mitigate the risks, and to institute a training focus on
how to maintain proper personal balance; especially when workers negotiated wet and slippery
work conditions. Miller et al. (2016) stressed the lifelong struggle of fall survivors to keep good
health and pain-free living; STF was the second leading cause of worker deaths after motor
vehicle accidents and more than one-fifth of all emergency room visits in the United States
(Miller et al., 2016). The traditional approach to identifying and mitigating STF challenges was
to focus on the environment and to encourage constant vigilance from workers. With vigilance
workers were expected to identify flooring problems, weather-related issues caused by rain,
snow, and ice, surface transitions, conditions and unevenness, and a combination of different
permutations of these factors (Miller et al., 2016). In this study, Miller et al. included the
orthodox review and analysis of previous incidents, actively encouraged the identification and
mitigation of hazards and risks, and supported worker training for maintaining personal balance.
This approach promoted changes to individual worker responsibility and actions, attitudes, and
behavior. It grew on a foundation where employees were able to identify and assess hazards and
the dangers that these presented. It was more an exercise in information management and
initiation of proactive actions to possible problems before these escalated into accident
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situations. The balance initiative was an organizational led initiative where workers were reoriented to appreciate newer techniques about human dynamics and how each person should
compensate for their unique requirements. It was a way for individuals to remain in control of
their actions, all aimed at ensuring that individuals were not injured and that near-misses did not
occur. Miller et al. (2016) showed that the ratio of slip, trip, and fall was 33:43:24 for all STF
cases. That was a simple but powerful breakdown. It was evident that snow and ice were not the
greatest STF factors.
Trip incidents were due to poor housekeeping, inappropriate supervision, and worker
inattention. These resulted in cases where debris, doors, stairway, carpet, cable/hose, bump stop,
and chairs all factored in similar ways. A closer focus of slip incidents revealed that wet surfaces
were the leading factor in 4 out of every ten slip-cases. Oily surface, vehicle entry/exit, debris,
ladders, tiled surfaces, and stairs were cumulatively less than wet surfaces as a contributor to
slip-cases. For almost one in every three slip-cases, the reason was listed as unknown (Miller et
al., 2016). For falls, one in every five cases was leg or ankle related. One in three was due to an
unsafe act or an undefined causal factor. Broken chair factored in one of every nine instances
while missed steps, walking too fast and an unknown factor each figured in one from every
twelve accident situations. Footwear, loss of balance, and foot placement were separately
identified as the causal factor in one from every twenty-five accident (Miller et al., 2016).
Miller et al. (2016) identified employee training as critical to shaping new attitudes and
behavior. The training was to encompass a common-sense approach to preventive actions as the
primary strategy and covered topics such as cell phone use and how that contributed to worker
distraction, especially in trip and fall situations (Miller et al., 2016). Another common-sense
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approach was to encourage a renewal of watching where one was going, using the right
footwear, not standing or rolling on chairs, and the benefits of keeping the work zone free from
debris and other unnecessary objects. Safety slogans developed for this purpose included eyecatching phrases meant to encourage worker safe-behavior and the idea of not becoming another
injury statistic.
Miller et al. (2016) indicated that the balance initiative was one where employees had to
individually consent to the program as it required confidential medical information that was
personal to the individual. That information was for personalized training on the balance
initiative. This STF program has been at NASA since 2013, and actively supported by the top
management and employees (Miller et al., 2016). The 4-plan program was aimed at an
organizational safety culture shift from employer-centric arrangements to make and keep the
workplace safe to an employer-employee-centric culture where employees could initiate actions
to mitigate hazards and to keep the workplace safe (Miller et al., 2016). That change was
possible because of changed attitudes, behavior, and appreciation for personal safety
responsibility.
Electric power industry. Fordyce et al. (2007) and Volberg et al. (2017) showed how
difficult it was to get appropriate near miss data for the U.S. electric power industry. The
unavailability of relevant data on electric industry accidents was also a significant negative.
Considerable difficulty in applying information derived from one study to other situations and
industries was that the prevailing conditions in both cases were not identical. Taking the results
obtained by Miller et al. (2016) for example, and applying that thinking to the electric power
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industry might result in an entirely different outcome; because of the uniqueness of the electric
power industry arena.
Missing data. Fordyce et al. (2007) and Volberg et al. (2017) lamented the absence of
near-miss data from the EPRI OSHD used in their respective studies in the U.S. electrical power
industry. Reason (2000) likened this absence of necessary information to not making the best
use of free lessons to help recognize when the precipice was very close: Reason further
suggested that it was a primary reason for the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power station accident.
Reason (2000) connected trust, a workplace culture that supported fair treatment, and a
blameless working environment as critical elements for a favorable safety climate in an
organization. Reason (2000) believed that by only considering accident causal factors as workerrelated and not organizational or systemic, finding the actual causes of accidents remained
elusive and challenging. The systemic factors such as work planning, equipment purchase,
material unavailability, inadequate planning, changed work procedures, work team selection, and
insufficient supervision control were among numerous other organizational factors outside of
worker control which contributed to accidents (Fordyce et al., 2007; Volberg et al., 2017;
Reason, 2000).
Delphi Research Technique
Using the Delphi technique, researchers could add to informed decision making in a
myriad of different technical, business, and policy environments and situations. The objectives
of this study included an understanding and explanation of the reasons why fatal and serious
workplace accidents were occurring in the electric power industry and the promotion of possible
ways to prevent future accidents. The aim developed through a Delphi technique where selected
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experienced and knowledgeable electric industry practitioners and professionals deliberated on
this high impacting topic. The Greek origins of the Delphi described a process where predictions
were the natural order. Today, however, methodological design drives this type of research for
results in cases where expertise and experience were significant influencing factors (Novakowski
& Wellar, 2008).
No suitable similar studies were found in the literature search to indicate that the Delphi
technique was ideal for research on how to prevent fatal and serious accidents in the electric
power industry. It was logical to approach this topic from the perspective that the experts would
be knowledgeable and experienced: That alone was an opportunity to gather valuable
information from them since an analysis of information they provided could be sufficient for a
critical and unbiased examination of the deep and underlying factors which could prove
important to this study. The approach adopted for the present study was to elucidate the Delphi
technique and describe the different study conditions that it was applied; with an explanation of
how previous study experiences could likely lead to positive results in the current circumstance.
In 1953, Dalkey and Helmer working at the Rand Corporation, developed the Delphi
technique. They aimed to explore the different strategies that the then Soviet Army could adapt
to deploy nuclear bombs (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008). The Rand Corporation was contracted
by the United States Air Force (USAF) to decipher this complicated and possibly dangerous task.
The Dalkey and Hemler approach were to poll American knowledge possessed by individuals
throughout the United States. Their aim was for each expert to provide critical information while
not being influenced by the communication challenges usually associated with in-person
interpersonal interactions. Linstone and Turoff (1975) indicated that one characteristic of the
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Delphi technique was a structuring of the communication process, especially group interaction
on complex problem resolution, for active participation by all members.
In this research, I was the monitor or facilitator. I facilitated group communication. I
coordinated the process so that the experts could address the research questions. I hosted the
questionnaires forwarded through Survey Monkey. Communication to the designated experts
was through emails sent via Survey Monkey. The experts then responded to each item on each
of the questionnaires. The response allowed me to conduct data harvesting, coding and
summarizing. The rounds of deliberations continued until consensus for each item occurred, or
to the point where agreement could not occur.
For the first round, I forwarded a list of reasons why accidents happened and invited the
participants to add to the list and to provide suggestions on how to possibly prevent accidents.
The participants each had two weeks to respond. This information and feedback, from the
research participants, were summarized, coded and used to generate questionnaires for the
second and subsequent Delphi rounds. A five-point Likert-type scale for the participant to
register their response to each of the questions in the second round was in the questionnaire.
Round 2 of the exercise commenced when participants received notification of Round 2 via
Survey Monkey.
After the second round, I reviewed each response and calculated statistical measures from
the received data to indicate what the leading answers were. The criteria, set as 70% or more of
the participants selecting a score of three or greater on the Likert-type scale for each item on the
questionnaire, was necessary for including the issue in the next round. These responses would
be used to determine the degree to which the respondents agreed or disagreed with a particular
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item (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008). I proceeded to develop a third-round questionnaire which
showed a summary of the answers to the items in the Round 2 questionnaire and what the overall
results for the entire group were.
Linstone and Turoff (1975) indicated that the greatest opportunity for response
convergence occurred in Round 1 and Round 2 of the Delphi. In this study, the Linstone and
Turoff (1975) Round 1 and Round 2 were the Round 2 and Round 3; This study was more in line
with the exercise done by Heitner, Kahn, and Sherman (2013). Novakowski and Wellar (2008)
described three different Delphi technique study categories: Normative, Forecasting, and Policy.
Normative Delphi explorations aimed to derive consensus on a challenging issue when starting
from a reference set by the level of current knowledge and thinking (Novakowski & Wellar,
2008). The Delphi technique could enable researchers to evaluate different frameworks used to
ascertain which future-plan or program may provide the best solutions based on the information
currently available. The electric power industry managers, supervisors, trainers, and workers
exposed to situations, where employees were at risk of becoming injured or even killed while at
work, provided opinions on how to prevent these from happening. The many different hazards,
hazardous conditions, work procedures, safety systems, work commitment, planning, techniques,
scheduling, and other micro details were known to these experts. Expert knowledge and
information were what this researcher relied on to derive an understanding of how to prevent
fatal and serious accidents in the electric power industry and to support future initiatives to
prevent worker injuries and death from workplace accidents.
A forecasting Delphi focussed on future predictions of events in situations where there
was little knowledge, or in cases where there were a diverse array of or conflicting information
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and ideas about the issue under examination (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008). Forecasting could
happen in different ways; from data extrapolation, indicator examination, to modeling, and also
by stochastic analysis type methods. A researcher employing the Forecasting Delphi technique
would likely process data from one or a combination of all of these methodologies. The Delphi
participants could even be experts at these analytical competencies, and their responses might
require me to also be capable and competent with these tools (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008).
The policy Delphi preference occurred in studies that involved political interests and matters or
consequence: In this type of study, the aim was not to generate consensus but with identifying
the range of possible contextual and politically relevant and influential parameters and variables
(Novakowski & Wellar, 2008; Sinclair, Oyebode, & Owens, 2016).
Despite the different Delphi categories, the fundamental approach to the Delphi technique
remained unchanged. These revolved around participant anonymity, an interaction between me
and the participants, coordination of group information, and the statistical measures used to
analyze data derived from the process. However, I aligned the method with the actual study for
best results from the exercise. In this current study, the preference was for a normative Delphi as
it allowed for consensus derived from the experience and knowledge of the experts as research
participants. Appendix C, shows the different forms of Delphi research as described by Hasson
and Keeney (2011).
The relevance of the Delphi technique to electric power industry accidents research
Linstone and Turoff (1975) promoted that when a research problem was not one where
precise quantitative assessment and analysis was preferred, the Delphi technique could be
beneficial particularly when a collection of ideas and subjective judgments would be available .
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In this context, the Delphi technique was ideal for investigating, understanding, and analyzing
how to prevent fatal and serious accidents occurring in the electric power industry. The Delphi
technique allowed for experts in the electric power industry to apply and utilize knowledge and
experience, and understanding of issues that contributed to workplace errors and accidents to the
extent that individuals were killed or permanently injured, and equipment destroyed.
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) extended the Delphi as being relevant in situations for analysis
of philosophical and conceptual issues with simple statistics and where objective observation
was neither easy to confirm nor deny. These conditions existed in the electric power industry, so
it made the Delphi methodology useful for examining the study topic.
Participants in a study done using the Delphi technique enjoyed equal and the same
opportunities to contribute towards the research. There were no interpersonal challenges;
situations where any individual views or mannerisms were dominant over others. Participants
expressed opinions, which I considered without ranking nor weighting. Each participant’s
response contributed equally to the statistical measures derived from the Delphi technique.
Workers' contribution to the research was treated similarly to those from managers and
supervisors. It also made the value of each input essential: That removed bias which could have
existed in other research methods, including phenomenology, case studies, or quantitative. I
developed questions were crucially important as careful crafting elicited the best responses from
the expert participants: If not adequately designed, the value of the expert deliberations might be
affected (De Loë, Melnychuk, Murray, & Plummer, 2016).
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Transparency and Research Design
The literature review was critical for the preparation of a comprehensive description of
current information, knowledge, and thinking about the research topic. It was apt for identifying
where gaps existed in current knowledge, what the research interests and direction were, the
theoretical challenges and misdirection, and how difficult relevant data was to find. The
literature review guided the determination of what new research was necessary, and what needed
clarification. The literature review was also be used to guide me on how to effectively identify
which subject area expert would be best for the Delphi exercise. The literature review guided me
on the research design determination. Research can be exploratory to find out more about the
research topic. It can also be confirmatory if the focus was on substantiating that a real
phenomenon remained valid. From the literature review, I effectively developed the research
content, and this helped to determine the best research direction and what research methodology
should be adopted. It was crucially important from the points highlighted that conduct of a
proper review by me was for the best indication of current knowledge and research direction on a
given research topic.
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) indicated that the more common literature review
strategies included an acknowledgment of the prevailing ideas about the topic, the learning
direction, and polling of the best topic repositories on the subject; professional associations,
industry journals, research academicians, regulatory resources among other resources.
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) cautioned that the omission of critical resource sources and
overemphasis on other sources were equally likely to produce research bias as I could be
influenced by one thinking and neglect another body of ideas about the same topic. That was
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likely to affect the overall credibility of the entire research. Novakowski and Wellar (2008)
indicated that pretest and trial run were distinct research activities even though there were
significant confusion and misuse of the terms among researchers. Ackoff (1956) indicated that
the pretest was done by a researcher when the research methodology was undecided and for
effective finalization of the best approach for the actual research.
Acoff further indicated that the trial run was conducted to determine and to fine-tune the
research instrument and so enhance the research viability and efficiency. Novakowski and
Wellar (2008) suggested that when there was insufficient research information on how to
proceed, engaging experts was acceptable for researchers to contact for suggestions and ideas to
consider. I must first accept that an expert-based technique was suitable for the study and
contacting individuals before the research commenced, were only for me to eventually crystallize
and settle on the most suitable way forward. Aside from the Delphi, suitable expert contact
methods included surveys, professional polling, roundtables, workshops, and brainstorming with
each approach providing research advantages confirmed in a pretest (De Loë, Melnychuk,
Murray, & Plummer, 2016; Miller, 2006).
A background report for each expert participating in the Delphi technique was necessary
so that they could understand the reasons for conducting the research, what the research topic
was and how the research process could work. It specified who were possible candidates (skills,
experience, knowledge, interests, and expertise). It was essential that I included the research
problem statement as part of the background report to the experts. That prevented time delay
and eventual participant disinterest if they were fully aware of the specific research before
committing to taking part in the exercise. Helmer (1983) referred to this process as the Delphi
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Round 0. It was essential that I sent sufficient information to each expert for the most informed
decision to be made by the participant. That proved to be a financially wise decision as delays
added to the overall cost of the research.
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) suggested that in some instances, even with the provision
of sufficient information to the participants, a Round 0 was required primarily due to the
complexity and the vagueness of the research topic. In this study, once the selection of experts
occurred from experienced and knowledgeable industry practitioners, the initial thinking was that
a Round 0 was not necessary. The mitigating factor was how time-consuming the entire research
was and how likely participants could maintain interest for that duration. There were different
ways that a researcher could circumvent research delay: these included expert interviews,
conducting focus group sessions, and brainstorming with a group of experts who were not be
engaged otherwise in the study. The focus group option was impractical for this study.
The selection of research participants covered the entire United States. That made a
focus group interaction almost impossible unless there could have been a video conference in
which all the participants could simultaneously attend. Even if this was likely, it was not a first
choice option and therefore was ruled out entirely. The interpersonal challenges that could occur
would only compound the overall difficulties in the research exercise. Conducting interviews
was an attractive option and was likely to factor in this research. Therefore, it was a possible
consideration until I was satisfied that there were sufficient candidates for a Delphi study.
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) suggested that interviews could replace the Round 1 of the
Delphi. This approach was not adopted but remained a viable option up to the commencement
of Round 1 of the Delphi.
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Linstone and Turoff (1975) cautioned that care must be taken to ensure that questions
were clear, written in language that was not ambiguous, and used terms that the experts would
have a common understanding. The content density of each sentence must not be such that the
participant would be overwhelmed and taxed. Novakowski and Wellar (2008) suggested using a
diagram or a pictorial as a representation of the process and how the different stages would
follow: That would be an excellent way for the researcher to convey crucial information to the
expert about the research exercise and how the exercise should progress. The approach preferred
for this research was a modified version of the Novakowski and Wellar (2008) flowchart for
normative Delphi, is shown below in Figure 11. Professor Wellar provided permission for
replication of their flowchart for normative Delphi in this study; This permission forms part one
of Appendix A (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008). Professor Wellar confirmed in an email that Dr.
Nonakowski had passed before the request for permission to use the flowchart in this study,
reproduced in Appendix D, was with the permission of Professor Wellar (Novakokowski &
Wellar, 2008).
A normative Delphi was employed to determine how to prevent fatal and serious
workplace accidents in the electric power industry, is shown in Figure 11: This was a
modification of the Novakowski and Wellar (2008) model as shown in Appendix D.
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Literature review
Establish the need for research
Establish the knowledge gaps

Dissemination of research results
Provide summary results to
panel members

Step 2

Preparation of draft
Background report
Survey

Step 3

Identification of potential participants
Identify potential trial-run participants
Identify potential Delphi panel
members

Anonymous post-Delphi survey
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Analysis of final results
Response stability testing
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Step 12
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Telephone or e-mail contact and
interviews Select trial run candidates
Select Delphi panel members
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Step 5a
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Step 9
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survey

Step 11

Step 10

Incorporation of feedback from
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Retabulation of responses
Response stability testing
Editing of relevant opinions

Step 5b

Round 1 (begins)
Initial distribution of background
report and survey to panel

Step 8

Round 2: redistribution of the
survey

Step6
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Initial distribution of background
report and survey to panel

Step 7

Incorporation of feedback from Round 1.
Incorporate new variables from open-ended
questions
Tabulation of round-1 results
Rewording; refinement of survey
Stabilization of conceptual hierarchy

Figure 11: Modified Flowchart for a Normative Delphi. Adapted from N. Novakowski, & B.
Wellar (2008). Reprinted with permission.

Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 2 is built on a platform informed by previous research into the same area of study
or from similar studies even if those are not identical or from the same setting. The learnings
derived from earlier studies and research literature are carefully crafted to build support for the
current research on the accidents that were occurring in the electrical power industry. These are
credible and from the most recent and relevant research work. The importance of peer work and
emphasis is tempered for a balance with the research literature from books, periodicals and
research dissertations from sources that are credible for this particular research. These are, for
this exercise, assumed to be valid, at least, to ensure that the research learnings and knowledge
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up to and before conducting this actual research and the information synthesized to show how
the prior findings are crucial in determining the exact knowledge base on the topic (Patton, 2015;
Ravitch & Carl, 2016).

This literature review is interpreted and informed by unbiased intent

and fairness. That is possible because it shows how the information is relevant to the current
study (Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Saldaña, 2016).
The primary intent was to conduct a Delphi research exercise and to use the Bolman and
Deal four-frame model. Selection of the Delphi participants came from electric utility experts in
the United States. Electric industry regulators were different for different regions in the United
States, but industry practice is closely aligned. Professionals practicing throughout the industry
were university and professionally trained and came from the geographical span covering the
United States (Feng, Teo, Ling, & Low, 2014). That made for well-informed industry experts
effectively helping in determining how best to prevent workers from being killed or severely
injured at work.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this normative Delphi research was to prevent workplace accidents and
serious and fatal worker injuries by gaining consensus on the reasons why these occur and
desirable and feasible solutions from a select group of experienced U.S. electric power industry
experts including trainers, employees, supervisors, and managers. This chapter contains a
description of specific research methods and practices I used to conduct this study. In it, I also
discuss the tools and strategies I used for analyzing the collected data.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Design
I explored the following research question:
What is the consensus of opinion of a panel of experts in the electrical power industry
regarding desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious workplace accidents occurring in
the United States?
The focus of this study was two-fold. First, I sought to determine what trainers,
employees, supervisors, and managers experienced with electric power industry accidents,
attributed as the real causes of workplace accidents, worker fatalities, and serious injuries.
Second, with an understanding of the real causes, my focus was on identifying ways to prevent
future accidents, worker fatalities, and serious injuries.
I used a qualitative method for this study. Qualitative researchers attempt to understand
human behavior and actions by focusing on unique people and factors. Quantitative researchers
develop and test hypotheses to prove or disprove researcher thinking. Mixed methods research
combines elements of qualitative and quantitative studies (Barnham, 2015). Qualitative research
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promotes the likelihood of understanding and appreciating human factors, and from that,
evaluating unique world experiences and environments (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013).
Qualitative research methodologies support flexible, evolving, and emerging research exercises,
unlike quantitative studies where boundary conditions are rigid and tested for acceptance
(Barnham, 2015). Practical application of quantitative research had traditionally been more
useful in natural sciences than in social science despite a sizeable percentage of social science
studies done using a statistical approach (Fassinger & Morrow, 2013). While quantitative
studies are premised on clearly delineated researcher-set conditions for acceptable and not
acceptable results, they do not clearly explain the human influences that significantly impact
those results. Qualitative studies are thus better suited for exploring the human factors where the
delineation of acceptable and non-acceptable is difficult to accomplish (Fassinger & Morrow,
2013).
In this qualitative study, I used the normative Delphi technique (Novakokowski &
Wellar, 2008; Yousuf, 2007). The normative Delphi technique was referred to as the classical
Delphi technique by Hasson and Keeney (2011). In it, the primary focus is to obtain a consensus
among experts as research participants. A full discussion of different aspects of a Delphi study
from its origins to its limitations follows in this chapter. The discussion includes different
applications where the Delphi technique is preferred, the rationale and benefit of this research
method. Hasson and Keeney (2011) listed several different Delphi techniques and showed how
these were relevant for different research perspectives. These techniques ranged from the
classical, where the emphasis was on gaining consensus of expert opinion among the research
participants, to the e-Delphi which depended on the nature of the research topic (Hasson &
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Keeney, 2011; Novakokowski & Wellar, 2008). Aligning successful and reliable outcomes with
safe work strategies to achieve organizational safety objectives is a difficult task. Barnham
(2015) noted that qualitative research involves a psychological approach where the focus is on
understanding why individuals think and behaved in unique ways.
The Delphi technique supported a process of iterations to establish consensus among the
research participants through questionnaires and feedback I coordinated (see Heitner et al.,
2013). The Delphi technique involved a process of expert participant selection based on
qualifications, knowledge, and recognition of experience and exemplary practice (see Heitner et
al., 2013). Participants’ interacted with me while remaining anonymous to the other expert
participants (see Brady, 2015). Information gathered from each participant was collated so that
only I was able to redistribute information to participants over the subsequent iterations
(Cegielski, Bourrie, & Hazen, 2013), and only I combined and analyzed individual participant
responses (Eleftheriadou et al., 2015).
Rationale for Using the Delphi Technique
Generally, the safety management systems employed in the electric power industry are
superior to minimal standards guaranteed by industry, federal, state, and regional regulators in
the United States (OSHA, 2017). Therefore, accidents are an indication that significant problems
exist. The versatility of and straightforward approach of the normative Delphi technique made it
appropriate to this inquiry into accidents in the electric power industry. The literature review
done as part of this research allowed me to set questions for Round 1 of this normative Delphi
study. The existing lack of knowledge, the gap between extant research, and data on electric
power industry accidents was sufficient reason for conducting this study. A phenomenological
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approach was possible. This method would have limited the geographic span to a particular
region. That was inconsistent with my focus. Groenewald (2004) listed core phenomenological
research principles as involving field notes, unstructured interviews, memo writing, participant
essays, and group discussion. None of these were relevant to this study. Larkin, Watts, &
Clifton (2006) indicated that phenomenological research demands required the researcher to
balance judgment with the broader context of the lived experiences of the participant. In this
study, I was not focused on individual consciousness and experience, but rather on the extraction
of knowledge possessed by the research participants about workplace accidents that they know
about in working conditions and arrangements that they, as experts and specialists, knew.
A case study was also possible. Yin (2013) indicated that case study research is used to
explore a phenomenon that is bounded by time and space. Case studies are good when
researchers seek answers to "how" or "why" questions and on real-life events over which there is
little control (Yin, 2017). Yin (2013) also indicated that the research design and analysis must
align with the research method for research success. My study was incompatible with the
specific focus that case studies support. For this study, I wanted to understand the issues that
resulted in workers becoming fatally or severely injured and to find solutions to prevent fatal and
serious workplace injuries. I did not select the case study option because it would have required
the specific involvement of individuals with detailed information about particular circumstances,
locations, working conditions, and detailed information about accidents that occurred. That
approach would require research participants to agree to conditions where they might be or could
be liable for contributing to accidents where individuals were killed or seriously injured at work.
This result was not the focus of this research.
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Role of the Researcher
Sanjari, Bahramnezhad, Fomani, Shoghi, and Cheraghi (2014) noted that a researcher in
qualitative studies is a process tool used for completion of the study. Patton (2015) extended this
by suggesting that qualitative research depends on clearly defined and identified researcher roles
articulated to the research participants. The first research quality management opportunity was
in the research literature search. Another chance to remove bias was in the identification and
selection of suitable experts for this Delphi study (see Yin, 2013). A third opportunity to remove
bias was for me to declare beforehand that while there was no familiarity with prospective U.S.
electric industry participants for this study, I was an industry practitioner with extensive
knowledge in the Caribbean and Canada. In this study, I was responsible for data collection.
Because there was the potential for individual bias, I made a deliberate effort to maintain
research integrity throughout the process. I was particularly careful during data processing and
analysis, thematic categorizing, summarising, coding, and development of questions for the
Delphi rounds so that my thinking and perspectives were not actively influential in the shaping
of the research (Sanjari et al., 2014). Development of the questionnaire items for the subsequent
rounds were opportunities for me to remove bias that could influence the research direction and
credibility (see Gobo & Mauceri, 2014).
One significant researcher influence, as coordinator of the research exercise, was the
maintenance of anonymity among the Delphi Panelists as research participants. The entire study
grew on a foundation that participants should freely contribute in an uninhibited manner
supported by individuals remaining anonymous. I was the critical axle for the maintenance of
that trust. I maintained all safeguards for research reliability, credibility, and trustworthiness by

145
strict and confidential handling of the identity of the Delphi panelists and the integrity of the data
provided by these experts (see Golkar & Crawley, 2014; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, & Murphy,
2013).
Tufford and Newman (2012) indicated qualitative researchers use bracketing to mitigate
preconceptions that may taint the entire process. I was mindful that familiarity with the research
topic because of professional practice must remain subservient to the quality controls barriers
necessary for removal of research bias. Failure to recognize and to remove this bias could have
been deleterious to the study.
Methodology
The normative, commonly known as classical or conventional, Delphi technique involved
a process of iterations which commenced with an open-ended question or set of questions shared
with expert contributors (Donohoe & Needham, 2009; Hasson & Keeney, 2011). Open-ended
questions encouraged a free sharing of information by expert contributors (Yousuf, 2007). The
responses ranged from a first-hand recollection of a sequence of events and how that impacted
on a particular research topic, to the opinion of the participant on items where there were no set
or agreed to guidelines or common knowledge (Novakowski & Wellar, 2008). From the initial
responses to the Round 1 questions, I developed the Delphi second round questionnaire. For
Round 1 of this study, participants commented on a list of reasons for accidents in the electric
power industry, provided additional reasons for accidents, proffered possible solutions to
accidents, and suggested ways to prevent further and future accident events.
In the second round, participants provided information on the desirability and feasibility
of possible issues identified in the first round. The solutions then formed the basis for the Round
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3 questionnaire where participants explored the importance of the issues that met the acceptance
criteria from Round 2. In Round 4, participants provided their confidence and final agreement
on the relevant and important solutions to accidents, where electrical power industry workers
were seriously injured or killed, derived through the earlier rounds of this study.
In Round 2, participants responded to two different and distinct 5-point Likert-type
scales; one for responses that they considered as desirable and another for what they considered
as feasible. Where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a score of 3 or more on
both Likert-type scale for an issue, the same item remained for inclusion in the Round 3
questionnaire (Brady, 2015). In Round 3 I provided information feedback on Round 2, via
Survey Monkey, to each participant, and this contained comments about the overall responses
that differed from the response from that particular participant. For each Round 3 question, the
participants were invited to review the feedback and to provide a response on a 5-point Likerttype scale developed to measure the importance of the solutions (Brady, 2015; Heitner et al.,
2013).
This process continued until the results from the exercise met the consensus condition
that I set or if there was no likelihood of a consensus. If there were no consensus, the study
would have ended prematurely with a contrary conclusion. I set the necessary conditions for
consensus or agreement condition. As an example, more than 70% of the participants must
support a point by selecting a score of more than 2 on the Likert-type scale for any item to reach
a consensus after the study. This condition signified that the item is desirable, feasible,
important, and with the confidence of more than 70% of the Delphi panelists. If for any question,
70% or more of the participants selected a score of 1 or 2 on the 5-point Likert-type scale then
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the consensus point remained unmet. Heitner et al. (2013) used a similar approach to determine
consensus: A statistical determination made with more than 80% of the respondents’ responses
for each question.
I assumed great responsibility for ensuring that information shared with the research
participants were correctly analyzed and did not misinform the experts about progress on the
study. I could have influenced actual expert-participant responses and effectively bias the study
in this way. The main research aim was to encourage free thinking and not to condition reactions
in an artificial and biased manner (Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Sandrey & Bulger, 2008). If the
research did not end after the fourth round, participants might have become disinterested and not
continue to provide quality feedback (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). Research delay was also possible
if I was unable to return feedback on the participants’ responses promptly (Hsu & Sandford,
2007).
Linstone and Turoff (2011) indicated that a weakness of the Delphi was that researchers
did not press expert participants far enough to encourage them to change opinions, to think
differently, and to challenge their fundamental assumptions. Linstone and Turoff (2011) further
suggested that researchers should focus more on divergent thinking and why experts feel
differently about critical issues rather than shared and convergent positions that provide
consensus. A low drop-off rate of research participants was usually a good indication of research
credibility and resulted in confidence. The acceptable sample size for a Delphi technique was
often around 12 to 20 participants (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).
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Participant Selection Logic
Electricity was a widely known hazard, and it was dangerous if not managed, just like
fire (Capelli-Schellpfeffer et al., 1999). Experienced electric power industry managers,
supervisors, skilled workers, and trainers were practitioners with the ability to recognize the
dangers associated with electricity and the other hazards associated with work activities in this
sphere. Practitioners with more than 10 years in this industry should possess sufficient industry
knowledge, understanding of systems, technologies, rules, procedures, and regulatory framework
that drive this industry (Albert & Hallowell, 2013).
Hsu and Sandford (2007) advised that a careful selection of research expert participant
candidates was crucial to the eventual success of the study. Linstone and Turoff (1975) and
Hallowell and Gambatese (2010), indicated that experts for Delphi studies must be highly
regarded, respected, and well-known in the area of focus for the study. Baker, Lovell, and Harris
(2006) described experts suitable for Delphi technique as individuals with knowledge,
experience, understanding of policies, procedures as well as the practices and how these were
relevant for the field.
For this study, practicing, experienced, and knowledgeable electric power industry
managers, supervisors, workers, and trainers formed a purposive sample of experts. This
normative Delphi approach aimed to determine how to prevent fatal and serious accidents that
were happening in the U.S. electric power industry. Experts were individuals sourced through
Social Media (LinkedIn).
For this study, an expert panelist satisfied three criteria: (a) was a manager, supervisor,
trainer, or worker in the electric power industry; (b) had more than 10 years of industry practice
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and experience; and (c) had knowledge about accidents in the electric power industry in the
United States. Five participants in each category, manager, supervisor, trainer, or worker, were
originally considered as adequate for this study. A minimum sample size of 20 was sufficient.
Heitner et al. (2013) considered an acceptable sample size of 30. For drop-offs, higher than 10%
would negatively impact research influence and success (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). To cater for
this possibility, I focussed on prompt feedback to participants and careful analysis of data so that
consensus could become possible without participants compromising their individual views in
favor of group thinking (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). For this study, a similar approach to that used
by Heitner et al. (2013) was an acceptable option. The number of research participants would
vary depending on the research topic and my preference. Saturation of information depended on
the actual research problem, the number of participants, and my focus (Heitner et al., 2013).
Hallowell and Gambatese (2010) cautioned that the sample size must always accommodate
possible participant drop-off during the study and therefore the minimum sample size must be
avoided and not researcher preferred. That avoidance was essential for maintaining research
credibility. Hsu and Sandford (2007) cautioned that a large expert sample could make the data
difficult to manage and thus can require longer times for researcher processing and analysis.
Table 5 lists different sample sizes used in previous studies. For this study, the expectation was
that 20 participants would provide credible results and saturation especially if there were five
individuals in each category of participants. Another five panelists were enlisted to start the
study to allow for panelist drop-off before the conclusion of the process; to equal the 25
participants who contributed to the Heitner et al. (2013) study. A panel size greater than 30
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could contribute to researcher inefficiencies and delays that could promote panelist drop-out
(Yousuf, 2007).
Table 5
Recommended Sample Size

Source

Different Source

7 – 10

Linstone and Turoff, (1975)

Donohoe and Needham
(2009)

3 - 80
15 - 20

Rowe and Wright (1999)
Delbecq, Van de Ven, and
Gustafson (1975)

Hsu and Sandford (2007)

>20

Heitner et al. (2013)

Van Hecke et al. (2015)

Note. Sample sizes from previous studies

Selection of participants for multi-round Delphi study. For this normative Delphi
study, invitees were potential experts from each of the operating across the United States. I sent
correspondence to well regarded regulatory agencies and professional organizations requesting
assistance in identifying possible participants for this study. I also searched public social media
(LinkedIn) for possible participants. Participants for this study needed to satisfy the conditions
listed for an Expert Panelist previously defined in Chapter 1. An expert panelist was an
individual who met three criteria: (a) be a manager, supervisor, trainer, or worker in the electric
power industry; (b) have more than ten years of industry practice and experience; (c) have
knowledge about accidents in the electric power industry in the United States.
E-mail invitations via Survey Monkey went to other prospective candidates; this
happened when I received feedback from potential candidates identified through LinkedIn. No
participant was accepted for this study before I conducted a suitability check. I required that
participants provide demographic information on their years of industry experience, particulars

151
about their specialty, certification, and education; Participants, identified from LinkedIn, were
requested to confirm their information publicly available through that medium.
Each participant received a personal request which aligned with the Walden University
policies for researching human subjects. All regulatory requirements at the federal, state,
regional, industry, and professional levels were satisfied in the pursuit of this study. The
invitation (via Survey Monkey) included information about the purpose of this study. It included
a summary of the research methodology, the level of contribution and requested participation
from potential participants, an estimate of the time that they were asked to commit, reasons why
the individual was suitable, and how vital and valuable this study is.
Instrumentation
The first round research focus came from the literature review conducted as part of this
study. The reasons for accidents, worker deaths, and injuries, as identified in previous studies
were I analyzed before the commencement of the Delphi process. The data derived from the
literature review guided the development of questions for Round 1 of the Delphi process.
Demographic information about the participants gleaned from questions added for this specific
purpose. These questions are in Appendix E. I grouped the Round 1 questions in a manner that
would come from the literature review and the research questions which aligned the reasons for
worker fatalities and injuries from accidents occurring in the U.S. electric power industry and
why these occurred.
Round 1 commenced when the expert panelists received the questionnaire, accessed
through Survey Monkey. Results of Round 1 were analyzed to find the major themes about
possible solutions as identified from the Delphi panelists responses and coded in line with the
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Bolman and Deal four-frame model. These themes formed the basis for Round 2 questions
where participants responded on a 5-point Likert-type scale to each of the issues identified in
Round 1. The items derived from Round 2 provided input for the Round 3 questionnaire. In
Round 2, participants responded to two different and distinct 5-point Likert-type scales; one for
responses that they considered as desirable and another where they considered how feasible
addressing and correcting these issues were to prevent accidents, serious worker injuries and
deaths. Where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a score of 3 or more on both
Likert-type scales for the same issue, the item remained for inclusion in the Round 3
questionnaire. For each of Round 3 and Round 4, participants responded to a 5-point Likerttype survey. The Likert-type scales mirrored those used by Heitner et al. (2013). Desirability in
Round 2, rated as 5 for highly desirable to 1 for highly undesirable and feasibility rated from 5
for definitely feasible to 1 for definitely unfeasible. Rating in Round 3 ranged from 5 to 1 for
extremely important to not at all important respectively. Rating in Round 4 ranged from 5 to 1
for definitely certain to unreliable. Questions from Round 3 where 70% or more of the
participant responses selected a score of 3 or more on the 5-point Likert-type scale were treated
as important, and as a consensus item. In Round 4 participants rated their confidence in the
overall findings of consensus-based solutions emergent from Round 3.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
Data collection from participating experts in the Delphi technique multi-round process
came from details volunteered about their competencies which justified their selection consistent
with a definition of expert I provided. For Round 1, participants received the questionnaire via
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Survey Monkey. This questionnaire listed questions I set , and determined from the literature
review conducted as part of this study (see Appendix E).
For the first round of this study, I provided a listing of possible reasons about how
accidents happened in the U.S. electric power industry and invited participants’ comments and
responses. Participants provided an understanding of what to do to prevent future accidents.
Novakowski and Wellar (2008) suggested that the participants should be allowed to indicate
other pertinent information relevant at this stage of the process and not captured before in the set
of Round 1 questions. I conducted data collation and coding from this phase and developed a
summary of the top solutions identified by 70% or more participants in Round 1. This summary
was on the opening page of Round 2.
In Round 2, participants responded, via Survey Monkey, to two different and distinct 5point Likert-type scales; one for responses that they considered as desirable and another where
they considered how feasible addressing and correcting these issues were to prevent accidents,
serious worker injuries and deaths. Where 70% or more of the participant responses selected a
score of 3 or more on both Likert-type scales for the same issue, the item remained for inclusion
in the Round 3 questionnaire. For each of Round 3 and Round 4, participants responded to a 5point Likert-type survey. The Likert-type scales mirrored those used by Heitner et al. (2013).
Desirability in Round 2, rated as 5 for highly desirable to 1 for highly undesirable and feasibility
rated from 5 for definitely feasible to 1 for definitely unfeasible. I then provided the results of
Round 2 and a survey developed for the Round 3 via Survey Monkey. The participants then
responded to each Round 3 question and ranked these according to the five ratings on the Likert-

154
type scale from "not important at all" to "extremely important" based on their understanding of
the importance of the issue.
My aim in Round 3 was determining the importance of different points derived from
Round 2. For Round 4, responses from Round 3 where 70% or more of the participant responses
selected a score of 3 or more on the 5-point Likert-type scale; were treated as important and
extracted. In Round 4 participants rated their confidence in the overall findings of consensusbased solutions emergent from Round 3. These solutions, based on the Delphi panelists
responses, to accidents in the electrical power industry where workers were seriously injured or
killed and derived through the different Delphi rounds of this study, might prove integral to the
prevention of future accidents in this industry and elsewhere. The study ended after Round 4. A
real consensus in this study came from important, desirable, and feasible factors that were agreed
to by the Delphi panelists. The factors identified as desirable and feasible and important
constituted the major findings of this study. The desirable and feasible factors that were not
deemed important could provide opportunities for further research.
For each round of this study, I sent an email via Survey Monkey to each participant, and
they had two weeks to respond to the questionnaire. I programmed a reminder email on Survey
Monkey for participants who did not respond after the first week. For each round, the
questionnaire closed after two weeks. Afterward, the participants were no longer be able to
access the questionnaire. I performed data analysis at the close of each round and developed
questionnaires for Round 2, Round 3, and Round 4 accordingly. Once the research ended, after
Round 4, I forwarded to each participant a “thank you” communication to formally close the
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Delphi exercise. I provided a summary document listing the main research results to each
participant as part of the process close-out.
Data Analysis Plan
Data from participants responses derived from the Delphi Round 1 are analyzed
thematically based on a review of common terms and ideas. A further grouping of the codes
derived from the thematic approach according to the Bolman and Deal four-frame model (as
shown in Table 2 in Chapter 2 Overview of the Four-Frame Model) followed. This grouping then
guides the development of questions for the Delphi Round 2. Given that participants are
electrical power industry practitioners, there were similar terms used by these individuals in their
responses to the questions. I searched for these common terms and grouped them into the same
data category. As an example, a high voltage power line and a high-power installation had the
same meaning once I identified the context of each response. I conducted an examination and
coding analysis of participant responses based on consensus and commonality of terms used,
individual views, the frequency of use of words, and concepts. I then assessed the data derived
from the word frequency, grouped them into broad categories, and identified fundamental ideas
and issues. This approach was used to reduce different responses from Round 1 into broad
categories from which I developed the Round 2 questions. This thematic analysis proved
beneficial as it allowed for the organization of the questions in Round 2 in a logical, systematic
way while seeking participant responses from Round 2 and in the later rounds.
Assessment and analysis of responses received from the Delphi Round 1, was done by
tagging of different themes that evolved from the data derived from the Delphi process and other
broader groups where multiple themes, aligned with analysis. The identification of actual
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themes and data categories, in this study, occurred when the responses from the Delphi Round 1
exercise are obtained and assessed. I analyzed the participants' responses from Round 1 by
employing a direct transfer of data from Survey Monkey into NVivo 12 Plus. Each response
from Round 1 formed the input for the Round 2 questionnaire.
The aim in Round 2 was to determine the desirability and feasibility of the issues
identified in Round 1 about the solutions to these accidents, and how to prevent other accidents.
The items from Round 2 with a score of 3 or higher on the Likert-type scale and endorsed by
70% or more respondents proceeded to Round 3. The aim of Round 3 was to determine the
importance of possible solutions after Round 2. Data received from each expert in the Delphi
Round 3 with a score of 3 or higher on the Likert-type scale and endorsed by 70% or more
respondents for each item proceeded to Round 4. For each item on the Round 3 questionnaire,
the Delphi panelists were asked to indicate their choice from most important to not important in
determining solutions to workplace accidents. Most important was reflected as a five (5) on the
Likert-type scale for Round 3 and not important was the lowest rank (Heitner et al., 2013).
In Round 4 participants rated their confidence in the overall findings of consensus-based
solutions emergent from Round 3 for accidents where electrical power industry workers may
become seriously injured or killed. Dalkey and Helmer (1963) suggested that these were
powerful tools that could describe data in a simple but effective manner. Hsu and Sandford
(2007), Heitner et al. (2013), and Linstone and Turoff, (1975) converged on this view.
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Issues of Trustworthiness
Credibility
The primary attribute for a credible study was how believable it was. In a Delphi study,
consensus promoted that belief. As the research participants remained anonymous, it was
imperative that I crafted the research documentation so that the quality of the responses and the
awareness of the participants blended to widespread acceptability that they were appropriate and
sufficient to review the research problem and questions. That required researcher vigilance and
diligence to prevent possible bias in participant selection and their responses to the items on the
different questionnaires (Houghton et al., 2013). Keeping a reflective research journal
(McGuinness & Brien, 2007), exercising a process of bracketing (Tufford & Newman, 2012),
and achieving saturation from the responses of the Delphi panelists, supported research
credibility. Confidence derived from Round 4 deliberations in this study also supported research
credibility.
This researcher did not favor the pre-test as it would have been only possible after the
research participants were known and selected. My dependence on previously available studies
and data, an assessment of that data using the Bolman and Deal four-frame model, and data
derived from the Delphi technique supported research credibility. I also achieved credibility by
keeping a reflexive journal and audit traceable documentation.
Transferability
Patton (2015) indicated that transferability surrounded the responsibility I assumed as the
researcher to ensure that results derived can be scrutinized and the process can find relevance in
other research areas. One risk for this current study was that it focussed on the U.S. electric
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power industry. It was possible that the unique nature of this industry made transferability
challenging. Transferability could also depend on how convincing I was in describing the
research sampling methods, the process of selecting research participants, and how well the
results were crafted and believable. This study could prove useful in further studies conducted
on the U.S. electrical power industry and elsewhere.
Dependability
The efficiency with which I recorded the research process, the quality of data and the
consistency achieved throughout the study were vital for the dependability of the study (Ravitch
& Carl, 2016). My first test as the researcher was to provide consistent details to each Delphi
panelist for a proper understanding of the process and what their roles were. I improved the
likelihood of providing consistent details as indicated by keeping and utilizing a reflective
research journal (McGuinness & Brien, 2007). The best indication of research dependability was
panelist dropouts from the process, before the completion of the overall exercise, as that could
have brought the results into focus and possibly derail the entire study. Dropouts in a study
where the participants could become disinterested or if the process was confusing and not
providing for consensus negatively impact the dependability of the study (Dalkey & Helmer,
1963; Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Yousuf, 2007).
Confirmability
Patton (2015) suggested that research bias was a critical influence on research
confirmability. Yin (2013) extended this into the tangible evidence from any research which, if
invalid, can set conditions for research challenge and loss of confirmability. In this study, the
focus on maintaining data that could be reproduced to substantiate research thinking and
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direction was paramount in ensuring research confirmability. Strategies for data coding, for
example, were sufficient to encourage support reproducibility of the research exercise. The
conceptual framework for this study, Bolman and Deal four-frame model, supported and fully
explained strategic suitability, relevance, and confidence (Bolman & Deal, 2013). That was a
possible risk to the research confirmability in this study. It was a versatile and practical model
and not considered high risk or as a concern to the successful completion of this research. I
enhanced research dependability by keeping appropriate research records that can provide for
successful audit trails (Tufford & Newman, 2012).
Ethical Procedures
Research students at Walden University must comply with the research guidelines set by
the institution. These guidelines referenced the university accepted standards of ethics and the
federal regulations that governed research work. IRB review of the current research maintained
these standards (Walden University, 2018). As the researcher, I accepted my responsibility to
maintain the highest ethical, research, and moral standards as I aimed to accomplish this research
into the prevention of fatal and serious accidents in the U.S. electric power industry.
Before contacting individuals to determine whether they may be suitable as Delphi
panelists, I received IRB approval. The Walden University IRB approval number is 02‐28‐19‐
0648285 which will expire on February 27, 2020. A participant consent form was drafted and
submitted to the IRB for that approval. The IRB clarified all permissions needed for this study.
This approval was necessary before personal communication with prospective panelists
occurred. That communication included an informed consent form which guaranteed that
participation in this study was voluntary and contact information so that the individual could
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query concerns or questions that they had. The informed consent communication on Survey
Monkey with research participants included the research question and purpose. The research
risks, benefits, and a reminder that panelists can withdraw from the study if that option was
preferred were also in the informed consent communication. No personal information was
solicited outside of vital demographics necessary to ensure an audit trail and for research
credibility. The Informed Consent form was the initial page of the Survey Monkey survey.
Potential participants saw the informed consent and were asked to click that they agreed. If there
was agreement, they continued with the survey. If they disagreed the survey ended, and Survey
Monkey thanked them for participating. It was not possible or practical to remove the data
provided in the earlier Delphi-Rounds by participants who withdrew.
The use of a Likert-type survey conducted through Survey Monkey removed
opportunities to link individual panelist response to particular questions or answers. I solely
maintained all research materials and data and will continue to do so for five years as required by
Walden University. I was the sole individual who was responsible for maintaining
confidentiality in this research. Participants were asked to provide some demographic
information. No identifying information was necessary. Participant-to-participant anonymity
was guaranteed. The identities of the Delphi panelists will not be published or communicated in
data linked to this study. I ensured that safeguards were in place to maintain this data anonymity
guarantee. First, all data was encrypted, password protected, and devoid of emails or traceable
demographic indicators. I retained sole responsibility for password maintenance.
Delphi panelists were assigned a random identifier, through Survey Monkey, to maintain
anonymity. All electronic data from this study is kept in an external hard-drive locked at a
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commercial bank safety deposit box maintained by me. I will destroy this data after the fifth
year in line with the Walden University guarantee of the keeping of individual and personal
information for five years after the study. I accepted responsibility for maintaining panelist
anonymity and for the coordination of communications between the panelist and researcher in a
manner that can be scrutinized by the IRB should the panelist have questions for me as the
researcher or the IRB.
Summary
This research was conducted to determine ways to prevent fatal and serious accidents that
are occurring in the U.S. electric power industry. Included in this chapter was a description of
the research methodology. A normative Delphi technique was preferred. The aim was that with
this effort, the findings were meaningful and could be used to help improve working
arrangements to avert workplace accidents in the U.S. electric power industry. The research
structure included a detailed description of how to conduct the research and the actual research
question explored. Since any research of this kind must address the human ethical and moral
guidelines set by the University and the Federal Government; all actions and arrangements that
followed fully complied with these requirements. The data management arrangements, as well
as the advantages and disadvantages of the Delphi technique, were addressed in this chapter.
For this normative Delphi study, the panel experts had to meet three criteria: (a) be a
manager, supervisor, trainer, or worker in the electric power industry; (b) have more than ten
years of industry practice and experience; (c) have knowledge about accidents in the electric
power industry in the United States. The measures that crucially provided for bias reduction,
issues of trustworthiness and ethics are in this chapter; this consisted of the steps to support the
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researcher to maintain trustworthiness, such as panelist selection, bracketing, a reflexive journal,
and an audit trail. The process for maintaining panelist assurance on anonymity and
confidentiality against potential risks and IRB requirements also are in this chapter. Chapter 4
will involve the analysis and discussion of the research results.
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Chapter 4: Results
In this chapter, I present the results of this Delphi study on possible actions that can be
taken to prevent workplace accidents in the U.S. electric power industry. This research is an
investigation designed from factors identified in previous studies as causes of accidents and the
subsequent exploration to determine if practicing experts believed that these factors were
relevant to the U.S. electric power industry. The effort also involved consideration of how to
prevent these accident causal factors on the assumption that by preventing accidents, workers
will not suffer serious injuries or be killed when working.
The research question was: What is the consensus of opinion of a panel of experts in the
electrical power industry regarding desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious
workplace accidents occurring in the United States?
To answer this question, I sought consensus practicing experts from the U.S. electric
power industry via a four-round normative Delphi study. Practitioners satisfied pre-set criteria
before becoming participants. For this study, an expert was an individual who meets three
criteria: (a) be a manager, supervisor, trainer, or worker in the electric power industry; (b) have
more than 10 years of industry practice and experience; and (c) have knowledge about accidents
in the electric power industry in the United States.
The study was a complex one, with 28 of the 30 questions from Round 1 being voted by
participants as relevant to the U.S. electric power industry and on the number of possible
solution responses in Round 1. This reality required data analysis to be much more detailed than
I initially expected, and as a result, the study did not mirror the original intention as described in
Chapter 3. This departure was because of the volume and varied responses that 26 of the
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participants provided to 28 different items in the Round 1 questionnaire. To maintain a
manageable study, I preserved the same format of the questionnaire throughout the Delphi
rounds. Each question required a response using a 5-point Likert-type scale, as described in
Chapter 3. For Round 2, I developed the questionnaire after an analysis conducted on the
solution data that participants provided in Round 1. The Round 2 questionnaire is in Appendix F.
By maintaining the exact solution responses, rather than the grouped solutions responses as
shown in Tables 9, 10, and 11, critical details were kept for the entire study. In Round 3, I
requested that participants list their answer on a 5-point Likert-type scale to rate the importance
for each item. This approach was a departure from the original intent: It was expected, but not
categorically detailed in Chapter 3 that, for Round 3, participants would rank the importance of
desirable and feasible solutions derived from Round 2. In Round 4, I asked participants to list
their answer on a 5-point Likert-type scale to indicate confidence in the entire study. Instead, the
questionnaire was done for participants to note confidence in each item. This approach was also
a departure from the original intent. For Round 4, participants indicated their confidence in
individual items of that questionnaire instead of the entire study.
This chapter includes sections on (a) research setting, (b) demographics, (c) data
collection, (d) data analysis, (e) evidence of trustworthiness, and (f) the study results.
Research Setting
Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn (2007) suggested that the Delphi study is useful for
determining whether consensus could exist among anonymous individuals, as experts, on topics
that are challenging and complex. The Delphi methodology allowed me to confirm that the
literature review I conducted as part of the preparation for this study was relevant, appropriate,
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and applicable to the real focus on the electric power industry (see Hsu & Sandford, 2007;
Yousuf, 2007). The four different rounds of deliberations by the expert panelists were consistent
with similar Delphi studies conducted by Linstone and Turoff (2011) and Delbecq, Van de Ven,
and Gustafson (1975).
Electric power industry practitioners from across the United States were invited to
participate in this study. Participation in this study was voluntary. Each of the invitees had to
consent to participate before being accepted and permitted access to the Round 1 questions. I
received Walden University IRB approval before for seeking possible participants, which
occurred by invitation on public social media. The Walden University approval number is 02‐
28-19-0648285. I used LinkedIn to search for suitable study candidates. Emails were sent to
two of the more recognized institutions with a broad reach in the U.S. electric industry;
consistent with IRB approval. One of the institutions has responsibility for reliability regulation,
while the other is an internationally recognized professional association. There was no response
to these emails. I then searched for electric industry practitioners on LinkedIn, a purposeful
search with 320 invitations, 27 positive responses, and the only participants in this study. Each
of the participants satisfied the requisite ask for an expert in this study.
I then sent a formal invitation to each candidate via SurveyMonkey. Once the candidate
responded, I sent a consent request to the candidate via SurveyMonkey. The IRB approved the
consent request sent to prospective participants by issuing the approval number for this study.
The Round 1 questionnaire was available to participants only after the invitee provided consent
and returned the form to me via Survey Monkey.
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Demographics
The geographical area from which the participants came spanned the mainland United
States and included Hawaii. The average length of service for participants in the electric power
industry was 25.2 years. There were three (3) individuals who started their careers as workers
and remained workers at the time of this study. These individuals were a power station
electrician (31 years service), a line worker/forrester (17 years service), and another electrician
(17 years service). Seven (7) participants began their careers as workers and eventually became
supervisors. These participants had an average of 28.14 years of service. Only two (2) of these
individuals remained supervisors at the time of this study; a general foreman and a
lineman/foreman/general foreman. The others became trainers, professionals, or managers.
Eleven participants were supervisors at one point during their careers. Six (6) participants
indicated that they were trainers at some point in their careers. Only one of these individuals was
hired as a trainer and was a trainer for 15 years at the time of this study. Two individuals were
supervisors before becoming trainers, with 42 and 38 years of service. Three trainers eventually
became managers, while another two trainers became professionals. Eleven (11) participants
were electric industry professionals. There were 12 managers, as represented in Tables 6 and 7.
Only two (2) managers began their careers as managers. Four (4) of these individuals
started as professionals. Their service lengths were 43, 38, 37, and 15 years in the U.S. electric
power industry. Another manager began as a trainer and had 38 years service. Two (2)
managers started as workers and moved to supervisors, trainers, professionals before becoming
managers. Their industry experience was 51 and 42 years. I removed participants' identities, as
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this was a condition set for this study included in the consent agreement between me and each
participant.
Table 6
Participant

Yrs
Service

New York
#1
38
Montana
#2
37
Texas
#3
16
Texas
#4
31
New York
#5
16
New York
#6
42
Missouri
#7
30
Philadelphia
#8
30
Texas
#9
51
Arizona
#10
30
Washington
D.C.
#11
10
Georgia
#12
36
New York
#13
43
Mississippi
#14
20
New York
#15
31
California
#16
10
North
Carolina
#17
20
New York
#18
15
Hawaiian
Islands
#19
20
Missouri
#20
19
Mississippi
#21
10
San
Francisco
Bay
#22
15
Missouri
#23
38
Idaho
#24
24
Florida
#25
17
New Jersey
#26
17
Texas
#27
15
Number of Invitees
320
Managers who started as Workers = 2
Professionals started as Workers = 3
Trainers who started as Workers = 4
Supervisors started as Workers = 7
Workers who started as Workers = 3
Note: Participant Information

Worker

Supervisor

Trainer

Professional

T
W
W

T

W
W
W
W
W

S
S
S

W

S

P
P

Manager
M
M

M
M
M

T
P
T

M

S

T

P
P
P

M

S
M
M

S
S

W
W

P
P

S
S
S

M
M

P
P
P

M

W
W
T
12
11
6
27.42
24.27
33.00
Average # Years Service =
Average # Years Service =
Average # Years Service =
Average # Years Service =
Average # Years Service =
Average Service (Yrs)

11
25.82
46.50
27.33
36.25
28.14
21.67
25.22

12
30.92
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Table 7
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Data Collection
In Round 1, each of the participants had an opportunity to indicate whether the 30
different reasons for workplace accidents, as I developed based on previous studies, were
relevant and pertinent in the electric power industry. Participants were also asked to provide
other reasons for why accidents occurred not covered in the list developed for Round 1 and what
they considered as ways of preventing further accidents in the electric power industry. I used
possible solutions to prevent accidents suggested by the participants in Round 1 to develop the
questionnaire for Round 2 of the Delphi study. In Round 2, participants considered whether
these solutions were desirable and feasible. In Round 3, participants were asked to identify the
important items, while in Round 4, they indicated their confidence with the list of overall
solutions and preventative methods, derived from the earlier rounds, based on importance,
feasibility, and desirability. I provided separate 5-point Likert-type scales for participant
response for feasibility and desirability in Round 2; another 5-point Likert-type scale for
importance in Round 3, and a final 5-point Likert-type scale for confidence in Round 4.
Solutions in this study were only accepted if items were scored as a 3 or more on each Likerttype scale by 70% or more of the participants.
Prior to beginning Round 1, I estimated that the average time to complete each of the four
questionnaires was less than 30 minutes. There were 27 participants in Round 1, 25 in Round 2,
24 in Round 3, and 23 participants completing Round 4. The average time taken by participants
in Round 1 to complete the questionnaire was approximately three hours. Two participants took
more than 24 hours while another participant took more than 17 hours to complete the Round 1
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exercise. In Round 2, the average time taken was 30 minutes while they took an average time of
9 minutes in Round 3 and 67 minutes in Round 4.
Participants in Round 1 were asked to provide solutions to accidents for each item on the
questionnaire and to indicate the possible challenges. The responses were collated for each
question and then analyzed using the NVivo 12 Plus qualitative analysis software. I used the
responses to develop a word cloud for each question and followed that with a word tree analysis.
These pictorially represented critical words identified by the study participants. That way, I had
a good indication of the common terms used by the participants and the context of these words
and phrases. I then conducted auto-coding, sentiment coding, and researcher manual coding
afterward. The auto-coding was done first to provide me with a view of the participants'
responses and for a review to determine how relevant these could be in the data analysis. I then
manually conducted sentiment coding (positive and negative). That indicated participants’
response perspective, which preceded my manual coding. The manual coding involved the use
of industry-relevant terms, the other questions on the Round 1 questionnaire, and themes that I
deciphered from the word cloud, word tree, auto-coding, and sentiment coding done before. I
then conducted a manual coding in line with the four-frames as offered by Bolman and Deal,
which was the conceptual framework adopted in this study. This coding approach occurred for
each of the 30 items listed in the Round 1 questionnaire. Appendix I includes all coding done as
part of this study and more detailed information.
Data Analysis
Table 8 above shows the Yes responses, as a percentage, for each issue, from Round 1, to
indicate whether these contributed to accidents, serious worker injuries, and fatalities in the
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electric power industry. Participants provided solutions to each of the 30 items in Table 8. Two
of these items were not supported with a yes-response by 70% or more of the participants, and I
removed them from further consideration in this study.
The deleted items were Poor Regulatory Oversight, with 59.26% participant yes-response
support, and Incorrect Labeling with 66.67%. I also removed the solutions provided in Round 1
for these two items from further consideration in the study. Each of the issues where more than
70% of the participants provided a yes-response remained for further consideration in Round 2 of
the Delphi study.
As an example, Q4 in Round 1 was: List at least one way to prevent accidents that may
be caused by "Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed." What are the
possible challenges?
There was a 92.59% yes- response to question Q4 with 26 different solutions forwarded
by participants for poor work ethics: history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed: This is shown
in Appendix J. From the Q4 solutions, a word cloud, word tree, auto-coding, and sentiment
coding was done using NVivo 12 Plus before I conducted manual coding in line with the Bolman
and Deal four-frames.
Figure 12 shows the word cloud generated for Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing
that went unaddressed. The associated word tree was developed by conducting word search
queries based on the word cloud. The top words were work, safety, and practices. Figure 13
shows the Word Tree developed for work (the top word from the word cloud). auto-coding of the
data followed, as shown in Figure 14. Figure 15 includes sentiments done afterward.
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Table 8 Round 1 Causes that participants provided solutions
% Yes

Question

Remarks

70.37
88.89
59.26

A: Q1: Poor Design
B: Q2: Management System Flaw
Q3: Poor Regulatory Oversight
C: Q4: Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went
unaddressed
Q5: Incorrect labeling
D: Q6: Medical and other personal issues
E: Q7: Grounding, earthing failures / errors
F: Q8: Ineffective and inefficient maintenance
G: Q9: Animals / living organisms
H: Q10: Hazardous worksite conditions
I: Q11: Unplanned events
J: Q12: Inappropriate work methods
K: Q13: Stakeholder demands
L: Q14: Poor judgment by individuals or work crews
M: Q15: Poor attitude and or behavior by individuals or work crews
N: Q16: Ineffective or no workplace training
O: Q17: Poor supervision
P: Q18: Work planning
Q: Q19: Management priorities
R: Q20: Poor team communication
S: Q21: Willful disregard for safety rules
T: Q22: Permit to work violations
U: Q23: Lock-out tag-out non-compliance
V: Q24: Organizational safety culture
W: Q25: Individual risk taking and negligence
X: Q26: Equipment failure
Y: Q27: Procedural error
Z: Q28: Poor management oversight
AA: Q29: Poor quality material
AB: Q30: Non-use or personal protective equipment

Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Drop

92.59
66.67
85.19
88.89
88.89
70.37
92.59
96.30
96.30
81.48
96.30
88.89
92.59
92.59
96.30
85.19
92.59
81.48
81.48
96.30
92.59
92.59
92.59
88.89
88.89
70.37
92.59

Note: Data from Round 1 of Delphi study

Move to Next Round
Drop
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round
Move to Next Round

173

Figure 12: Word Cloud (Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed)

Figure 13: Word Tree (Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed)
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Figure 14 Auto-Coding (Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed)

Figure 15: Sentiments ((Poor work ethics; history of wrongdoing that went unaddressed)
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I then conducted manual coding; shown in Fig 16.

Figure 16: Researcher Conducted Manual Coding
Finally, I conducted coding consistent with the four-frames as espoused by Bolman and
Deal; shown in Figure 17.

Figure 17: Group Query
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I conducted a similar analysis for each of the other problem items where participants
provided solution responses: shown in Appendix K.
Table 9 contains a summary of the top three solutions for each problem item where more
than 70% of participants in Round 1 provided a yes-response to accident causation: Problems
listed in Table 8 (with Poor Regulatory Oversight and Incorrect Labeling removed after Round
1). Solutions shown in Table 9, were Focus on People; S1, Work Standards; S2, Safety
Management; S3, Workplace Training; S4, Management; S5, and Supervision; S6.
Solutions to Poor work ethics; History of wrongdoing that went unaddressed emerged
from this analysis. These were Management-S5 (31% coding reference), Safety Management -S3
(16%), and Focus on People-S1 (15%). Similarly, the top three solutions for problem A (Poor
Design) were Work Standards-S2 (28% coding reference), Management-S5 (28%), and
Supervision-S6 (17%). The top three solutions for problem AB (Non-use of Personal Protective
Equipment) were Supervision-S6 (22% coding reference), Work Standards-S2 (19%), and Safety
Management -S3 (19%).
A weighted ranking of these top solutions was then done for each problem item in Table
9 and summarized in Table 10. I used a rank multiplier of seven for the top-ranked solution for
each problem. The other two solutions had rank multipliers of five and three, respectively. These
were arbitrary rankings that were used to separate the solutions derived to identify the top ranked
solutions from the other solutions (Lourenço, & Lebensztajn; 2018).
Focus on People, S1, included solution coding regarding qualified personnel; experts and
consults; human performance monitoring; regular job visits; management - workers
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communication and feedback; Individual and group behavior and habits; culture; teamwork;
confidence; work planning and review.
Table 9 Top 3 Solutions to Identified Problems (Round 1)
The Top Three Solution Areas for each question in Round 1 (% Coding)
Problems (From A, B, C,….., AB) / Solutions (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, & S6)

S2
S5
S6

A
28
28
17

S2
S3
S4

F
21
21
20

S5
S6
S4

K
27
22
18

S6
S2
S4

P
29
22
15

S2
S6
S3

U
23
22
16
Z
24
20
17

S1
S5
S3

B
25
22
16

S4
S2
S6

G
22
20
18

S5
S6
S4

L
22
22
21

S5
S6
S2

Q
26
22
21

S6
S5
S2

V
23
18
17

S6
S6
S5
S4
S2
S3
Note: Top three solution sets

AA
21
20
18

S5
S3
S1

C
31
16
15

S3
S4
S2

H
19
19
14

S6
S5
S2

M
25
23
16

S6
S2
S3

R
21
18
18

S6
S5
S3

W
24
18
17

S6
S2
S3

AB
22
19
19

S1
S5
S3

D
26
26
19

S5
S4
S6

I
21
19
17

S6
S2
S1

N
23
18
18

S6
S5
S2

S
22
22
19

S6
S2
S3

X
21
19
18

S2
S4
S6

E
58
21
17

S4
S5
S6

J
19
17
16

S5
S6
S1

O
21
21
16

S6
S2
S3

T
22
20
17

S6
S4
S2

Y
22
19
18
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Table 10 Solutions to Accidents
Solution Areas
Focus on People
Work Standards
Safety Management
Workplace Training
Management
Supervision
Note: Top Group Solutions

S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6

Rank
1
2
4
1
2
6
13

PTS
7
7
7
7
7
7

Rank
2
0
7
2
5
9
5

PTS
5
5
5
5
5
5

Rank
3
3
7
9
4
0
5

PTS

W/PTS

PTS

3

23
84
44
51
87
131

5
18
12
11
15
23

3
3
3
3
3

Work Standards, S2, included solutions coding regarding: maintenance; reliability;
inspection; international best practice; compliance; technology use, diagnostic testing, and
research; quality management systems; troubleshooting; breakdowns; calibration; construction;
operating; performance monitoring; focus on compliance; work methods, documented standard,
procedures, implementation of change; work planning; work monitoring and review; qualified
and experienced workers; manufacturers instructions; spares, materials, tools, and personal
protective equipment; safety culture, barriers, housekeeping; and equipment failure.
Safety Management, S3, included solution coding regarding focus on safety; safety
legislation; focus on compliance with approved work methods and procedures; culture of change;
organizational culture; safety culture; quality of regulator inspections; distraction; individual
obligation to inform; safe work procedures and documented standards; compliance with
manufacturers instructions; workplace inspections; work planning, monitoring, and review;
spares, materials, tools, and personal protective equipment; safety barriers; housekeeping; lockout-tag-out, permit to work; and recordkeeping.
Workplace Training, S4, included solution coding regarding training frequency, quality,
methods, and location ; company core values; communication and feedback; work processes,
rules, and procedures; correcting (flaws); manufacturers instructions; compliance; work
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planning, monitoring, and review; materials, tools, documented standards, and inspection;
personal protective equipment; safety systems; safe work barriers; good housekeeping;
prevention of equipment failure.
Management, S5, included solution coding regarding management coaching and support;
priorities, focus, and assumptions; response management and arrangements; actions; significance
of regulator findings; regulator communication; industry stakeholders; qualitative of intake and
recruits; disciplinary action; company-union collaboration; HR services; work planning,
monitoring, and review; availability and quality of spares, materials, and tools; procedures and
documented standards; organizational safety culture; equipment failure.
Supervision, S6, included solution coding regarding supervisor support and interaction;
confidence; knowledge; ability; involvement in job – work; work team selection; compliance
demand; reporting; worker involvement in work planning, monitoring, and review; availability
of spares, materials, and tools; adherence with work procedures and documented standards; work
inspection; personal protective equipment audits and inspection; tools inspection; recordkeeping;
Lock-Out-Tag-Out oversight; safety barriers; safety culture; permit to work arrangements;
equipment failure.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
A study is worthy if the research value and process support clarity maintained throughout
the study (Cope, 2014). Brady (2015) described the trustworthiness as the integrity of the
research process and the results and outcome of the study. I was determined, in this study, to
maintain cognizance of these requirements and not to be biased. Houghton, Casey, Shaw, &
Murphy (2013) suggested that bias reduction was possible if I deliberately and proactively
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looked for opportunities to mitigate possible bias situations during the study. Achieving
trustworthiness means that research credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability
have been established.
Credibility
The primary attribute for a credible study is how believable it is. Credibility is the first
strategy that I used to ensure research quality and to remove bias (Yin, 2013). This strategy,
exemplified in the quality of data collected during the study and by the systematic approach to
interpret the results derived from the entire process. Data collection in this study occurred from
the literature search to the information developed through the four Rounds of the Delphi
exercise. Items moved from one Delphi round to another when supported by more than 70% of
the participants selecting a 3, 4 or 5 on a 5-point Likert-type scale provided for each item in each
round of the Delphi study. Credibility developed from the systematic approach to analyzing
qualitative data in this study. Responses were collated for each question and analyzed using
NVivo 12 Plus. A word cloud and word tree analysis pictorially represented critical and
common words participants used. These were a good reflection of the common terms and the
context of these words and phrases. I conducted auto-coding of data before sentiment and
manual coding. I also conducted manual coding in line with the Bolman and Deal four-frame
conceptual framework adopted in this study. In a Delphi study, consensus promotes that belief.
In this study, there was a consensus on 28 items. Achieving saturation from participants’
responses also adds to research credibility (McGuinness & Brien, 2007). There was data
saturation. Data were consistent and repeated by different participants in the Delphi (Dalkey &
Helmer, 1963; Linstone & Turoff, 1975).
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Transferability
Patton (2015) postulated that transferability was applying the findings from one study to
other research in different spheres and disciplines. Transferability surrounds the responsibility I
assumed to ensure that results derived can be scrutinized and the process can find relevance in
other research areas (Patton, 2015). It is possible that while this study covered the entire United
States, the results are relevant in the electric power industry outside the United States; in Canada
where I, work, and in the Caribbean where I have extensive experience and knowledge. There
are issues considered in this research, including workers working in remote locations, without
direct supervision from supervisors and managers. The study findings may, therefore, be relevant
to other industries in the United States, such as the telecommunication and other utilities such as
water, natural gas, transportation, and high energy industry.
Dependability
Dalkey and Helmer (1963) postulated that the maintenance of data consistency in
different areas of research is a measure of dependability. In this study, data gathering occurred
through participants’ responses, which resulted in consensus on a topic that has real-world
significance. Data, sourced from an arrangement where questionnaires, were administered via
Survey Monkey and research participants were anonymous to one another. Data analysis was
done through a systematic approach using NVivo 12 Plus, which involved the automatic
generation of word clouds, word trees, and auto-codes. These automatic analyses preceded
manual coding in line with the conceptual framework upon which the study occurred.
Additionally, a set criterion of 70% or more participants agreeing to a particular issue by
selecting a 3, 4, or 5 on a Likert-type scale before that item went to the next round of the Delphi
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study. The efficiency with which I recorded the research process, the quality of data and the
consistency achieved throughout the study are vital for the dependability and captured in this
study (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Consistent details sent to each Delphi panelist, as approved by the
IRB, for a proper understanding of the process and what their roles will be, also supported
dependability (Hsu & Sandford, 2007; Yousuf, 2007). I kept a reflective journal which
improved research details and management (McGuinness & Brien, 2007). Participant dropouts
did occur, but 23 individuals completed the entire four Rounds of the Delphi. Before the
exercise, a participant population of 20 was deemed sufficient for this study. There was data
saturation. Data were consistent and repeated by different participants in the Delphi (Dalkey &
Helmer, 1963; Linstone & Turoff, 1975).
Confirmability
Confirmability is a measure of objective corroboration of research results by an
independent and unbiased party (Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). Paton (2015) postulated that
there is a potential for bias in qualitative studies. Yin (2013) supported that limitations and
biases exist on data validation, analysis, and result explanation. Mitigation of that bias occurred
by me as the researcher adopting a data analysis methodology where the first three assessment of
qualitative data were automatic features of and generated using NVivo 12 Plus before the
researcher attempted any manual coding. Even then, the conceptual framework I selected for
this study guided the coding. I was deliberate in maintaining this strategy to data analysis and
management throughout the study. Tufford and Newman (2012) described this as bracketing, a
method of improving research quality by removing researcher assumptions and mitigating
researcher bias. In this study, the focus on maintaining data that could be reproduced to
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substantiate research thinking and direction is one that can be reproduced and therefore, lends
positively to research confirmability. The conceptual framework, Bolman and Deal four-frame
model, was suitable, relevant, and provided research confidence (Bolman & Deal, 2013).
Study Results
The research question was specific in the search for answers:
What is the consensus of opinion of a panel of experts in the electrical power industry regarding
desirable and feasible solutions to fatal and serious workplace accidents occurring in the United
States?
The different solution groups, S1 to S7 as in Table 11, were developed from responses
provided by participants and further clarified in Table 12 up to and including Table 18. The
process followed is shown in Figure 18. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, the S1 solution group
is a composite of the different sub-points about the group shown in Table 12. For the S2 solution
group and each of the other solution groups from S3 to S7, the information about the respective
sub-points is in Table 13 through to Table 18. The chart shown in Figure 18 is a simple depiction
of the study process. That way, the logical sequence of the study can be better understood.
Testing and collation of participant responses on solutions to problems identified in
Round 1 in this study occurred and were measured against the study criteria. In Round 2, the
seven leading solutions (S1 to S7) was tested to determine whether participants found them
desirable and feasible through two separate 5-point Likert-type scales; one for feasibility and
another for desirability for each solution item. For S1, Focus on People, each of the sub-items
described before was listed, and participant responses noted: as shown in Table 12.
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Figure 18: Study Process
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Table 11 Summary of Solutions (overall rating)
Rating

6

S1: Focus on
People
S2: Work
Standards

% response
Worker knowledge,
training, behavior,
attitudes, judgment,
communication, and
Related solutions

Work Method and
Related solutions
Safety Management,
S3: Safety
5
Regulatory and Related
Management
solutions
S4: Workplace
Workplace Training
4
Training
and Related solutions
Management Related
2
S5: Management
solutions
Supervisor Related
1
S6: Supervision
solutions
Management Audits,
7
S7: Audit/Review Review, and Related
solutions
Note: Summary of Solutions (overall rating)
3

Indicate Indicate
Desirable Feasible

Indicate
Indicate
Importance Confidence

93

92

90

87

97

98

97

94

95

94

93

88

96

95

95

92

98

97

98

98

100

100

100

100

88

92

88

78

From Table 11 The top rated solution group is Supervision. Management, Work Standards are
the next two solution groups.
There was consistent support from participants for Focus on People type solutions to
problems where individuals were becoming accident prone, seriously injured, or killed at work.
It was desirable for manager and supervisor attention on behavior and habits, teamwork, and
communication type solutions. Participants felt that if qualified personnel, as knowledgeable and
experienced practitioners, are involved in work planning, prevention of errors due to work
missteps can occur.
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Table 12 Focus on People Solutions
response Round 2
Desirable Feasible
Focus on
People

# Responses
3, 4, or 5

S1

Round 3
Importance

Round 4
Confidence

93% (25)

92%
(25)

90% (24)

87% (23)

24

23

22

19

24

22

20

22

24

24

23

21

23

22

20

19

24

23

23

19

23

22

23

21

22

25

20

19

24

22

20

19

21

23

23

21

% response Worker knowledge,
training, behavior, attitudes,
judgment, communication, and
Related solutions
Involvement of qualified personnel,
expert practitioners, and
consultants,
Monitor human performance
Regular supervisor and manager job
visits
Communication and feedback
(management - workers)
Focus on people, behavior, habits
Work methods, procedures, and
management of change, work
planning, monitoring, review,
procedures, documented standards
Culture, Safety Culture, problem
identification (the why)
Teamwork, communication,
confidence, confidential
Prevention of equipment
failure

Note: Focus on People Solutions
Participants unanimously supported an organizational safety culture which encouraged
involvement by all at work as feasible: prompted by managers and supervisors conducting
regular job visits. In Round 3, regular supervisor and manager job visits; focus on people,
behavior, habits; and work methods, procedures, and management of change, work planning,
monitoring, review, procedures, documented standards were most important to participants as
Focus on People type solutions. In Round 4, participants were most confident that once
managers and supervisors monitored human performance, prevention of workplace accidents,
worker injuries and fatalities could occur. Overall, Focus on People type solutions were deemed
as desirable, feasible, and important by more than 90% of participants and with 87% of them
confident that once implemented and managed accidents prevention could occur.
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Actual participant Focus on People type solutions response: Feeder processing requires
applying grounds. This step is clearly outlined in orders that are provided to the operator. One
way to prevent this is to utilize HPI tools such as 3-way communication where the order is
repeated back to the district operator to confirm that information was understood.
A similar analysis, conducted for S2 (Work Standards), was as listed in Table 13.
Adopting measures aimed at the prevention of equipment failure, maintenance of safety barriers,
an enhanced safety culture, good housekeeping, and constant vigilance of work monitoring and
review were the most desirable and feasible Work Standards type solutions highlighted by
participants in Round 2. The availability of personal protective equipment and how employees
kept these were also unanimously deemed as desirable and feasible by all of the 25 responses
received in Round 2. In Round 3, all participants found performance monitoring, work
monitoring and review, personal protective equipment availability and condition, safety and
housekeeping and equipment failure prevention-type solutions as important.
Compliance focus, technology in use, work methods change management, work design,
and planning type solutions were deemed as important by all participants in Round 3. All
participants were confident that this focus was needed to prevent accidents. All participants were
also confident that a focus on diagnostic testing of apparatus and manufacturer instructions,
together with worker training, knowledge, and experience was necessary to prevent accidents.
Overall, Work Standards type solutions were deemed as desirable, feasible, and important by
more than 90% of participants who were confident that once implemented and managed
accidents could be prevented.
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Table 13. Work Standards Solutions

Work
Standards
# Responses
3, 4, or 5

S2

response Round 2
Desirable Feasible
98%
97% (25)
(25)
24

24

Round 3
Round 4
Importance Confidence
97% (24)

94% (23)

24

20

23

23

21

20

24

24

23

22

24

24

21

21

25

24

24

22

24

25

24

23

23

25

24

23

25

25

24

21

25

25

24

22

25

25

24

22

Note: Work Standards Solutions

% response Work Method and
Related solutions
Performance Monitoring
Reliability Centered
Maintenance, Maintenance
scheduling and cycles,
Recordkeeping and
Recordkeeping procedures
inspection methods and
arrangements,
troubleshooting, breakdown
management, equipment and
device calibration
Construction and Operating
practices and procedures,
International and Best
Practice , Technology,
Quality Management System
Compliance Focus,
Technology in Use, New
Technology, Work Methods
change-management, Work
design and planning
Work monitoring, review, ,
documented, standard, worker
training, knowledge and
experience
Diagnostic testing, Research,
and Manufacturers
instructions
Available and condition of
personal protective
equipment, tools, and
materials
Safety Barriers, Safety
Culture, and Housekeeping
Prevention of equipment
failure
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Actual participant Work Standards type solutions response: Proper and effective
maintenance can help prevent the failure of equipment, which can cause harm to individuals in
the vicinity. Another method is to plan around the potential failure of equipment so that workers
have barriers in between where they are working and the hazard.
An analysis for S3 (Safety Management) yielded results that were similar for S1 and S2
above; as shown in Table 14.
Table 14 Safety Management Solutions

Safety
Management
# Responses
3, 4, or 5

S3

response Round 2
Desirable Feasible
93%
95% (25)
(25)

Round 3
Importance

Round 4
Confidence

93% (24)

88% (23)

% response Safety Management,
Regulatory and Related solutions
Focus on safety and Legislation

24

24

24

20

25

25

24

21

24

21

20

18

22

21

19

18

23

22

24

21

24

24

24

23

25

25

24

22

23

25

23

21

24

24

21

19

23

24

18

19

Focus on compliance, work
methods, procedures, change
Culture , Organizational Culture,
Safety Culture
Quality of Regulator Inspection
Distraction, individual obligation to
inform, procedures, rules and
documented standards
Manufacturers instructions and
other compliance
Safety inspection, work planning,
monitoring, and review
Safety oversight and audits of
materials, spares, materials, tools,
and personal protective equipment
Workplace training, safety Systems,
barriers, safety culture,
housekeeping, workplace safety
arrangements
Prevention of equipment failure

Note: Safety Management Solutions
Overall, Safety Management type solutions were deemed as desirable, feasible, and
important by more than 90% of participants and with 88% of them confident that once
implemented and managed accidents prevention could occur. Focus on compliance, work
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methods, procedures, change, manufacturer instructions, safety inspection, work planning, and
review were the top solutions in this analysis: an active, direct, and forward management type
approach that participants believed will reduce workplace errors, accidents injuries and fatalities.
Actual participant Safety Management type solutions response: Have a Safety Program
with a policy that reflects effective controls for any and all hazards associated with
animals/living organisms. The Program should also consist of initial expectations training and
periodic retraining. Conduct periodic audits. Periodically update the policy with Continuous
Improvement in mind.
Table 15 Workplace Training Solutions

Workplace
Training

# Responses
3, 4, or 5

S4

response Round 2
Desirable Feasible
94%
96% (25)
(25)

Round 3
Importance

Round 4
Confidence

95% (24)

92% (23)

24

23

23

20

24

24

23

23

23

24

23

20

25

22

24

20

25

25

24

22

24

25

21

21

23

24

23

20

24

25

22

21

24

22

22

23

Note: Workplace Training Solutions

% response Workplace Training
and Related solutions
Training philosophy, company
core values training, and
workplace training arrangements
(cost, availability, management).
Communication, process,
procedures, frequency, quality,
methods, and location
Feedback (management workers), Correct (Flaws)
Manufacturers instructions and
other compliance
Inspection, work planning,
monitoring, and review
Material science, use, testing, and
maintenance of tools, work
procedures, and documented
standards
Safety rules, procedures, and
barriers, Safety Culture
Housekeeping
Lessons from equipment failure,
accident prevention
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An analysis for S4 (Workplace Training) yielded results that were similar for S1, S2, and
S3 above: as shown in Table 15. Overall, Workplace Training type solutions were deemed as
desirable, feasible, and important by more than 90% of participants who were confident that once
implemented and managed, accident prevention could occur. There was a consistent spread of
participant support for each of the different aspects of Workplace Training type solutions
highlighted in Table 15.
Table 16 Management Solutions

Management
# Responses
3, 4, or 5

S5

response Round 2
Desirable Feasible
97%
98% (25)
(25)

Round 3
Importance

Round 4
Confidence

98% (24)

98% (23)

24

24

24

21

24

23

24

23

25

24

24

23

23

25

21

21

25

25

22

23

25

24

24

22

25

24

24

23

25

25

24

23

25

24

24

23

24

25

24

23

% response Management Related
solutions
Focus and Assumptions
Management Coaching /Support /
Priorities / Response Management
and Arrangements
Actions/Response
Response of Regulator Findings /
Regulator Communication /
Industry Stakeholders
Qualitative of intake/ recruit/ / HR
Services
Disciplinary Action/ CompanyUnion collaboration
Support for work planning/
monitoring/ review
Purchase of
spares/materials/tools/Equipment
Failure
Work procedures, documented
standards
Safety Management and Safety
Culture

Note: Management Solutions
Actual participant Workplace Training type solutions response: More training and
oversight; structured process. Require lineman to earn continuing education credits annually.
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An analysis for S5 (Management) yielded results that were similar for S1, S2, S3, and S4
above; as shown in Table 16.
Overall, Management type solutions were deemed as desirable, feasible, and important by
more than 95% of participants who were confident that if implemented and managed, accident
prevention could occur. There was a consistent spread of participant support for each of the
different aspects of Management type solutions highlighted in Table 16.
Actual participant Management type solutions response: Station ground grids need to be
tested periodically to ensure that grounds used for worker protection are actually providing the
intended protection from inadvertent energization.

Table 17 Supervision Solutions

Supervision
# Responses
3, 4, or 5

S6

response Round 2
Desirable Feasible
100%
100%
(25)
(25)

Round 3
Importance

Round 4
Confidence

100% (24)

100% (23)

25

25

24

23

25

25

24

23

25

25

24

23

25

25

24

23

25

25

24

23

25

25

24

23

25
25

25
25

24
24

23
23

% response Supervisor Related
solutions
Supervisor support, interaction,
confidence, knowledge, ability,
involvement in job - work
selection
Demand for compliance,
reporting, Inspection, adherence
with procedures, and documented
standards
Worker Involvement
Work planning, monitoring,
review
Arrangements for available spares,
materials, and use of tools,
personal protective equipment
Safety and Safety Culture
Permit to Work, Lock-out-tag-out

Note: Supervision Solutions
An analysis for S6 (Supervision) yielded results that were similar for S1, S2, S3, S4, and
S5 above; as shown in Table 16. Overall, Supervision type solutions were desirable, feasible, and
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important to 100% of participants who were confident that once implemented and managed,
accidents prevention could occur, and as highlighted in Table 17.
Actual participant Supervision type solutions response: We have to teach workers when
their "automatic mode" needs to slow down. Practical drift creates a sense that their work
methods are fine because, they have gotten away with it for so long.

An analysis for S7 (Audit/Review) yielded results that were similar for S1, S2, S3, S4,
S5, and S6 above; as shown in Table 18.
Table 18 Audit/Review Solutions
response Round 2
Desirable Feasible
S7

Round 4
Confidence

88% (25)

92%
(25)

88% (24)

78% (23)

22

23

21

18

Audit/Review
# Responses
3, 4, or 5

Round 3
Importance

% response Management
Audits, Review, and Related
solutions
Audits, review, corrective
action response, management
of inspection, safety culture

Note: Audit/Review Solutions :
There was a consistent spread of participant support for each of the different aspects of
Audit/Review type solutions highlighted in Table 18.
Actual participant Audit/Review type solutions response: Conduct Field Auditing to
ensure that workers are knowledgeable and using proper work procedures. Another response:
The Program should also consist of initial expectations training and periodic retraining.
Conduct periodic audits. Periodically update the policy with Continuous Improvement in mind.
The responses received from participants in this study on solutions to problems identified
in Round 1 were collated, tested against the study criteria for consensus and listed below keeping
the alignment of individual problems and the solutions identified for that particular issue. Testing
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of these solutions occurred against participants'-indication of the solutions being desirable,
feasible, important and provided confidence that, if addressed, the suggested ways can prevent
further and future accidents where workers in the electric power industry can become seriously
injured or even killed while performing work. A summary listing of the solutions proffered for
each of the 30 items in Round 1 follows in Appendix J and Appendix K which contain a detailed
listing of the actual solutions.
The design of this study was for a selection of a 3, 4, or a 5 on a 5-point Likert-type
Scale for each item in each of the Delphi rounds resulted in 28 out of the 30 items originally
identified and included in the Round 1 questionnaire remaining relevant throughout the Study.
That made the data analysis and study management much more complex and complicated than
originally anticipated. In Appendix K, a comparison of the possible results if the acceptance
criteria were 4 or 5 only for each item in the different questionnaires in this study. Instead of
participants’ responses to 28 items moving from Round 1 to Round 2 as actually occurred in this
study, solutions to 20 items would have remained relevant for later consideration. The reduction
may or may not have impacted on the overall conduct of the study, but this was not assessed in
its entirety.
Summary
In Chapter 4, there was a description of the research setting and the process for receiving
approval from the IRB at Walden University before collecting any data in this study. Process
description for identifying and eventually selecting the research participants also occurred.
Demographic information on the research participants and their industry experience was used to
show how suitable they were as experts for the Delphi study. A description of the data collection
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procedures and data analysis strategy adopted for this study was then detailed and discussed at
length. Evidence of the research trustworthiness was then tabled and supported by a rich
description of how credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability of the study and
study results.
In Chapter 5, there is an interpretation of the research findings and how these relate to the
research question and conceptual framework. An explanation of the study limitations will
precede the study implications and recommendations.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The primary motivation for this study was a significant misunderstanding among electric
industry practitioners about how to prevent accidents, worker injuries, and fatalities. The
purpose of this Delphi study was to rely on experienced and knowledgeable electric industry
practitioners to confirm the reasons for accidents and to suggest ways to prevent these from
occurring. I used the Bolman and Deal four-frame model to assist in the conceptualization of the
issue and to assist in addressing the challenge in an approach not previously adopted. Proposed
solutions to accidents identified in this study, were desirable, feasible, and important for
participants. Participants concurred that organizational leadership, managers, supervisors, and
workers are in different ways responsible for solving problems that can prevent accidents. The
solutions to these accidents invariably require concerted and dedicated effort by each group of
industry participants to ensure that systems remain safe and by extension, individuals at work
will not be injured or killed. System issues can be solved by the dedicated attention of the
different working groups. People problems add an entirely different challenge and cannot be
easily solved. People issues stem from social dynamics to medical and personal difficulties,
interpersonal communication, and trust. Participants in this study believed that it was possible to
address and solve these issues.
Interpretation of Findings
Seven different groups of solutions evolved from this study. Of these, supervision, the
role of supervisors, supervisor understanding and supervisor action was the most fundamental
and seen by participants as the most influential in accident prevention with no injuries, including
fatalities, to workers in the electric power industry in the United States. Management aim and
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focus was another top-ranked solution that evolved from this study: So too, was work methods
and workplace training. The other but slightly less popular accident prevention solutions were
safety management, a focus on people, and workplace audits and reviews. While it is possible to
isolate each of these and specifically focus on the solution item, the most significant benefit can
only occur if the solutions are holistically treated as interdependent. It is therefore not suggested
that workplace training alone, for example, be considered as a right solution that if implemented
would prevent worker injuries or deaths. It is more likely that workplace training, management
focus, together with supervisory understanding and action, would combine to realize a safer
workplace where workers will be more inclined to comply with safety rules and work
procedures. That way, workplace errors can be reduced and possibly be entirely mitigated. It
will, therefore, mean that in workplaces where there is a significant effort to augment safety
management systems, workplace audits, and reviews with a focus on people, especially attitudes,
behavior, and judgment, with management focus, and supervisory action, the likelihood of
workplace accidents occurring will be extremely low, if at all (Murata, 2017; Probst, 2015). It
will be challenging for best results to be achieved from an audit exercise, for example, by not
following the workplace training on audits and audit review; in line with safety management
system requirements, or if not done with a management focus on accident prevention. It is
equally not possible for workers to believe that workplace audits can achieve the best possible
outcomes if there is a focus on technical and systemic problems and not also on people and
people issues for which, if handled, could result in workers’ improved performance levels and
while remaining safe. As a result, the following must be considered via a combined focus on
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several different solution strategies and not solely on the particular issue at any point in the
discussion.
A design flaw with electrical devices such as transformers and poles are sometimes only
realized after being installed for extended periods. To prevent accidents and for organizational
success, employee engagement is critically important (Kaliannan & Adjovu, 2015). Design
considerations must include construction factors as well as maintenance, operation, worker
safety, and working space considerations. The International Electrotechnical Commission and
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers standards for electrical power systems
construction can guide design in a safe manner utilizing industry best practice. If changes or
retrofitting to the design model occur while the equipment is in-service and with all associated
hazards not adequately mitigated, this change can be dangerous. Sometimes work crews can
have a false sense of security concerning issues of clearance. If measurements are inaccurate in
a work-plan, this can complicate the work tasks.
Safety management flaws can be difficult to identify and challenging to fix once
identified. The prevention of accidents depends on how well individuals address the known
flaws (Dekker, 2006; Manuele, 2014). Supervisors, managers, and trainers have significant
responsibilities in this regard: managers in conducting system reviews and audits; supervisors in
managing tailgate meetings or pre-job talks and for enforcing compliance with work
requirements; and trainers in teaching workers and individuals at work and ensuring that workers
can identify hazards, hazardous conditions, and effectively mitigating the associated danger
(McGrory et al., 2017; Mills & Koliba, 2015).
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Human issues: Workers not wearing personal protective equipment, bad habits,
procedural deviation, poor judgment, willful violations of work rules and procedures,
overconfidence, negligence, and inadequate and inconsistent supervision are among the factors
that contribute to poor work ethics. Vaughn (1997) suggested that deviation from standard
human performance and practices, once allowed to flourish, is extremely difficult to rectify.
Mitropoulos et al. (2005) suggested that focusing on compliance reduces hazard exposures and
that it is possible that compliance promotes a limited view of accident causality and unnecessary
attention on individuals at fault rather than on the system factors that do not address hazards.
These hazardous situations eventually lead to and encourage unacceptable worker behaviors.
Getting individuals at work to enforce compliance with rules and work procedures will keep
individual behavior in check, temper attitudes, and prevent deviation from standard work
requirements (Albright, 2017).
Kao et al. (2016) contended that safety behavior was self-regulatory, which could help to
prevent injuries and to avoid unsafe actions. Medical conditions and personal issues can impact
on workplace activities. Managers, supervisors, and coworkers need to exercise empathy and
extend support to individuals who are affected by these issues and conditions. At the same time,
individuals must exercise self-control and follow all of the prescribed directions of their health
care providers. Workers must communicate medical conditions with their employers. If known,
administrative controls can lead to either the retirement of the worker as being medically unfit or
for supervisors to designate duties to accommodate the worker. To not do so may result in the
worker putting themselves and others at risk when carrying out critical work operations (Uehli et
al., 2014). Grounding and earthing failures and errors are human issues much more than
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technical or systemic problems. There are locations where the installation of grounds or
electrical-earths can be challenging and likely impractical, but work tasks can be revised to
maintain safe working arrangements. The value of worker training on equipotential earthing
must never be underestimated. Supervision and strict compliance with work procedures is
critically important (Probst, 2015). Complacency, laziness, and poor judgment by individuals
and work teams not grounding systems before work is as much an indication of supervision and
training failures (Albright, 2017; Price & Williams, 2018). Managers and supervisors must set
the expectation, offer initial and reoccurring training, guide work activities, and strictly enforce
compliance with procedures. Violations, reflecting poor work ethic and wrongdoing, are grounds
for immediate dismissal of managers, supervisors, and workers who contribute to this
procedural deviation (Merlin et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2016).
Spares and parts necessary for effective maintenance are not always available, mainly
due to inefficiency and poor planning, so that equipment remains in service for longer than
optimum periods. Uncompleted maintenance contributes to poor equipment condition and
eventual failure. Maintenance-related failures are many times misdiagnosed as random failures
and treated as emergency breakdowns. Park (2015) described how a commercial aircraft was
destroyed by fire after landing at an airport as a result of a poorly done maintenance job. All of
the passengers were still on board. Maintenance related issues and work practices that deviate
from standard methods, represent a willful disregard by workers and work teams. Ineffective
training if workers are incompetent afterward; and new technologies introduced without workertraining are opportunities for superior work performance and accident prevention (McCall &
Pruchnicki, 2017). The political and symbolic frames are apt for analyzing the effects of
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vegetation management strategies, stakeholder demands, and technical work standards on
electric power system reliability and worker safety (Bolman & Deal, 2013). The human
resources and structural frames enable examination of existing industry practices and the
workers' abilities, skills, and capabilities (Bolman & Deal, 2013). Invariably, with tree cutting,
trimming, and removal optimized both in the distance away from energized power lines and
installations, it effectively means that workers are more often than before conducting tree
trimming exercises in energized environments where higher risk levels exist. A possible sideeffect of this activity is that workers may develop confidence that can prove dangerous in the
absence of meticulous hazard mitigation. Park (2015) highlighted two maintenance-related
safety recommendations. The first focused on the preparation of instructions for maintenance
jobs, and the second involved the planning and implementation of maintenance jobs.
Electrical power lines, equipment, and stations are in places that can be a habitat for
wildlife and dangerous plant species and organisms. Workers, at times, have to work in
territories where bears, alligators, venomous snakes, bees, and other dangerous animals can be.
These present different challenges to workers who already work in some of the most dangerous
and challenging working situations and environments. Worker death, by tree contact with
electric power lines, is known to have occurred (Casman, 2019). Zhao, Ghiselli, Law, and Ma
(2016) believed that intrinsic motivation affects job characteristic so it may be that electrical
workers are intrinsically motivated and always aware of the dangers that wildlife and living
organisms presented.
Management must set guidelines that will allow for full regulatory and industry
compliance while still allowing for unique organizational and actual workplace and locational
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challenges to be fully covered in the training course content (Wanik, Parent, Anagnostou, &
Hartman, 2017). Individuals performing work require the technical knowledge of the work
tasks, working environment, and condition. Employees also need program schedules, acceptable
performance outcomes, an indication of how these are measured, the work procedures, and the
safety rules that guide work activities. All of these require appropriate and adequate supervision
by competent and knowledgeable individuals capable of maintaining workers respect and focus
on the work tasks to be performed. The working conditions on and around energized power lines
and installations where workers have to carry out work activities at heights with high risks of
falls will always be dangerous. There are instances where hazardous worksite conditions have
led to accidents and where workers died (Fox, 2014; Sinclair, 2017).
Work planning and hazard identification are critical activities to mitigate possible danger
and to prevent accidents. One way to avoid unplanned events is to have someone dedicated to
looking at others performing work activities. That way, when individuals would be microfocused on particular items of work, the onlooker will be scanning the work environment for
issues that either encroached into the work zone after the work began or for situations possibly
missed during the job briefing or tailgate discussions (Kaliannan & Adjovu, 2015). A deviation
from the planned work arrangements requires another tailboard before proceeding. The
opportunity will exist for the conducting of another thorough site-specific risk analysis and for
effective and timely mitigation. Stakeholder demands are many times conveniently
overestimated and not treated in the right context. Managers and supervisors are responsible for
managing stakeholder demands and for ensuring that work remains fully compliant with
standards and procedures (Bedarkar & Pandita, 2014; Ibrahim et al., 2016).
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There are special work activities in the electric power industry where individuals may
work alone: This may happen for individuals who perform functions that require specialized
training and certification. Even in this arrangement, these individuals must employ all of the
safety procedures, double check that these arrangements are in place and active, and wear proper
personal protective equipment before performing hazardous work operations (Jerie & Baldwin,
2017). At times, following an individual's actions in that way may not be possible as the
communication medium is inhibited, absent, or not possible either technically or because of
organizational procedures and practices. Workplace training, supervision, management
priorities, improper maintenance, or equipment failure each are significant contributors to poor
decisions and judgment by workers. Individuals, however, sometimes exercise personal
behavior and attitudes that are less than appropriate; they willfully disregard working advice and
guidance, sometimes because of overconfidence. Individual self-discipline is critically essential
if individuals are to remain safe while at work: this may be a single but most important factor in
poor judgment and the prevention of accidents(Albright, 2017; Jerie & Baldwin, 2017).
Workplace training is a core business activity; without it, the business will likely fail;
with it, the best opportunities exist for successful organizational outcomes. The right topics not
delivered will not derive the practices and procedures perpetuated by the organization but the
practices and procedures convenient to other individuals at work (Murata, 2017). Supervisors in
organizations are like the chassis of a vehicle. There are wheels which take the vehicle where it
goes; the engine to ensure that it can get there, and the driver who coordinates the speed, the
actual route, and the time when the journey will commence. The chassis keeps everything
together and makes the vehicle work as a vehicle should. In the workplace, the supervisor holds
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everything together and causes the work operations and organizational outcomes to be what it
should.
Work planning, when done well, is an organizational commitment to conducting work in
a methodological, strategic manner aimed at safe and productive performance outcomes. Work
planning, not well done, is a failure to meet the vision of conducting work in a manner intended
at the safe and productive performance. Management actions that are inconsistent or dismissive
of worker concerns are anti-supportive and not conducive to a positive work environment where
genuine efforts by all occur for organizational success. Ballard, Miller, Piantadosi, Goodman,
and McClure (2017) indicated that it was inherent for humans to develop categories determined
by membership rules learned implicitly. Humans, however, are generally gifted with the ability
to learn (Kuselman, 2015). The implications are that managers and supervisors can learn not to
compromise workplace safety, even if it is not intentional when pressured to get things done and
to meet organizational goals (Probst, 2015). Individuals who do not work to this end shall be
removed or even dismissed; regardless of their job function (Ballard et al., 2017). It is critically
important that the person in charge of a job must know and project the importance of good
communication. Workers cannot get help from supervisors and managers if they are unable to
communicate this need in a clear and appropriate manner. Managers and supervisors cannot
expect superior and accident-free outcomes if their intent is effectively not transferred to workers
understanding, agreement, and focus (Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017; Scott et al., 2014; White et al.,
2016).
Individuals violating permits to work are either not aware of the provisions of the permit
to work or have willfully disregarded one of the most sophisticated work management systems in

205
the electrical power industry. To fix this type of safety breach, one must fully understand why
breaches occur on a detailed work arrangement, where workers issuing or receiving permits are
specially trained to issue or receive these instruments and where the declarations are deliberate
and worded such that the signatories accept legal liabilities for ensuring that work measures are
safe (Allen & D’Elia, 2015). It is also critical that the individual issuing the permit to work
usually is a supervisor or the supervisor of the work to be performed. Implicit in this
arrangement, is the quality of communication between the issuer and the receiver of the permit to
work. Also implied, is the job briefing that occurs with all members of the work party for a
detailed discussion on the job (Labib, 2015).
If a permit to work violation is an exquisite high-end violation, then lock-out-tag-outnon-compliance is the most significant willful violation of safe work procedures and which is
most times carried out by a supervisor or the person receiving the permit. These violations are
occurring in the electric power industry. Ideally, the opportunity to learn from accident
experiences are the best opportunities to apply new knowledge and to best prepare and to prevent
other similar accidents (Murata, 2017). Several things must happen for learning from accident to
occur; findings of the accident investigations must guide the lesson. The quality of the
investigation should guide the credibility of the report findings, recommendations, and
conclusions; organizational leaders, managers, and supervisors must support and facilitate
learnings and implement recommendations once known. Non-use of personal protective
equipment speaks more to workers and their responsibility and duty of care while at work than
anything else. No amount of experience and work knowledge will substitute for workers
wearing appropriate and necessary personal protective equipment while performing dangerous
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work. Defaulting employees are to be removed and even dismissed; to be saved from their
irresponsible behavior.
Limitations of the Study
The first limitation could be that the study results may prove useful in the electrical
power industry only because of the uniqueness that exists in this industry. Safety Management
System as a contributor to accidents, based on the findings of this study, seems not likely to
restrict the application of the findings only to the electric power industry. Deficiencies in Lockout Tag-out procedures, issues surrounding worksite responsibilities, and understanding of
individual roles on job sites; a poor safety culture exists and promoted by management;
management, worker unions, and regulators interaction and games; Job Safety Analysis issues
and proper use of personal protective equipment are all issues that reflect a poor safety
management arrangement in the electric power industry. These were evident in other industries
(Labib, 2015; Moshansky, 1992; Murata, 2017; Probst, 2015; Singh et al., 2010). The use of the
Bolman and Deal four-frame approach to analyzing data proved advantageous as it was easy to
apply and sufficiently versatile that the results can extend the findings to industries and
workplaces other than the electric power industry (Bolman & Deal, 2013; Moore, 2016). The
research scope was limited to the electric power industry and how to prevent accidents occurring
in the United States. The primary focus was to understand the contributing factors for situations
where electricity industry workers become severely injured or even killed while performing
work. The strategy was to employ the Bolman and Deal (2013) four-frame model to analyze
participants’ responses and to use the data to promote safe working arrangements: It may prove a
helpful model for further studies in the electric power as well as other industrial sectors.
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The second limitation is that the Delphi panelists as research participants brought very
pointed views that may be prevalent only where the individual works. Researcher tact and skill
ensured that the research remained on-course (San Su, Wardell, & Thorkildsen, 2013). The
number of items, 28 out of 30 possible issues, that the participants supported as factors that
contribute to workplace accidents, serious worker injuries, and even fatalities, are indicative of
two cogent facts. First, the electric power industry is a dangerous and hazardous industry where
accidents can occur if individuals at work are not safe and do not take appropriate steps to
mitigate the danger. The second fact is that the issues tested in this study were from previous
studies of accidents in other industries; the level of agreement indicate the wide-ranging
implications of the findings in this study that the lessons can extend into different work areas
(Labib, 2015; Moffatt-Bruce et al., 2017; Murata, 2017; Probst, 2015; Singh et al., 2010).
The third possible limitation was if the best candidates did not participate in this study.
The experienced and knowledgeable participants in this study were electric power industry
managers, trainers, professionals, supervisors, and workers with an average of 25.2 years service.
Their industry background was diverse and a good reflection of the practitioners who are
crucially involved in dangerous and hazardous work in the electric power industry (Volberg et
al., 2017). Participants were able to describe work arrangements, procedures, environments, and
pertinent issues connected to workplace safety management in the electrical power industry. The
participants willingly shared information and contributed to new learning and understanding of
the challenges in and as contributors to accident prevention efforts in the electric power industry
(Volberg et al., 2017).
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A fourth limitation can be the personal and professional bias and possible influence on
the strategy used to conduct the literature search, data collection, and analysis in this study.
More than 20 electric power industry experts contributed to the extension of existing knowledge
about the electric power industry. They did this over the four separate rounds of the Delphi
study: In the Round 1, I encouraged the participants to suggest other information they considered
as pertinent and not covered in the questionnaire (Patton, 2015). The information they provided
enhanced the likelihood that the data is correct because of the consensus achieved on 28 different
issues while participants remained anonymous to one another. The 28 relevant issues
represented a significant effort to improve the research trustworthiness and data derived from the
process (Yin, 2013).
The fifth limitation may be researcher management of the Delphi study. The iterative
process of the Delphi technique was a possible disadvantage as attrition by participants can affect
the research and highlight credibility issues in the overall findings (Annear et al., 2015; Willems,
Sutton, & Maybery, 2015). Before the study I accepted that twenty-five (25) participants were
acceptable if the attrition rate is less than 25 % over the entire study; to this end, 27 participants
started Round 1 and 23 completed Round 4: 85% of the participants in this study remained
interested to the end of the Delphi rounds (Brody et al., 2014; Sinclair, Oyebode, & Owens,
2016). I remained meticulous and exercised all available opportunities to keep the research
exercise free of administrative delays and inefficiencies (De Loë et al., 2016; Patton, 2015).
A sixth limitation may be possible social desirability bias if participants misrepresented
their real views and behaved in socially acceptable ways (Heitner et al., 2013). There is very
little likelihood of this occurring as the questions did not require participants to reveal or recount
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their behavior, contribution, or influence on any particular accident or workplace issue directly
related to the study (Kim & Kim, 2016). Also, I ensured strictest control on participant
anonymity and research confidentiality (Heitner et al., 2013).
Understanding how accidents occur is preliminary to the deliberate taking of steps toward
the prevention of future electric industry workplace accidents and to keep workers safe and
uninjured. For this study, a specific delimitation surrounded the use of the Bolman and Deal
four-frame model. The different perspectives described in the four-frames allowed for a better
review of organizational and people issues and dynamics that contribute to workplace accidents.
Since no previous study of this kind was conducted in the electric power industry using this
model, the heavy reliance on participants and the detailed data they provided heightens the
significance of the selection strategies and process (Brady, 2015). It is possible that individuals
with little or limited knowledge and experience made the research less meaningful, even with
consensus. That possibility makes participant retention and the integrity of their industry
experience and knowledge crucially important. Participants selection were on LinkedIn through
invitation. Participation was voluntary and spanned over two months. The fact that 85% of the
participants remained interested in the study over the entire four rounds more likely improved the
study credibility and trustworthiness.
Other specific issues, considered as a delimitation before the study, surrounded the use of
the Normative Delphi technique, what a Delphi expert was, and how that aligned with the actual
selection of participants. It is possible that better and more suitable experts did not accept the
invitation to participate or that the use of the public social media, LinkedIn, was not the best way
to attract participants (Brady, 2015). It is also possible that the participants, even over the vast
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geographical space, were unhelpful because they were too personally-linked to electric power
industry accidents. That realization, as far as I know, did not materialize.
The research question, whether it was too pointed and possibly contentious for experts to
admit to issues in the electric power industry freely as a delimitation. That likelihood is low as
each of the four questionnaires in this study comprised more than 30 questions which required
participants to indicate desirability, feasibility, importance, and confidence. The likelihood of
individual bias and coordinated bias among more than 20 anonymous participants in this
arrangement is extremely low. It is possible that workers could blame managers and vice versa,
but that would more reflect a characteristic of the electric power industry rather than a research
design factor. With participant involvement limited to responses to me as the researcher
developed questionnaires, participant actions and group politics, research inadequacies,
technologies, and techniques that may have factored in this study is insignificant. If during the
period over which the study spanned accidents occurred, that experience may influence
participant response for the remaining Delphi rounds. The results of this study were consistent
through the entire exercise. That showed a consistent pattern of participants’ responses.
A delimitation condition set before the study was the geographical area where
participants were chosen (United States) and the requirements for research consensus: With the
data coding strategy I adopted and the acceptance criteria for research results also delimited
before the study. It was possible that all these factors limited the results derived in this research.
The fact that 28 out of the 30 issues remained as factors that lead to workplace accidents in the
electric power industry makes these assumptions credible. The likelihood of results limitation is,
therefore, insignificant.
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One possible limitation in this study surrounds the composition in terms of the job
functions of the participant pool. It is possible that if the participants came from only one
discipline, linemen as an example, the results can be different. Differentiation of the responses
from linemen as compared to those from managers was not discernable in this study because of
the anonymous manner the four Delphi rounds occurred via Survey Monkey. If the participant
pool were only trainers, then the responses using the approach from this study would produce
trainers responses while still maintaining individual anonymity. This way, it will likely be
possible to identify where particular human performance issues may exist and how best to
mitigate these for superior outcomes, including the prevention of accidents and worker injuries.
Recommendations
Organizations in the electric power industry should use the findings identified in this
study to compare their own operating experiences and to appropriate suitable corrective actions
for superior performance outcomes. The approach may make it necessary for the recreation of
the study and to compare actual organizational results against their desired results. It may be that
for particular organizations, the challenges can be different and so too will be the forward
approach to addressing and correcting problems they may identify. Organizations adopting this
approach should measure the possible benefits against their accident and worker injury
experience.
Organizations and individuals in the electric power industry are experiencing a crisis with
regards to individual attitudes, behavior, and a problem of willful disregard for work rules, and
safe work procedures. Further investigation is necessary to determine if this is isolated or
widespread, even extending outside of the industry and into other realms of human endeavor.
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The inquiry must include a review and understanding of safety culture in the electric power
industry and whether there are elements in this culture that if promoted, can allow for improved
organizational outcomes.
Individual investigation, at an organizational level, of the items identified in this study as
contributing to accidents in the electric power industry where workers suffer serious and fatal
injuries should occur. This aim of that investigation is to glean exact details on how in particular
organizations, the work rules, procedures, and practices can be revised and updated, and for
workplace changes to prevent further and future accidents.
Further investigation on the items identified in this study where individuals at work either
misjudged situations or disregarded safe work arrangements is necessary as that shows a
negative pattern of human performance in the hazardous and dangerous industry and working
environment. It may be that with a more in-depth and focussed investigation of the human and
social issues, significant opportunities and initiatives that would be unique to the region or
company where that study occurs will evolve. Organizational leadership, especially where
employees suffered fatal and serious injuries in the last five years, should review the safety
management systems to focus on and emphasize more on human interactions, the quality of
interpersonal communication, and interactive person-to-person activities to augment existing
organizational support for work procedures and technical compliance.
A review of workplace training for work in critical functions should occur for
opportunities to merge individual focus with organizational direction and if training
arrangements can align with employee needs rather than only on organizational processes and
procedures. Possible benefits from this approach is an evolving human performance culture
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which can appropriately address individual attitudes and behavior while discouraging willful
violations of safety rules and poor judgment by individuals at work.
Further studies can be conducted with single job functions for better identification and
understanding of the human problems and challenges experienced by that homogenous group of
participants. It is possible that results from this study were skewed and tempered by the
heterogeneous group of participants who represented a full cadre of job functions in the electrical
power industry. Participant groups can also be gleaned from Power Stations separately from
those in Transmission or Distribution and the other divisions in the electric power industry. It is
possible that results can vary depending on the work division.
A lot of the causes of accidents are related. Proper supervision will prevent most of the
reasons for accidents to occur. Adequate training for supervisors is imperative for a safe
working environment. Specific supervisor-work procedures and oversight activities must grow
on support by institutionalized knowledge resident in the organization, possessed by experienced
practitioners, and in specialist training to augment the effort.
The safety policies and rules in an organization must keep pace with advancements in
technology and industry best practice. Many times workers encounter tools, equipment, and
procured material that are available on the market which encourage modes of operation that
inherently vary from set work procedures and documented instructions. As such, there must be
continuous review and revision to ensure that new items procured are consistent with policy,
rules, and procedures.
Recommendations from accident investigations, appropriately reviewed and actioned, to
ensure that there is no recurrence. This review may involve revision of work procedures and
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safety rules. Disseminate information about work issues and work practices from accident
investigation so that work teams can, in the future, prevent similar errors and breaches.
Non-use of personal protective equipment is in the same category as poor work ethic,
poor attitude, and poor supervision. It is common that personal protective equipment is the last
line of defense against hazards behind engineering and administrative controls. However,
personal protective equipment is of utmost importance, especially in instances where there is a
breakdown of the different lines of defense up to the worker. An example of this would be
insulation breakdown when operating a switch. If for whatever reason the bushings of a switch
were to crack while in operation, the operator must be wearing insulated gloves if the handle was
to become energized as a result. Supervisors and managers must demand full compliance.
Implications
Unengaged management and uninterested supervision: complacency is a big contributing
factor in accidents. Personnel (including executive leadership), who do not have an
understanding of what hazards are faced daily by frontline workers, allowing drift from strict
adherence to the process and procedures. Workers when performing the same types of tasks, day
after day not being vigilant when the expected task changes or is slightly modified. Workers
often perform the customary steps and get themselves into challenging and dangerous situations.
An example, provided by a participant in this study, was the preparing equipment for
energization; there is a step where high voltage testing is one of the final activities. An
individual can perform this process many times in the same week. Then on the Friday-afternoon,
the worker gets instructions to prepare equipment for energization, but not with the high voltage
testing because of a field task where someone is still at work. The individual making the
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equipment ready for energization follows the customary practice, without registering that
someone is still at work on the system, performs the high voltage testing, electrocuting (killing)
the individual in the field. The implication is that whatever the task or work activity and
wherever done; the effect can be that an individual at work in the electrical power industry can
introduce unsafe conditions into the workplace. If that goes unaddressed, the implications can
include worker injuries or death. Organizational leaders, to clerical assistants, can impact on the
quality of information upon which a lineman or an electrician may have to act. If all other
barriers fail as to err is human, then the frontline worker can be in danger.
Latent organizational weaknesses which can lead to accidents where workers can become
injured or killed including any undetected deficiencies in the management control processes
(such as strategy, policies, work control, training, and resource allocation), values (shared
beliefs, attitudes, norms, and assumptions), and workplace conditions which can cause individual
error (precursors) or safety barrier breaches (flawed defenses). Organizational Leadership must
recognize the implications of promoting inherently flawed systems: individuals at work will not
improve performance and workplace outcomes would suffer. The consequence can also include
worker injuries and fatalities.
Potential hazards: If left uncontrolled, can contribute to an accident. These include
engineering factors, task demands, human factors and individual capabilities, management
issues, work organization, and environmental factors, work pace and personal protective
equipment, unexpected equipment conditions and proximity to other utilities. The implications
are that with poor work outcomes, electric power service availability, continuity, reliability
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assurance to customers who depend on electric service to maintain their quality and living
standards are no longer guaranteed.
Deficiencies in work organization or planning, specialized equipment operation, the
encroachment of minimum approach distances in energized environments all contribute to
workplace accidents occurring in the electric power industry. These can happen at any job site.
Weather conditions can exacerbate road driving conditions and increase the likelihood of motor
vehicle accident or a road mishap occurring at a location where individuals would be working on
or near electrical systems. That can exacerbate dangerous conditions, cause inattention and
distraction as well as improper equipment operation. The implications are that these accidents
are more likely if the work crew installed an inadequate level of work area protection and
incorrectly managed the hazards present at that location. It may be that individuals at the
worksite were inexperienced, inadequately trained, or willfully disregarded safe work rules and
procedures. It can also happen if the individuals exercised poor judgment on the dangers of
working at that location. Human nature and habit patterns, their assumptions, and
overconfidence can contribute to individuals making a poor judgment at work. These are equally
possible if there was mental short-cuts, inaccurate risk assessments due to the erroneous
perception of risks.
The above points addressed what can impact the safe performance of a job. One problem
is that in the electric power industry, workers frequently have to report to remote locations, and
there is no one to oversee how a job is set up and performed. Workers must be trained and must
be encouraged to speak up when necessary. Workers must be trained adequately so if there is
something out of line, they will maintain control of the worksite and activities, and are capable of
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deciding on how to do that and keep the safe performance of a job. The implications are that the
work can impact members of the public to the extent that there is equipment loss, individuals can
become affected by unplanned and unanticipated power outages, or worse.
Managers and supervisors must insist that the crew members understand that the
foreman, as the supervisor, is ultimately responsible for completing a safe project, and it is their
responsibility to follow the plan. Specific arrangements are necessary for confirmation of
worker retention of knowledge: This can be a topic of further research. The implications are that
the performance outcomes can improve, worker injuries or deaths prevented, and the lessons
apply to other workplaces, in other industries or the electric power industry outside of the United
States.
Although this is a low probability scenario, there are instances of trees making contact
with energized infrastructure and becoming energized. One participant related that there was a
situation where a frog closed a circuit between an energized LV conductor and the pole. It
created a high impedance fault, and as such, the fuse for the circuit did not operate. The pole and
down-guy-wire in this instance became energized as the bonding conductor burnt out. Where the
down-guy-wire entered the ground, there was a puddle of water that started to boil with the
dissipated heat. These instances are particularly dangerous as the fault current is low and does
not ensure that protective devices operate promptly. The implications are that lessons learned
from accident investigations into these and other electric power industry accidents and dangerous
conditions can help to prevent accidents throughout the United States and in territories such as
Canada and the Caribbean.
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Where material procured is substandard and low quality, there can be unexpected failures
at critical stages of a job which can result in accidents. One participant related an example where
on a pin-type insulator changeout hotline job, the new insulator failed while being installed. This
accident investigation revealed that a batch of pin-type insulators received was defective. Even
though it passed an insulation resistance test, it was a soft material that was cut easily by the tie
wire. In cases like this, both the specifications for future procurement and the acceptance testing
of future material received must be reviewed and revised to prevent such occurrences. The
review of methods of field testing material must be comprehensive (technical and procurement
practices). The implications are that the lessons learned from these incidents and the
improvements made to the procurement processes can be used to aide the positive development
of similar arrangements in the electric power industry throughout the United States and in
territories outside of the United States; such as Canada and the Caribbean.
Equipment failure can be mitigated against on a job by proper inspection and testing of
equipment and also using the equipment as intended. In most instances, there are provisions and
multiple layers of protection in the event of failure. However, in some critical instances,
equipment failure can cause fatal accidents. Employees must be appropriately trained in critical
thinking when reacting to such unplanned events. Employees applying the teachings from
training courses can impact on the serviceability of electric components and therefore prevent inservice or premature equipment failure. The implications are that customer service quality,
availability, and reliability can be guaranteed as possible dangerous occurrences may be averted.
Permitting systems are enforced to ensure the safety of the workforce. It is a method of
communication between plant operators and the executing crew to indicate that the portion of the
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plant on which work occurs is safe. Permits are necessary for instances where the plant has to be
made safe by a plant operator before a crew executing work. The switching process is usually
the prerequisite to a cold line permit. The permit is also a guide that ensures that the switching
process is safe. Violations to the permit to work procedure could mean that work is being carried
out by crew/s on a plant that is not made safe for work by the plant operator, which can result in
accidents. Permitting is also imperative in instances where there are multiple working parties on
the same circuit and coordinating between the working parties and the plant operators to safely
re-energize circuits after completing work. The implications are that multi-workgroups working
on the same circuit for efficiency gains can continue to occur without issues of
miscommunication between workgroups. That way, workers can complete tasks successfully
and in an injury-free manner.
The safety rules would have been developed to prevent very particular unsafe situations
and for mitigation of hazards. By not adhering to the safety rules and without a proper
supervisory assessment and implementation of controls, the result can be accidents. These
accidents are due to employees encountering situations and hazards that the safety rule was there
to prevent and mitigate. There are instances, however, where the safety rules are lagging behind
industry best practice, and there are deviations in safety rules implementation. In such cases,
proper work planning and job hazard analysis must be done to ensure the necessary controls to
prevent departure from standard practice, and to mitigate against the hazards, consistent with the
safety rules. The implications are that for instances where industry best practices are available,
electric power industry organizational leaders shall adopt these and upgrade organizational
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processes, practices, and rules and so benefit from the opportunity of improved performance
outcomes and accident prevention.
Poor judgment by individuals or work crews is the human aspect of the job. Skilled
workers are trained to make a continuous assessment of the job and adapt accordingly. There
have been several instances where wrong decisions taken by foremen and linemen have led to a
loss of life or limb. An example would be to attempt a reclosure on a circuit without tracing the
entire circuit. There could be a burst-wire on the ground which could become energized when
closing the fuse. In a fatality accident, involving a line clearing crew, the workers decided to
utilize a porter wrap to cut a large tree-branch without taking a proper assessment. This decision
eventually led to an improper technique by a worker for the size of the branch resulting in the
branch falling on one of the line clearers killing him instantly (George, 2018). The implications
of successful addressing of poor judgment instances and situations are that the lessons learned
can be applied elsewhere in the United States and territories such as Canada and the Caribbean.
Conclusion
Financial pressures on management and time pressures put on crews create conditions
where individuals in the electric power industry resort to taking short-cuts, which can inevitably
lead to serious worker injuries and fatalities. There are significant social and interpersonal
challenges: poor supervision by individuals vested with the responsibility to maintain safe
operations; field employees have poor attitudes towards management; and clueless management
with no idea what’s going on in the field because they never go out and enforce the
organizational expectations for its employees. There is insufficient quality involvement in and
an emphasis on job briefings and tailgate meetings by general foremen, foremen, and
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supervisors. A poor safety culture that strives on blame and finger-pointing where management
seems fully aware but not inclined to repair. Implementing change, even if poor performance is
known, is difficult to accomplish. Workers disregarding safe work procedures must know and
understand that the price includes their becoming injured permanently, killed, or dismissed from
the company. Management issues such as the organizational culture, leadership matters,
inadequate controls, and sub-optimal allocation of resources can lead to worker errors, especially
when work procedures, policies, and standards are not well promulgated. Managers are
responsible for ensuring appropriate communication of work procedures, policies, rules, and
organizational priorities with employees. Managers are also responsible for selecting employees
with the right qualifications and for the actual placement of employees. It is, therefore, an
indictment on management and supervision if workers lack necessary job experience,
knowledge, and were involved in workplace accidents, primarily when there was inadequate
supervision of the work activities.
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Ganesh Narine
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From: Ganesh Narine
Sent: June 6, 2018 8:41 PM
Subject: Fw: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation

From: Ganesh Narine
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To: Barry Wellar
Subject: Re: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation
Thank You Professor Wellar,
I am sorry about the passing of Dr. Novakowski. I also apologize for incorrectly spelling your
name before.
I will update you when my Dissertation becomes available online.
Ganesh
From: Barry Wellar <wellarb@uottawa.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, June 6, 2018 9:07:13 AM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: RE: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation
You are most welcome. Since Erin/Nick has passed away it seems that only my
permission is needed in terms of authorship. Regarding the journal, to my knowledge it
appears that as a rule journals only require what you are doing in terms of sourcing, so
please consider permission granted to proceed as you propose.

Dr. Barry Wellar, MCIP
Professor Emeritus
Department of Geography
University of Ottawa
Ottawa ON K1N 6N5
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From: Ganesh Narine [mailto:ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, June 5, 2018 10:38 PM
To: Barry Wellar; nnovakowski@swgc.mun.ca
Subject: Re: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation

Thank You Dr. Weller,
I truly appreciate your positive response.
I most certainly will let you know when it can be accessed online.
Ganesh
From: Barry Wellar <wellarb@uottawa.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, June 5, 2018 10:02:27 PM
To: Ganesh Narine; nnovakowski@swgc.mun.ca
Subject: RE: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation

Permission granted on my part, best wishes for a successful dissertation outcome.
Please inform me when the dissertation can be viewed online.

Dr. Barry Wellar, GISP
President, Information Research Board Inc.
133 Ridgefield Crescent
Ottawa, ON K2H 6T4
CANADA
From: Ganesh Narine [mailto:ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu]
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To: wellarb@uottawa.ca; nnovakowski@swgc.mun.ca
Subject: Request for use of your Flowchart in my doctoral dissertation

Hi,
I am a doctoral research student at Walden University. I am conducting my research and using
the Delphi Method. I found your document (Using the Delphi technique in normative planning
research: methodological design considerations), relevant to my study.
My request is for permission to reproduce your Figure 1 Flowchart for a normative Delphi on
page 1488. I assure you that all necessary recognition will be afforded your work as the
data source if permission is granted.
I look forward to your response and I thank you in advance.
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From: Ganesh Narine
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To: Icek Aizen
Subject: Re: Request to reuse your diagram in my research
Thank You Professor.
GN

From: Icek Aizen <aizen@psych.umass.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 2:16 PM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Re: Request to reuse your diagram in my research
Dear Ganesh Narine,
No permission is needed to include an ORIGINAL drawing of the TPB model in a thesis,
dissertation, presentation, poster, article, or book. If you would like to reproduce a published
drawing of the model (such as the one in the White et al. article, you need to get permission
from the publisher who holds the copyright. You may use the drawings on my website
("https://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpb.diag.html” or
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including publication in a journal article, so long as you retain the copyright notice.
Best regards,
Icek Ajzen
Professor Emeritus
University of Massachusetts - Amherst
https://people.umass.edu/aizen
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I am a doctoral student at Walden University. I am at the dissertation stage of my research. Your
research on the Theory of Planned Behaviour is relevant to my study on why accidents are occurring in
the US Electric Power Industry. Your diagram on this theory was captured by White et al. (2016). My
request is for permission to reuse this diagram in my doctoral dissertation. I assure you that all
appropriate recognition will be afforded.
I thank you in anticipation of a positive response.
Ganesh Narine
Student ID: A00648285
Walden University

From: Ganesh Narine
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To: Katherine White
Subject: Re: Request for copy of your paper to further my research (further request)
Thank you for your kind response. I will contact the Azjen website as you suggested. Appreciate
much.
Ganesh

From: Katherine White <km.white@qut.edu.au>
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To: Ganesh Narine
Cc: Nerina Jimmieson
Subject: RE: Request for copy of your paper to further my research (further request)
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Thanks for your email. It is ok to use the idea of the Figure from this paper but it might be an
idea for you to consult also Ajzen’s website for Figure suggestions.
http://people.umass.edu/aizen/
Kind regards,
Katy White

From: Ganesh Narine
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 5:24 AM
To: km.white@qut.edu.au
Subject: Fw: Request for copy of your paper to further my research (further request)
Hi Ms White,
I found your article very much relevant to my study and I want to reuse your Figure on "The
Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991, p.182)" as captured Section 1.2.2 of your paper. I
again assure you that all appropriate recognition will be afforded you and your colleagues as the
source of this data. I believe that it compliments my research literature and makes my doctoral
dissertation all the better.
I look forward to your response.
Ganesh Narine
STUDENT ID: A00648285
WALDEN UNIVERSITY

Your paper:
White, K. M., Jimmieson, N. L., Obst, P. L., Gee, P., Haneman, L., O’Brien-McInally, B., &
Cockshaw, W. (2016). Identifying safety beliefs among Australian electrical
workers. Safety science, 82, 164-173. doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2015.09.008
From: Ganesh Narine
Sent: Friday, May 4, 2018 6:05 AM
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To: Katherine White
Cc: Nerina Jimmieson
Subject: Re: Request for copy of your paper to further my research
Thank You very much for your positive and kind response.
GN

From: Katherine White <km.white@qut.edu.au>
Sent: Friday, May 4, 2018 12:21:57 AM
To: Ganesh Narine
Cc: Nerina Jimmieson
Subject: RE: Request for copy of your paper to further my research
Hi Ganesh,
Thanks for your email. Please find the paper attached.
All the best with your research.
Kind regards,
Katy White
From: Ganesh Narine [mailto:ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu]
Sent: Friday, 4 May 2018 11:24 AM
To: Katherine White <km.white@qut.edu.au>
Subject: Request for copy of your paper to further my research
Good Evening Ms. White,
I am a student at Walden University (USA) and I am conducting my doctoral research on
accidents in the electric power industry in North Eastern USA. I found your paper on one of my
literature search. This is relevant to my study. I therefore request that you allow me a copy. I
assure you that all proper citations and source identification will be afforded to you and your
colleagues. Thank you in advance.
Your paper:
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White, K. M., Jimmieson, N. L., Obst, P. L., Gee, P., Haneman, L., O’Brien-McInally, B., &
Cockshaw, W. (2016). Identifying safety beliefs among Australian electrical
workers. Safety science, 82, 164-173. doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2015.09.008

Ganesh Narine
STUDENT ID: A00648285
WALDEN UNIVERSITY

From: Ganesh Narine
Sent: Sunday, April 29, 2018 11:41 AM
To: Matt Brearley
Subject: Re: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research
Thank You Dr. Brearly,
I will provide you with details of my study progress and with any interesting studies that I
unearth during this journey. I have not done any work on electrical safety but I am open to that
possibility. I did an article in 2004 for the West Indian Engineering Forum. I will look for that and
share it with you as soon as I can.
Ganesh
From: Matt Brearley <matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au>
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2018 6:59:59 AM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Re: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research
No Problem Ganesh, will send through within the next 7 days. Your research area is of great
interest to me as I work with a variety of electrical utility organisations here in Australia –
please let me know of any publications/documents you produce as I’d like to read them.
Apologies for the typo in the previous email.
Regards,
Matt
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From: Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu>
Date: Thursday, 26 April 2018 at 7:47 pm
To: Matt Brearley <matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au>
Subject: Re: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research
Good Morning Sir,
Thank You so much. I will very much be interested in your latest article as well. I assure you that
appropriate recognition and citations for your work will be maintained.
I look forward to your new article.
Ganesh
From: Matt Brearley <matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au>
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 11:08:54 PM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Re: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research
Hi Garesh,
Please find attached the requested paper. We are close to submitting another paper regarding
heat stress in the electrical utility industry, I can send that to you once submitted if you are
interested.
Regards,
Matt
Matt Brearley PhD
Managing Director
Thermal Hyperformance Pty Ltd
+61420889399
www.thermalhyperformance.com.au

From: Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu>
Date: Thursday, 26 April 2018 at 12:56 pm
To: "matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au" <matt@thermalhyperformance.com.au>
Subject: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research

264
Good Evening Sir,
I am a doctoral research student at Walden University in the USA. My research is on why
serious and fatal accidents are happening in the electric power industry.
My request is for a copy of your work (below). This is a paper that may prove very helpful to my
research. Thank you in advance of a positive response. I assure you that all required citations
and recognition will be afforded your work, if I include it in my research.
Ganesh Narine
STUDENT ID: A00648285
Your Document:
Working in Hot Conditions—A Study of Electrical Utility Workers in the Northern Territory of
Australia
Matt Brearley, Phillip Harrington, Doug Lee & Raymond Taylor
Pages 156-162 | Accepted author version posted online: 29 Sep 2014, Published online: 29 Sep
2014
Download citation https://doi.org/10.1080/15459624.2014.957831

From: Glen Kenny <gkenny@uottawa.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 10:28 PM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Automatic reply: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research
Hello, thank you for your message. I am currently away from the office. I will respond to your email on
my return April 26.

Regards,
Glen P. Kenny, PhD (Med), FCAHS
Professor and University Research Chair (Exercise and Environmental Physiology)
Director, Human and Environmental Physiology Research Unit
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Fellow of the Canadian Academy of Health Sciences
Faculty of Health Sciences
University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5
(613) 562-5800 ext. 4282 (office)
(613) 562-5497 (fax)

From: Ganesh Narine
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 10:28 PM
To: gkenny@uottawa.ca
Subject: Request for a copy of your paper to further my research

Good Evening Sir,
I am a doctoral research student at Walden University in the USA. My research is on why
serious and fatal accidents are happening in the electric power industry.
My request is for a copy of your work (below). This is a paper that may prove very helpful to my
research. Thank you in advance of a positive response. I assure you that all required citations
and recognition will be afforded your work, if I include it in my research.
Ganesh Narine
STUDENT ID: A00648285

Your Document:
An Evaluation of the Physiological Strain Experienced by Electrical Utility Workers in North
America
Robert D. Meade, Martin Lauzon, Martin P. Poirier, Andreas D. Flouris & Glen P. Kenny
Pages 708-720 | Accepted author version posted online: 26 May 2015, Published online: 02 Sep
2015
Download citation https://doi.org/10.1080/15459624.2015.1043054

From: Takis Mitropoulos <takism2009@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, April 3, 2018 3:37 PM
To: Ganesh Narine
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Cc: tabdelha@msu.edu; takism@asu.edu; gah2343@mac.com
Subject: Re: Fw: Request for use of information
HI Ganesh,
yes you have permission to use the figures from the paper.
Best
P. Mitropoulos
On Mon, Apr 2, 2018 at 6:26 AM, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote:
Dear Professors, Director
I hope that you are enjoying great health and happiness. I am a doctoral student at Walden
University. I am conducting research on why accidents are occurring in the North American
power industry. I have your research paper on " Accident prevention strategies: Causation model
and research directions" (cited below). I am interested in using information, including your
diagrams on my research dissertation. I will appropriately cite and fully recognize the source of
my information. Before doing this, I seek your permission to do so. I assure you that I will
attribute full recognition to you for the excellent work that you have done.
I look forward to your positive response. Thank you in advance.
Ganesh Narine
STUDENT ID: A00648285

Mitropoulos, P., Howell, G. A., & Abdelhamid, T. S. (2005). Accident prevention strategies: Causation
model and research directions. In Construction Research Congress 2005: Broadening

Perspectives (pp. 1-10). doi: 10.1061/40754(183)8

From: Greg Howell <GHowell@Leanconstruction.org>
Sent: Monday, April 2, 2018 9:18 AM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Automatic reply: Request for use of unformation
Thank you for your email. To reach Greg Howell, please contact gah2343@mac.com.
Greg
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From: Takis Mitropoulos <takism2009@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 8, 2018 4:38 PM
To: Ganesh Narine
Cc: gah2343@mac.com
Subject: Re: Fw: Request for use of unformation
Ganesh, I already emailed you permission several days ago.
Best
On Sun, Apr 8, 2018, 6:19 AM Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote:
Good Morning Professor,
Please assist me with regards to my request in the email thread below.
Thank you in advance.
GN

From: Gregory Howell <gah2343@mac.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 7, 2018 1:59 PM
To: Ganesh Narine
Cc: Takis Mitropoulos
Subject: Re: Request for use of unformation
Suggest you contact Takis Mitropoulos

Takis Mitropoulos <takism2009@gmail.com

Gregory A. Howell
Box 1003
Ketchum, ID 83340-1003

Connecting people and ideas
C - 208/726-9989
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Skype GregHowell

On Apr 2, 2018, at 11:50, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote:
Hello Mr. Howell,
The drawing that I am interested in is attached. Thank you for responding
GN

From: Gregory Howell <gah2343@mac.com>
Sent: Monday, April 2, 2018 10:23 AM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Re: Request for use of unformation
I suggest you send me the diagrams from the paper - I am not where I can find the paper. I’ll
read it and then suggest a time for you to call and we can figure out where to go from there.
Best regards, GAH
Greg Howell

On Apr 2, 2018, at 7:26 AM, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote:
Dear Professors, Director
I hope that you are enjoying great health and happiness. I am a doctoral student at Walden
University. I am conducting research on why accidents are occurring in the North American
power industry. I have your research paper on " Accident prevention strategies: Causation model
and research directions" (cited below). I am interested in using information, including your
diagrams on my research dissertation. I will appropriately cite and fully recognize the source of
my information. Before doing this, I seek your permission to do so. I assure you that I will
attribute full recognition to you for the excellent work that you have done.
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I look forward to your positive response. Thank you in advance.
Ganesh Narine
STUDENT ID: A00648285

Mitropoulos, P., Howell, G. A., & Abdelhamid, T. S. (2005). Accident prevention strategies: Causation
model and research directions. In Construction Research Congress 2005: Broadening

Perspectives (pp. 1-10). doi: 10.1061/40754(183)8

From: Greg Howell <GHowell@Leanconstruction.org>
Sent: Monday, April 2, 2018 9:18 AM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Automatic reply: Request for use of unformation
Thank you for your email. To reach Greg Howell, please contact gah2343@mac.com.
Greg

<accident causation model a.jpg>

From: Ganesh Narine
Sent: Sunday, April 1, 2018 9:27 PM
To: Ashraf Labib
Subject: Re: Request for use of information
Thank You Professor.
I will proudly share my work with you afterwards.
Ganesh
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From: Ashraf Labib <ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk>
Sent: Sunday, April 1, 2018 5:07 PM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Re: Request for use of information
Dear Ganesh,
With pleasure. Good luck.
Best wishes,
Ashraf

-----8<--------------------------------Professor Ashraf Labib
University of Portsmouth
Faculty of Business and Law,
Operations & Systems Management.
Portsmouth PO1 3DE
United Kingdom
Tel: 0044(0)23 9284 4729
Email: ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk
-----8<---------------------------------

On 1 April 2018 at 21:46, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote:
Dear Professor Labib,
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I hope that you are enjoying great health and happiness. I have your research paper on
" Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from Bhopal to Fukushima an analysis
through reliability engineering techniques" (cited below). I am interested in using information,
including your diagrams on my research dissertation. I will appropriately cite and fully recognize
the source of my information. Before doing this, I seek your permission to do so. I assure you
that I will attribute full recognition to you for the excellent work that you have done.
I look forward to your positive response. Thank you in advance.
Ganesh Narine
STUDENT ID: A00648285

Labib, A. (2015). Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from Bhopal to
Fukushima an analysis through reliability engineering techniques. Process Safety and
Environmental Protection, 97, 80-90. doi: 10.1016/j.psep.2015.03.008

From: Ashraf Labib <ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk>
Sent: Tuesday, January 9, 2018 4:05 AM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Re: Request for your permission and a copy
Dear Ganesh,
Thank you for your kind email. I am sorry that at the moment, I am very busy in supervising 12
doctoral students plus working on a large grant with strict deadlines, and many teaching
responsibilities. So my availability will be very limited. Hope you do well in your research which
is quite interesting.
Best wishes,
Ashraf

-----8<--------------------------------Professor Ashraf Labib
University of Portsmouth
Faculty of Business and Law,
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Operations & Systems Management.
Portsmouth PO1 3DE
United Kingdom
Tel: 0044(0)23 9284 4729
Email: ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk
-----8<---------------------------------

On 8 January 2018 at 21:37, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote:
Dear Professor Labib,
Thank you for your kind gesture. Sir, your study is one that is very revealing. My study is
focused on why accidents happen in the electric power industry and the prevention of
future accidents. This is in line with the disasters you have succinctly studied. Your work is one
that extended knowledge in a way that I hope to do in my industry. Would you be willing to
give me guidance if that becomes necessary? I am grateful for your response. Thank you in
advance.
Ganesh

From: Ashraf Labib <ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk>
Sent: Monday, January 8, 2018 9:21 AM
To: Ganesh Narine
Subject: Re: Request for your permission and a copy
Dear Ganesh,
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Please find attached as requested. Good luck in your studies.
Best wishes,
Ashraf

-----8<--------------------------------Professor Ashraf Labib
University of Portsmouth
Faculty of Business and Law,
Operations & Systems Management.
Portsmouth PO1 3DE
United Kingdom
Tel: 0044(0)23 9284 4729
Email: ashraf.labib@port.ac.uk
-----8<---------------------------------

On 7 January 2018 at 14:43, Ganesh Narine <ganesh.narine@waldenu.edu> wrote:
Hello,
I am a doctoral student at Walden University conducting research on why workplace accidents
happen. I am interested in your article (below).
Is it possible for you to share a copy with me? I want to study this and to include the lessons in
my own study. I will ensure full recognition of the high quality work that you have done. I may
also communicate further with you as I progress with my research. I am sure that I will learn
from you.
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Thank you for a great and positive response.
Ganesh

Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from
Bhopal to Fukushima an analysis through reliability
engineering techniques
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2015.03.008
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Appendix B: Disaster Comparison in Bhopal and Fukushima Daiichi

Comparison of the 1984 Chemical Disaster in Bhopal and the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station Meltdown.
Bhopal

Fukushima Daiichi

When

midnight of December 2, 1984

March 11th, 2011,

What (happened)

Water leak into methyl isocyanate (MIC)

Japan earthquake (9.0

tank 610.

Richter scale) followed by a
tsunami. AC electrical
power lost at Fukushima
Daiichi site.

How significant

water leak bypassed safety systems and

cooling capability of the four

was the problem

barriers. Other control systems

nuclear reactors lost

unavailable due to maintenance.
Other issues

Operational errors lead to further

Tsunami breached designed

escalation of problem.

systems and barriers
originally considered as
adequate for this facility

Disaster/

leads to an uncontrolled chemical

Accident/Event

reaction and deadly gas leak.

Consequence

nuclear melt-down

>3400 persons died

Level 7 disaster (the highest

> ~200 000 injured

severity level ) International
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>300 cows died

Nuclear and Radiological

>40sqkm of vegetation and eco-

Event Scale (INES),

systems damaged.

Unique

“Storm” waiting to happen

Unexpected and not

(learning/un-

designed for this level of

learning)

water from tsunami event

What went wrong

1. safety devices not designed for
major gas leak like this one.
2. Safety devices not enabled,
bypassed and unavailable
3. The plant was losing money
4. staff and maintenance cutbacks
5. questionable safety culture
6. worker/management problems.
Plant was due to be closed.
7. Ineffective emergency response
and inability to treat injured
victims
8. Communities were uninformed
resulting in thousands of victims
being injured or killed.
9. Environmental disaster.
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After the Accident

Led to organizations keeping less

Global regulation, new

volume (storage) of volatile chemicals

licencing arrangements for
nuclear power plants.

Note: Learning (and unlearning) from failures: 30 years on from Bhopal to Fukushima an
analysis through reliability engineering techniques. Adapted from A. Labib (2015). Reprinted
with permission.
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Appendix C: Delphi Design Types

Design type

Aim

Target
panellists

Administration

Number of
rounds

Classical

To elicit
opinion and
gain
consensus

Experts selected
based on aims of
research

Traditionally
postal

Employs
three or
more
rounds

Modified

Aim varies
according to
project
design, from
predicting
future events
to achieving
consensus

Experts selected
based on aims of
research

Varies, postal,
online etc.

May employ
fewer than 3
rounds

Decision

To structure
decisionmaking and
create the
future in
reality rather
than
predicting it

Decision makers,
selected according
to hierarchical
position and level
of expertise

Varies

Policy

To generate
opposing
views on
policy and
potential
resolutions.

Policy makers
selected to obtain
divergent opinions

Can adopt a
number of
formats
including
bringing
participants
together in a
group meeting

Round 1
design
Open
qualitative
first round, to
allow
panellists to
record
responses
Panellists
provided with
pre-selected
items, drawn
from various
sources,
within which
they are asked
to consider
their
responses

Varies

Can adopt
similar
process to
classical
Delphi

Varies

Can adopt
similar
process to
classical
Delphi
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Real
time/consensus
conference

To elicit
opinion and
gain
consensus

Experts selected
based on aims of
research

Use of
computer
technology that
panellists use
in the same
room to
achieve
consensus in
real time rather
than post

e-Delphi

Aim can vary
depending on
the nature of
the research

Expert selection
can vary
depending on the
aim of the research

Administration
of Delphi via
email or online
web survey

Technological

Online

Argument

Aim varies
according to
project
design, from
predicting
future events
to achieving
consensus
Aim varies
according to
project
design, from
predicting
future events
to achieving
consensus
To develop
relevant
arguments
and expose
underlying
reasons for
different
opinions on a
specific
single issue

Experts selected
based on aims of
research

Experts selected
based on aims of
research

Panellists should
represent the
research issue
from different
perspectives

Use of handheld keypads
allowing
responses to be
recorded and
instant
feedback
provided
Implementation
of the
technique on
any online
instrument
such as a chat
room, or
forum.

Varies

Varies

Can adopt
similar
process to
classical
Delphi

Varies

Can adopt
similar
process to
classical
Delphi
Can adopt
similar
process to
classical
Delphi

Varies

Can adopt
similar
process to
classical
Delph

Varies

Can adopt
similar
process to
modified
Delphi i.e.
first round
involves
expert
interviews
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Constructs
future
scenarios in
Adoption of
which
Expert selection
modified
Disaggregative panellists are
can vary
Varies
Varies
format using
policy
asked about
depending on the
cluster
their probable aim of the research
analysis
and the
preferable
future
Note. Enhancing rigour in the Delphi technique research. Adapted from F. Hasson & S. Keeney
(2011). Reprinted with permission.
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Appendix D: Normative Delphi
Figure 2.12 Flowchart for a Normative Delphi.
Step 1

Literature review
Establish the need for research
Establish the knowledge gaps
Step 15

Dissemination of research results
Provide results to client
Send results to panel members

Step 2

Pretest
Ensure that the Delphi is the most
appropriate research instrument

Step 14

Anonymous post-Delphi survey

Step 3

Preparation of draft
Background report
Survey

Analysis of final results
Response stability testing
Application of the consensus
criteria

Step
13

Step 4

Identification of potential participants
Identify potential trial-run participants
Identify potential Delphi panel
members

Step 12

Final tabulation of responses

Step 5
Telephone or e-mail contact and
interviews Select trial run candidates
Select Delphi panel members
Step 11
Step 6

Trial run. Investigate viability of
the draft background report and
draft survey

Iterations of the
survey

Step 10

Step7

Incorporation of feedback from
previous round
Retabulation of responses
Response stability testing
Editing of relevant opinions

Round 2: redistribution of the
survey

Final revision of background
report and survey
Step 9
Step8

Round 1
Initial distribution of background
report and survey to panel

Incorporation of feedback from
round 1. Incorporate new variables
from open-ended questions
Tabulation of round-1 results
Rewording; refinement of survey
Stabilization of conceptual
hierarchy

Figure 18: Using the Delphi technique in normative planning research: Methodological design
considerations. Adapted from N. Novakowski & B. Wellar. (2008). Reprinted with permission.
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Appendix E: Round 1 Questions

Round 1 Questions
1. The following are reasons why serious and fatal accidents occur in the electric power industry.
For each of the listed items, indicate whether you agree and comment on why you
selected your option.
Accident Cause

Poor design
Safety management system
flaw
Poor regulatory oversight
Poor workplace ethics,
history of wrongdoing that
went unaddressed
Incorrect labeling
Medical and other personal
issues
Grounding, earthing
failures/errors
Ineffective and inefficient
Maintenance
Animals/ living organisms
Hazardous Worksite
conditions
Unplanned events
Inappropriate work methods
Stakeholder demands
Poor judgment by individuals
or work crews
Poor attitudes and or behavior
by individuals or work crews
Ineffective or no workplace
Training
Poor Supervision
Work planning

Agree (Yes/No)

Comment - Potential solution
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Management priorities
Poor team communication
Willful disregard for safety
rules
Permit to work violations
Lock out tag out noncompliance
Organizational safety culture
Individual Risk taking and
negligence
Equipment failure
Procedural error
Poor management oversight
Poor quality material
Non-use of personal
protective equipment

2 What other contributing factors, either organizational and/or individual, that impact on safe
work and how do these affect accidents events where individuals are killed or injured at work?

3. What can be done to prevent further and future accidents caused by the items identified in
questions 1 and 2 above?
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Appendix F – Round 2 Questions

Round 2 Questions
1. Each of the following are solutions to accidents as suggested by >70% participants in Round
1. With Desirability in Round 2, rated as 5 for highly desirable to 1 for highly undesirable and
feasibility rated from 5 for definitely feasible to 1 for definitely unfeasible. Please indicate your
response to each item.
Solution to Prevent Accident

In Round 1 > 70%
Involvement of Qualified
of participants
Personnel, Expert Practitioners,
believed that Focus and Consultants;
on People Solutions
was a solution to
accidents in the
electric power
industry where
workers are
seriously injured or
killed while doing
work.
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions

Human Performance
Monitoring;
Regular Supervisor and Manager
Job Visits
Management - Workers
Communication and Feedback

Desirable

Feasible

Indicate on the
scale provided (1
to 5) on how
desirable it is to
address, and if
this may lead to
the prevention of
accidents,
serious worker
injuries, and
death.

Indicate on the
scale provided (1
to 5) on how
desirable it is to
address, and if
this may lead to
the prevention of
accidents,
serious worker
injuries, and
death.
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Focus on People
Solutions

Individual and Group Behavior
and Habits; Teamwork;
Confidence, Confidential

Focus on People
Solutions

Work Methods, Procedures, and
Management of Change, Work
Planning, Monitoring, Review,
Procedures, Documented
Standard
Culture, Safety Culture, Problem
Identification
Prevention of Equipment Failure

Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
In Round 1 > 70%
Performance Monitoring
of participants
believed that Work
Standards Solutions
was a solution to
accidents in the
electric power
industry where
workers are
seriously injured or
killed while doing
work.
Work Standards
Solutions

Reliability Centered
Maintenance, Maintenance
Scheduling and Cycles,
Recordkeeping and
Recordkeeping Procedures

Work Standards
Solutions

Inspection Methods and
Arrangements, Troubleshooting,
Breakdown Management,
Equipment and Device
Calibration
Construction and Operating
Practices and Procedures,
International and Best Practice ,
Technology, Quality
Management System

Work Standards
Solutions
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Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions

Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
In Round 1 > 70%
of participants
believed that Safety
Management
Solutions was a
solution to
accidents in the
electric power
industry where
workers are
seriously injured or
killed while doing
work.
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions

Compliance Focus, Technology
in Use, New Technology, Work
Methods Change-Management
Work Design and Planning;
Work Performance Monitoring
and Review; Recordkeeping;
Documented, Standard, Worker
Training, Knowledge and
Experience
Diagnostic Testing, Research,
and Manufacturers’ Instructions
Available and Condition of
Personal Protective Equipment,
Tools, and Materials
Safety Barriers, Safety Culture,
and Housekeeping
Equipment Failure
Focus on Safety Legislation

Focus on Compliance, Work
Methods, Procedures, Change
Culture; Organizational Culture;
Safety Culture
Quality of Regulator Inspections

Distraction, Individual
Obligation to Inform,
Procedures, Rules and
Documented Standards
Safety Management Compliance with Manufacturers
Solutions
Instructions
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Safety Management Safety Inspection, Workplace
Solutions
Inspections; Work Planning,
Monitoring, and Review
Safety Management Safety Oversight and Audits of
Solutions
Materials, Spares, Materials,
Tools, and Personal Protective
Equipment
Safety Management Workplace Training; Safety
Solutions
Barriers; Housekeeping; LockOut-Tag-Out, Permit to Work;
Recordkeeping
Safety Management Equipment Failure
Solutions
In Round 1 > 70%
Training Philosophy, Company
of participants
Core Values Training, and
believed that
Workplace Training
Workplace
Arrangements (Cost,
Training Solutions Availability, Management).
was a solution to
accidents in the
electric power
industry where
workers are
seriously injured or
killed while doing
work.
Workplace
Communication, Process,
Training Solutions Procedures, Frequency, Quality,
Methods, and Location
Workplace
Feedback (Management Training Solutions Workers), Correct (Flaws)
Workplace
Manufacturers Instructions;
Training Solutions Compliance
Workplace
Work Planning, Monitoring, and
Training Solutions Review
Workplace
Material Science, Use, Testing,
Training Solutions and Maintenance of Tools, Work
Procedures, and Documented
Standards
Workplace
Safety Rules, Procedures, and
Training Solutions Barriers, Safety Culture
Workplace
Good Housekeeping
Training Solutions
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Workplace
Training Solutions
In Round 1 > 70%
of participants
believed that
Management
Solutions was a
solution to
accidents in the
electric power
industry where
workers are
seriously injured or
killed while doing
work.

Prevention of Equipment Failure

Management
Solutions

Management Coaching /Support
/ Priorities / Response
Management and Arrangements
Actions/Response

Management
Solutions
Management
Solutions
Management
Solutions
Management
Solutions
Management
Solutions
Management
Solutions
Management
Solutions
Management
Solutions
In Round 1 > 70%
of participants
believed that
Supervision
Solutions was a
solution to
accidents in the

Focus and Assumptions

Response of Regulator Findings
/ Regulator Communication /
Industry Stakeholders
Quality of intake/ recruit/ / HR
Services
Disciplinary Action/ CompanyUnion collaboration
Support for work planning/
monitoring/ review
Purchase of
spares/materials/tools/Equipment
Failure
Work procedures, documented
standards
Safety Management and Safety
Culture
Supervisor support, interaction,
confidence, knowledge, ability
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electric power
industry where
workers are
seriously injured or
killed while doing
work.
Supervision
Supervision
Supervision

Supervision
Supervision
Supervision

Supervision
Supervision
Audit/Review
solutions are
desirable in the
prevention of
accidents where
workers can
become seriously
injured or killed

Involvement in job – work; work
team selection
Compliance demand; reporting
Inspection, adherence with
procedures, and documented
standards
Worker involvement
Work planning, monitoring,
review
Arrangements for available
spares, materials, and use of
tools, personal protective
equipment
Safety and Safety Culture
Permit to Work, Lock-out-tagout
Audit/Review solutions are
feasible

Solutions to Poor design
Solutions to Safety management system flaw
Solutions to Poor regulatory oversight
Solutions to Poor workplace ethics, history of
wrongdoing that went unaddressed
Solutions to Incorrect labeling
Solutions to Medical and other personal issues
Solutions to Grounding, earthing failures/errors
Solutions to Ineffective and inefficient Maintenance
Solutions to Animals/ living organisms
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Solutions to Hazardous Worksite conditions
Solutions to Unplanned events
Solutions to Inappropriate work methods
Solutions to Stakeholder demands
Solutions to Poor judgment by individuals or work
crews
Solutions to Poor attitudes and or behavior by
individuals or work crews
Solutions to Ineffective or no workplace Training
Solutions to Poor Supervision
Solutions to Work planning
Solutions to Management priorities
Solutions to Poor team communication
Solutions to Willful disregard for safety rules
Solutions to Permit to work violations
Solutions to Lock out tag out non-compliance
Solutions to Organizational safety culture
Solutions to Individual Risk taking and negligence
Solutions to Equipment failure
Solutions to Procedural error
Solutions to Poor management oversight
Solutions to Poor quality material
Solutions to Non-use of personal protective equipment
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Appendix G – Round 3 Questions

Round 3 Questions
1. The following are solutions to accidents as suggested by participants in Round 2. Rating in
Round 3 ranges from 5 for extremely important to 1 for not at all important. Please indicate your
response
Solutions to Prevent Accident

Importance

Indicate on the scale
provided (1 to 5) the
importance of
addressing this issue
to realize the
prevention of
accidents, serious
worker injuries, and
death.
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions

Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions

Involvement of Qualified
Personnel, Expert Practitioners,
and Consultants;
Human Performance
Monitoring;
Regular Supervisor and Manager
Job Visits
Management - Workers
Communication and Feedback
Individual and Group Behavior
and Habits; Teamwork;
Confidence, Confidential
Work Methods, Procedures, and
Management of Change, Work
Planning, Monitoring, Review,
Procedures, Documented
Standard
Culture, Safety Culture, Problem
Identification
Prevention of Equipment Failure

292
Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions

Work Standards
Solutions

Work Standards
Solutions

Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions

Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions

Performance Monitoring
Reliability Centered
Maintenance, Maintenance
Scheduling and Cycles,
Recordkeeping and
Recordkeeping Procedures
Inspection Methods and
Arrangements, Troubleshooting,
Breakdown Management,
Equipment and Device
Calibration
Construction and Operating
Practices and Procedures,
International and Best Practice ,
Technology, Quality
Management System
Compliance Focus, Technology
in Use, New Technology, Work
Methods Change-Management
Work Design and Planning;
Work Performance Monitoring
and Review; Recordkeeping;
Documented, Standard, Worker
Training, Knowledge and
Experience
Diagnostic Testing, Research,
and Manufacturers’ Instructions
Available and Condition of
Personal Protective Equipment,
Tools, and Materials
Safety Barriers, Safety Culture,
and Housekeeping
Equipment failure
Focus on Safety Legislation
Focus on Compliance, Work
Methods, Procedures, Change
Culture; Organizational Culture;
Safety Culture
Quality of Regulator Inspections
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Safety Management
Solutions

Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions

Safety Management
Solutions

Safety Management
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions

Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions

Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions
Management Solutions

Distraction, Individual
Obligation to Inform,
Procedures, Rules and
Documented Standards
Compliance with Manufacturers
Instructions
Safety Inspection, Workplace
Inspections; Work Planning,
Monitoring, and Review
Safety Oversight and Audits of
Materials, Spares, Materials,
Tools, and Personal Protective
Equipment
Workplace Training; Safety
Barriers; Housekeeping; LockOut-Tag-Out, Permit to Work;
Recordkeeping
Equipment Failure
Training Philosophy, Company
Core Values Training, and
Workplace Training
Arrangements (Cost,
Availability, Management).
Communication, Process,
Procedures, Frequency, Quality,
Methods, and Location
Feedback (Management Workers), Correct (Flaws)
Manufacturers Instructions;
Compliance
Work Planning, Monitoring, and
Review
Material Science, Use, Testing,
and Maintenance of Tools, Work
Procedures, and Documented
Standards
Safety Rules, Procedures, and
Barriers, Safety Culture
Good Housekeeping
Prevention of Equipment Failure
Focus and Assumptions
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Management Solutions

Management Coaching /Support
/ Priorities / Response
Management and Arrangements
Management Solutions
Actions/Response
Management Solutions
Response of Regulator Findings
/ Regulator Communication /
Industry Stakeholders
Management Solutions
Quality of intake/ recruit/ HR
Services
Management Solutions
Disciplinary Action/ CompanyUnion collaboration
Management Solutions
Support for work planning/
monitoring/ review
Management Solutions
Support for work planning/
monitoring/ review
Management Solutions
Purchase of
spares/materials/tools/Equipment
Failure
Management Solutions
Work procedures, documented
standards
Management Solutions
Safety Management and Safety
Culture
Supervision
Supervisor support, interaction,
confidence, knowledge, ability
Supervision
Involvement in job – work; work
team selection
Supervision
Compliance demand; reporting
Supervision
Inspection, adherence with
procedures, and documented
standards
Supervision
Worker involvement
Supervision
Work planning, monitoring,
review
Supervision
Arrangements for available
spares, materials, and use of
tools, personal protective
equipment
Supervision
Safety and Safety Culture
Supervision
Permit to Work, Lock-out-tagout
Audit/Review solutions are important in the prevention of
accidents where workers can become seriously injured or
killed
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Solutions to Poor design
Solutions to Safety management system flaw
Solutions to Poor regulatory oversight
Solutions to Poor workplace ethics, history of wrongdoing
that went unaddressed
Solutions to Incorrect labeling
Solutions to Medical and other personal issues
Solutions to Grounding, earthing failures/errors
Solutions to Ineffective and inefficient Maintenance
Solutions to Animals/ living organisms
Solutions to Hazardous Worksite conditions
Solutions to Unplanned events
Solutions to Inappropriate work methods
Solutions to Stakeholder demands
Solutions to Poor judgment by individuals or work crews
Solutions to Poor attitudes and or behavior by individuals or
work crews
Solutions to Ineffective or no workplace Training
Solutions to Poor Supervision
Solutions to Work planning
Solutions to Management priorities
Solutions to Poor team communication
Solutions to Willful disregard for safety rules
Solutions to Permit to work violations
Solutions to Lock out tag out non-compliance
Solutions to Organizational safety culture
Solutions to Individual Risk taking and negligence
Solutions to Equipment failure
Solutions to Procedural error
Solutions to Poor management oversight
Solutions to Poor quality material
Solutions to Non-use of personal protective equipment
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Appendix H – Round 4 Questions

Round 4 Questions
1. The following are solutions to accidents as suggested by participants through Round 1, 2, and
3. With the rating in Round 4 ranging from 5 to 1 for definitely certain to unreliable respectively,
please indicate your response.

Solutions to Prevent Accident

Confidence

Indicate on the scale
provided (1 to 5) your
confidence in the
solutions to accidents
in the electric power
industry where
workers are seriously
injured or killed while
doing work, derived
in this study.
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions
Focus on People
Solutions

Focus on People
Solutions

Involvement of Qualified
Personnel, Expert Practitioners,
and Consultants;
Human Performance
Monitoring;
Regular Supervisor and Manager
Job Visits
Management - Workers
Communication and Feedback
Individual and Group Behavior
and Habits; Teamwork;
Confidence, Confidential
Work Methods, Procedures, and
Management of Change, Work
Planning, Monitoring, Review,
Procedures, Documented
Standard
Culture, Safety Culture, Problem
Identification
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Focus on People
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions

Work Standards
Solutions

Work Standards
Solutions

Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions

Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
Work Standards
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions

Prevention of Equipment Failure
Performance Monitoring
Reliability Centered
Maintenance, Maintenance
Scheduling and Cycles,
Recordkeeping and
Recordkeeping Procedures
Inspection Methods and
Arrangements, Troubleshooting,
Breakdown Management,
Equipment and Device
Calibration
Construction and Operating
Practices and Procedures,
International and Best Practice ,
Technology, Quality
Management System
Compliance Focus, Technology
in Use, New Technology, Work
Methods Change-Management
Work Design and Planning;
Work Performance Monitoring
and Review; Recordkeeping;
Documented, Standard, Worker
Training, Knowledge and
Experience
Diagnostic Testing, Research,
and Manufacturers’ Instructions
Available and Condition of
Personal Protective Equipment,
Tools, and Materials
Safety Barriers, Safety Culture,
and Housekeeping
Equipment failure
Focus on Safety Legislation
Focus on Compliance, Work
Methods, Procedures, Change
Culture; Organizational Culture;
Safety Culture
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Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions

Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions
Safety Management
Solutions

Safety Management
Solutions

Safety Management
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions

Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions

Workplace Training
Solutions
Workplace Training
Solutions

Quality of Regulator Inspections
Distraction, Individual
Obligation to Inform,
Procedures, Rules and
Documented Standards
Compliance with Manufacturers
Instructions
Safety Inspection, Workplace
Inspections; Work Planning,
Monitoring, and Review
Safety Oversight and Audits of
Materials, Spares, Materials,
Tools, and Personal Protective
Equipment
Workplace Training; Safety
Barriers; Housekeeping; LockOut-Tag-Out, Permit to Work;
Recordkeeping
Equipment Failure
Training Philosophy, Company
Core Values Training, and
Workplace Training
Arrangements (Cost,
Availability, Management).
Communication, Process,
Procedures, Frequency, Quality,
Methods, and Location
Feedback (Management Workers), Correct (Flaws)
Manufacturers Instructions;
Compliance
Work Planning, Monitoring, and
Review
Material Science, Use, Testing,
and Maintenance of Tools, Work
Procedures, and Documented
Standards
Safety Rules, Procedures, and
Barriers, Safety Culture
Good Housekeeping
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Workplace Training
Solutions
Management Solutions
Management Solutions

Management Solutions
Management Solutions

Management Solutions
Management Solutions
Management Solutions
Management Solutions
Management Solutions

Management Solutions
Management Solutions
Supervision
Supervision
Supervision
Supervision

Supervision
Supervision
Supervision

Supervision
Supervision

Prevention of Equipment Failure
Focus and Assumptions
Management Coaching /Support
/ Priorities / Response
Management and Arrangements
Actions/Response
Response of Regulator Findings
/ Regulator Communication /
Industry Stakeholders
Quality of intake/ recruit/ HR
Services
Disciplinary Action/ CompanyUnion collaboration
Support for work planning/
monitoring/ review
Support for work planning/
monitoring/ review
Purchase of
spares/materials/tools/Equipment
Failure
Work procedures, documented
standards
Safety Management and Safety
Culture
Supervisor support, interaction,
confidence, knowledge, ability
Involvement in job – work; work
team selection
Compliance demand; reporting
Inspection, adherence with
procedures, and documented
standards
Worker involvement
Work planning, monitoring,
review
Arrangements for available
spares, materials, and use of
tools, personal protective
equipment
Safety and Safety Culture
Permit to Work, Lock-out-tagout
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Audit/Review solutions to prevent accidents where workers
can become seriously injured or killed
Solutions to Poor design
Solutions to Safety management system flaw
Solutions to Poor regulatory oversight
Solutions to Poor workplace ethics, history of wrongdoing
that went unaddressed
Solutions to Incorrect labeling
Solutions to Medical and other personal issues
Solutions to Grounding, earthing failures/errors
Solutions to Ineffective and inefficient Maintenance
Solutions to Animals/ living organisms
Solutions to Hazardous Worksite conditions
Solutions to Unplanned events
Solutions to Inappropriate work methods
Solutions to Stakeholder demands
Solutions to Poor judgment by individuals or work crews
Solutions to Poor attitudes and or behavior by individuals or
work crews
Solutions to Ineffective or no workplace Training
Solutions to Poor Supervision
Solutions to Work planning
Solutions to Management priorities
Solutions to Poor team communication
Solutions to Willful disregard for safety rules
Solutions to Permit to work violations
Solutions to Lock out tag out non-compliance
Solutions to Organizational safety culture
Solutions to Individual Risk taking and negligence
Solutions to Equipment failure
Solutions to Procedural error
Solutions to Poor management oversight
Solutions to Poor quality material
Solutions to Non-use of personal protective equipment

301
Appendix I: Results of Qualitative Analysis
Using NVivo 12 Plus Software
Poor Design

Query: Poor DesignAutocodes vs Manual codes Text Search Query: Poor Design Word Tree

Poor Work Ethics

Poor Work Ethics Word Cloud

Text Search Query: Poor Work Ethics Word Tree
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Medical Issues

Medical Issues Word Cloud

Group Query Vs all (including Medical)

Group Query Frames Vs all (including Medical)

Text Query (Personal Issues & Medical)

Grounding
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Grounding Word Cloud

Text Query (Grounding)

Ineffective & Inefficient Maintenance (I&IM)

I&IM Word Cloud

Text Query (Maintenance)

Group Query I&IM vs all (Frames)

Autocodes (I&IM)

Animals & Living Organisms
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Animals & Living Organisms Word Cloud Text Query (Animals)

Hazardous work-site conditions

Hazardous work-site conditions Word Cloud

Group Query Hazardous work-site conditions vs People Issues

Inappropriate Work Methods

Inappropriate Work Methods Word Cloud

Text Query (Inappropriate Work Methods)
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Text Query (Inappropriate Work Methods)

Autocodes (Inappropriate Work Methods)

Poor Quality Material

Group Queries (vs all)

Poor Quality Material

Autocodes
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The word cloud developed for the question on non-use of personal protective equipment
is shown in Fig 12. The word cloud showed that the top five words used in the responses by
participants to the Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment on the Round 1 questionnaire
were ppe, non, use, expectations, and culture. These words were used to generate the associated
Word Trees from NVivo 12 Plus as the researcher used the text search query option available
with on this software.

Fig 12 Word Cloud: Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment

Fig 13 shows that associated Word Tree: Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment (ppe,
non, use, expectations, & culture).
Fig 13
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Fig 14 shows that associated Auto-Coding : Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment
Fig. 14
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The automatic coding resulted from the selection of the auto-code option on NVivo 12
Plus. It exacts improper use of personal protective equipment, a disregard for the personal
protective equipment, and also safety issues that required further investigations. The codes
generated were from participants responses to Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment
on the Round 1 questionnaire. Table 10 shows the Researcher Manual Coding: Q30: Non-use of
Personal Protective Equipment.
The matrix entries represent the number of different links I identified as the researcher
between the factors listed and based participants responses to the Round 1 questions. For nonuse of personal protective equipment, there were participant responses that linked this item with
equipment failure, poor design, work planning, ineffective or no workplace training among other
factors. This link-spread was almost even across the elements included in this table. Table 11
shows Researcher Manual Coding (Four-Frames): Q30: Non-use of Personal Protective
Equipment.
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Table 10 The Researcher Manual Coding: Q30
A:
inappropri
ate work
methods

B:
judgment
individual
crew

C : non
use of ppe

D : Poor
attitude
and
behavior

E : Poor
Team
Communic
ation

F : Poor
Work
Ethics

G : Wilful
Disregard
For Safety
Rules

1 : Animal Guards

31

31

29

32

29

30

24

2 : Equipment Failure

22

18

11

15

11

11

13

3 : Grounding and earthing

42

49

30

43

30

32

25

4 : Hazardous worksite conditions

48

54

30

48

31

35

25

5 : Incorrect Labeling

41

40

28

37

28

29

24

6 : ineffective maintenance

45

57

30

47

30

38

26

7 : ineffective or no workplace
training
8 : Organizational Safety Culture

49

70

39

58

38

41

33

48

82

43

80

50

59

47

9 : Permit to Work

20

21

16

19

18

17

18

10 : Poor Design

26

45

36

45

30

39

27

11 : Work Planning

34

47

34

46

47

42

54

12 : Positive

69

88

59

84

59

65

60

13 : Negative

83

118

60

104

64

90

62

Table 11 Researcher Manual Coding (Four-Frames): Q30
A : Human
Resources
Frame

C:
Political

F:
Structural
Frame

H:
Symbolic
Frame

B:
Management
Priorities

D : Poor
Management
Oversight

E : Safety
Management
Flaw

G:
Supervision

49

49

44

36

54

10

45

50

67

82

74

62

107

20

75

89

38

43

41

37

49

8

44

46

4 : Organizational
Safety Culture

66

93

85

76

117

18

104

103

5 : Poor attitude
and behavior

60

75

67

56

87

19

66

78

34

48

45

41

51

14

45

47

41

56

50

44

63

15

47

54

34

38

47

41

44

16

42

46

1 : inappropriate
work methods
2 : judgment
individual crew
3 : non use of ppe

6 : Poor Team
Communication
7 : Poor Work
Ethics
9 : Wilful Disregard
For Safety Rules

The entries represent the number of different links identified by me as the researcher
between the factors listed; the four-frame conceptual framework in this study, and based
participants responses to the Round 1 questions. The Bolman and Deal four-frames were as
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relevant as the other factors highlighted in this analysis. Links existed between non-use of
personal protective equipment at work, management priorities, management oversight,
supervision, and each of the four frames as espoused in the Bolman and Deal model.
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Appendix J: Actual Responses
Actual Participants responses to question Q4 for poor work ethics: history of wrongdoing
that went unaddressed:
One way is to identify individuals who are prone to take safety risks. Coaching
these individuals can improve their attitude towards risky behavior.
Supervisors not knowledgeable about proper work practices or safety rules.
Supervisors not wanting to get their guys in trouble
The brother in law positions. Just moving trouble along instead of dealing with it
Workers in the electric utility are expected to always check dead before touching
conductor. Sometimes we've witnessed people getting lax and bypassing this step,which
could be disasterous.
Organizations need to create a "Safety First" culture. In this culture, poor or
unsafe work ethic as well as a history of wrongdoing needs to be corrected. Set initial
expectations that nothing is more important than getting the job done Safely and that
unsatisfactory behavior will be addressed. Progressive discipline is oftentimes necessary.
Set the initial expectations. If those expectations are not met, provide retraining. If
expectations are still not met, then it is fair to remove personnel from the team if they
cannot or are not willing to fit into a Safety First culture.
Have work practices reviewed by an independent party. An independent party
would more easily recognize poor work ethics; practices that may have been done for
years.
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Stop allowing these people to train apprentices. Poor work ethics is a continuous
cycle until it it broken. A bad foreman creates bad journeyman, that creates bad
apprentices and the cycle continues, because people do what they are taught to do.
People with bad work ethics usually have the most experience which is why the issues go
unaddressed.
More training and oversight; structured process
Workers not Trained in areas that the projects needs. I.E. apprentices working
without Journeyman supervision.,
As previously stated, there is not enough disciplinary action for noncompliance at
the company level.
Tap root analysis and incident analysis of serious accidents are supposed to
produce "lessons learned" to help prevent future accidents. If the analysis conclusions
are incorrect, the lessons learned will be inaccurate. Poor work ethics are a product of
poor accident investigation. Areas not investigated are in- attentional blindness,
practical drift, the anatomy of "good judgement" including instinct, tuition and intuition.
Poor work practices, such as taking short cuts, can result in serous injury.
Supervision must constantly reinforce the importance of strictly adhering to procedures.
I disagree that historical work practices contribute to accidents.
Address wrong doing with firm and fair action
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Not reporting and discussing near misses with the work crews is a leading
indicator that an accident will happen sooner or later.
Implement controls, I.e., knowledgable observers.
Make "Integrity" one of your organization's core values. Set the expectation (both
initial and reoccurring training) that the Work should be completed with Integrity and
that Integrity violations (poor work ethic, wrongdoing, etc.) are grounds for immediate
dismissal.
Sometimes in this industry people who are found doing wrong do not belong in a
hazardous work environment. Firing or harsh discipline sometimes is doing the offender
a favor and may save their life.
Training Safety awareness human factors PPE Job safety analysis equipment
safety environment condition if any of above can affect , work , mainly human factors like
emotional health , mood balance should be assessed as a part of Job safety analysis
If a someone does something wrong and no one tells them it is wrong they can’t
learn. In the same way if you tell them it is wrong and they don’t fix it and nothing
happens to that person they will keep doing the same things.
Can't get away from this. Only a certain pool of people and s transient workforce.
Bad workers are around and you inherit on occasions. You learn from experience but the
next guy has too
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Dismissing all parties (management and workers) who contribute to this
unacceptable situation
Management and Worker Unions must not allow internal organizational politics
and games to cloud their responsibility for keeping a safe operation and to positively
reinforce full safety compliance.
This is probably the number one reason for workplace accidents. Going up in the
air without harness properly worn. Working hot secondary without gloves. One guy
grabbing a phase and something else that is at a different potential even with gloves on.
Most are human error.
Work cultures that have a habit of taking "shortcuts", not providing proper
training and/or not enforcing work standards are at a high risk for accidents. Workers
need to: 1. Safety needs to be #1 priority and everyone needs to understand what that
means 2. Workers need the right tools and PPEs to do the job 3. Get the right training
and get refresher courses to stay current 4. Work standards/practices need to be enforced
Challenge: Changing the way workers think about doing their job. Many think that "this
is the way I was taught and it's good enough"
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Appendix K: Frame Responses
Solutions Provided by Participants
For the problem of Poor Design include: 70.37% of participants believed that Poor
Design issues could be solved. In Round 2, 92% of participants indicated that the solutions to
Poor Design were desirable; 100 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 100% indicated that it was
important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4,
91.3% expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not
become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Design include:
Monitoring of individual performances to stop the action, review assumptions and
strategies, and to change work plans if that is necessary: participants agreed that
sometimes it was not always possible to spot poor design problems, but skilled
and knowledgeable individuals can help to prevent accident-causing situations.
Knowledgeable individuals know when to stop work activities to avoid accidents
due to Poor Design.
Incorporate safety by design into the engineering processes; involve safety
professionals in the design phase of projects. Engineering designers should gather
feedback from all parties before final approvals. Construction personnel should
comment as to how to build the equipment, and Operations personnel should
enlighten on how to operate the equipment safely. Likewise, Maintenance
practitioners can offer advice on maintenance challenges expected with the
design.
Situations/equipment with Poor Design issues must be documented and readily
available to those who need it regardless of how difficult an exercise that may be.
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Design) occurred. These surrounded possible conflicts,
assumptions, inspections, practices, maintenance, construction, procedures, training,
consultation, work methods, managers, and supervisors.
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Table: Poor Design Participant Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
The challenge is to design electrical
systems that don't need "tree wire." Better
tree clearances mean a lighter wire with
no insulation to skin

Human Resources Frame
Integrate the Environmental, Health, and
Safety department into the planning and
design phase of projects.

Political Frame

Symbolic Frame

If personnel have to work within the "poor design",
they should be trained in how to do it safely. If that is
not possible, then whatever "poor design" is causing
the problem should be taken out of service

Accidents caused by poor design are prevented by
correcting poor design.

I disagree that poor design is a fatal accident
cause.

For the problem of Safety Management Flaw: 88.89% of participants believed that Safety
Management Flaw issues could be solved. In Round 2, 100% of participants indicated that the
solutions to Safety Management Flaw were desirable; 100 % found them feasible. In Round 3,
100% indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future
accidents. In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry,
workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Safety Management Flaw include:
Periodic review of the Safety Management System can allow for the identification
of flaws. Existing flaws should be addressed and corrected with alacrity and
purpose. If there is a flaw in the Safety Management System processes, then
some risks can be overlooked.
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A renewed emphasis on tailgate meetings, and job hazard analysis that is fully
supported and facilitated by supervisors, general foremen, or foremen, is
necessary. Their involvement is critical for full compliance. Management, worker
unions, and regulators must support periodic and jointly conduct Safety
Management System reviews.
Data saturation (solutions to Safety Management Flaw) occurred. These surrounded
Safety Management System links with deficiencies in Lock-out Tag-out procedures, working
knowledge and understanding of work activities. Issues surrounding worksite responsibilities and
understanding of individual roles on job sites where different working parties are engaged.
Inadequate and poor quality supervision. Workplace training and refresher training. Job safety
analysis and proper personal protective equipment.
Table: Participant Safety Management Flaw Responses: Four-Frames

Structural Frame
(1) Management failure to enforce rules
and to demand compliance.
(2) Improper work procedures.

Human Resources Frame
(1) Individuals and work teams
deliberately not adopting safety
work measures because of a
false thinking that the rules do
not apply or are relevant to the
work activities.
(2) Have qualified people in the
jobs who have hands on
knowledge.

Political Frame
(1) I disagree that accidents are caused
by safety management flaws
(2) Time pressure given by management
can be a cause.

Symbolic Frame
(1) leadership should always be
evaluating management systems
and making improvements.
(2) Typical Safety Management
Systems follow OHSAS 18001,
OSHA, and State requirements
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For the problem of Poor Regulatory Oversight include: 59.26% of participants believed
that Poor Regulatory Oversight issues could be solved. This item was not taken further than
Round 1.
For the problem of Poor Work Ethics: History of wrongdoing that went unaddressed:
92.59% of participants believed that Poor Work Ethics issues could be solved. In Round 2, 96%
of participants indicated that the solutions to Poor Work Ethics were desirable; 96 % found them
feasible. In Round 3, 100% indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to
prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence that if applied in
the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing
work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Work Ethics: History of wrongdoing that
went unaddressed include:
Managers and supervisors must deliberately look for and identify individuals who are
prone to take safety risks; coaching these individuals for improved attitudes towards the
removal of risky behavior. Managers and supervisors must set initial expectations that
nothing is more important than for workers to complete job tasks safely.
Management and Workers Unions must not allow internal organizational politics and
games to cloud their responsibility for keeping a safe operation and to positively
reinforce full safety compliance.
Human (individual and personal) factors assessment like emotional health and mood
balance must be part of job safety briefing and analysis. Train supervisors and managers
so that they can be proven competent at doing this.
Managers, supervisors, and workers must undergo workplace training to bolster
organizational work cultures where individuals will not take shortcuts" in preference to
work procedures and standards. A review of these standards and procedures must be done
to determine practical difficulties in implementing. Any identified challenge must be
effectively addressed and removed as a work challenge.
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Managers and supervisors must set the expectation that integrity must guide work
activities and that violations (poor work ethic, wrongdoing, etc.) are grounds for
immediate dismissal. Dismissing all parties (management, supervisors, and workers)
who contribute to this unacceptable situation will address procedural deviation.
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Work Ethics: History of wrongdoing that went
unaddressed) occurred. These surrounded the need for leaders in the electric power industry
organizations to create a safety first culture. Progressive discipline and its frequency. Managers
and supervisors roles and responsibilities for setting initial expectations and providing training.
Removal of errant individuals, including dismissal, if expectations are still not or if they cannot
or are not willing to fit into a safety first culture. Work standards/practices enforcement are
necessary: near misses, reporting and investigations must be a positive paradigm and actively
promoted.
Table: Participant Poor Work Ethics: History of Wrongdoing that went Unaddressed Responses:
Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Workers in the electric utility are
expected to always check dead before
touching conductor. Sometimes we've
witnessed people getting lax and
bypassing this step, which could be
disastrous.
Political Frame
The brother in law positions. Just moving
trouble along instead of dealing with it
I disagree that historical work practices
contribute to accidents.

Human Resources Frame
Poor work ethics is a continuous cycle
until it is broken. A bad foreman
creates bad journeyman, that creates
bad apprentices and the cycle
continues, because people do what
they are taught to do.
Symbolic Frame
Have work practices reviewed by an
independent party. An independent
party would more easily recognize
poor work ethics; practices that may
have been done for years.
Address wrong doing with firm and
fair action
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For the problem of Incorrect Labeling include: 66.67% of participants believed that
Incorrect Labeling issues could be solved. This item was not taken further than Round 1.
For the problem of Medical and Other Personal Issues: 85.19% of participants believed
that Medical and Other Personal Issues could be solved. In Round 2, 96% of participants
indicated that the solutions to Medical and Other Personal Issues were desirable; 92 % found
them feasible. In Round 3, 91.67% indicated that it was important to implement these solutions
to prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence that if applied
in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing
work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Medical and Other Personal Issues include:
Medications can lead to symptoms such as drowsiness which can pose a safety risk in
dangerous work as exists in the electric power industry. If a worker is on medication that
can cause inattention to detail, or worse (passing out or drowsiness), they should not
perform hazardous tasks. Supervisors must explore all possible ways to assign workers
with known medical or other health issues to non-high-risk activities.
When non-high-risk work is not available, getting employees to speak up about issues
they may be having can prove vital. Specialist medical officers can provide employees
with sufficient confidential guidance so that the employee and other co-workers will not
be at risk of becoming injured as a result of this issue.
Organizational leadership must support safety policies and programs that mandate fit-forduty-testing for safety-sensitive roles.
Managers and supervisors must encourage workers to indicate when they have medical or
personal issues that can affect job performance. Employees with these issues should not
do hazardous work. Organizational leadership should ensure that organizational policies
and procedures are sufficient for supervisors and managers to handle workers’ medical
and other personal issues appropriately.
Train supervisors and managers for this role, have a medical advisor to assist and can
screen workers (especially those in safety-sensitive functions, and aging or previously
injured workers) as fit for duty (mental, physical, emotional, drug and alcohol testing).
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Train volunteer employees, with guaranteed periodic refresher training, on CPR and First
Aid Techniques.
Data saturation (solutions to Medical and Other Personal Issues) occurred. These
surrounded medications, individual privacy, assumptions, procedures, training, consultation,
work, managers, and supervisors.
Table: Medical and Other Personal Issues Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Supervisors can recognize unfit
workers during the tailboard meeting.

Human Resources Frame
Allowing more sick time and mental
health days will help employees be able to
stay home when they have medical and
personal issues.

Political Frame

Symbolic Frame

Health has no bearing on safety.

Encourage a culture of self reporting

Personal issues should be left outside of the work
environment.

For the problem of Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors: 88.89% of participants
believed that Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors could be solved. In Round 2, 100% of
participants indicated that the solutions to Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors were desirable;
100 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 95.83% indicated that it was important to implement
these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence
that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed
while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors include:
Work procedures and arrangements for proper Grounding and Earthing must be
outlined, clear, and detailed in every work-plan as work on de-energized overhead power
lines or electrical systems can be done safely if electrical grounds are applied.
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Managers and supervisors must demand non-compliance to this requirement by utilizing
human performance improvement tools such as 3-way communication. In grounding and
earthing exercises, work procedures must be for workers to repeat the instruction is back
to the supervisor to confirm that information was understood. Electrical switching
operations, involving the application or removal of grounds, shall be double checked if
not more frequently. When preparing energized power lines or equipment for work, the
process of making the lines or equipment safe will involve the grounding and earthing. A
competent worker must confirm and approve the earthing and grounding of electrical
systems before workers can begin work tasks.
Managers and supervisors must train workers on these requirements and procedures so
that the workers can understand the electrical theory and reasons for grounding and for
them to not just view it as a work requirement. Not using equipotential grounding is a
bad and incorrect decision: equipotential grounding is not always correctly taught, and
many times it is not followed. Equipotential grounding is one of the most misunderstood
and hazardous situation linemen, and electrical workers can encounter. Getting
individuals at work to follow the rules rather than opt for short cuts is paramount in
maintaining safe work conditions.
Managers and supervisors must ensure that, in electrical substations, electrical ground
grids are to be periodically tested to ensure that electrical grounds used for worker
protection remain sufficient and capable providing the intended protection from
inadvertent energization.
Data saturation (solutions to Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors) occurred. These
surrounded equipotential grounding, poor judgment, managers and supervisors, workers,
application or removal of grounds, worker training, communication, teamwork, competent
worker, work procedures, discipline, and short-cuts.
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Table: Grounding, Earthing Failures/Errors Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Conduct initial and reoccurring training on
appropriate grounding. Conduct observations
on ongoing work to make on the spot
corrections and retraining. Apply progressive
discipline up to and including removal from
the team.
Political Frame
It is possible, but grounding errors are
infrequent.

Human Resources Frame
Training! I have been aware of two serious
injuries from improperly grounded lines: The
employees were sure they had grounded
correctly.

Symbolic Frame
Managers and supervisors shall manage the
Organizational Safety Program and uphold the
safety policy for effective controls of grounding
and earthing hazards. The Program shall include
provisions for worker training and periodic
retraining, the conduct of periodic audits and
management overview and review.

For the problem of Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance: 88.89% of participants
believed that Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance could be solved. In Round 2, 100% of
participants indicated that the solutions to Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance were desirable;
100 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 95.83% indicated that it was important to implement
these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4, 91.3% expressed confidence
that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed
while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance include:
Managers, supervisors, and workers must keep electrical equipment maintained to
prevent an accident by avoiding catastrophic failures of high energy equipment.
Defective and faulty equipment and machinery are significant unsafe work conditions.
Developing and keeping, as a top priority, a maintenance program with recurring
intervals, in line with actual performance cycles, equipment manufacturers
recommendation, industry standards, best practices, and other arrangements for
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equipment and specialized tools maintenance will prevent premature equipment failure.
If maintenance on the electrical system is inefficient and ineffectively managed, rotted
poles, failing insulators, all with increasing amperage load, will lead to unsafe conditions
and opportunities for the next employee tasked with repairing or operating that equipment
with hazardous conditions and a higher risk of injury.
Managers and supervisors must focus on workers' needs and organizational requirements.
Managers and supervisors must support a safety program that mandates effective
preventative maintenance. Engineering/Asset Management/Operations/Safety should
enforce effective maintenance procedures. The program should also consist of
organizational-set initial expectations, worker training, and periodic retraining. Managers
and supervisors shall conduct regular inspections and audits and periodically update and
improve work rules and procedures.
Organizations must adopt and implement a maintenance management system for
managers and supervisors to track equipment maintenance. The challenge is to ensure
that any maintenance management system adopted is simple and sufficiently well
organized enough for personnel to be able to use.
Workers must maintain all tools in safe conditions, especially tools required for electrical
work, for either live or de-energized environments, and grounding exercises. Supervisors
shall audit these arrangements and practices. Supervisors shall conduct random and
periodic inspections of tools used by workers. All defective tools shall be removed from
use and destroyed according to organizational approved procedures.
Data saturation (solutions to Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance) occurred. These
surrounded worker training, oversight, structured process, maintenance management system,
management priorities, inspection, repairs, maintenance procedures, customer inconvenience,
operating costs, discipline, and short-cuts.
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Table: Ineffective and Inefficient Maintenance Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Careful inspection of tools and
equipment prior to use can prevent
such an accident.

Human Resources Frame
In my experience, workers are trained and
fully aware of the need for additional
maintenance and are prepared for and
trained to perform proper assessments before
working.

Political Frame
Lack of funding or placing funds in other
places

Symbolic Frame
Managers and supervisors shall manage the
Organizational Safety Program and uphold
the safety policy for effective controls of
grounding and earthing hazards. The
Program shall include provisions for worker
training and periodic retraining, the conduct
of periodic audits and management overview
and review.

For the problem of Animals/Living Organisms: 70.37% of participants believed that
Animals/Living Organisms could be solved. In Round 2, 80% of participants indicated that the
solutions to Animals/Living Organisms were desirable; 92 % found them feasible. In Round 3,
79.17% indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future
accidents. In Round 4, 86.96% expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Animals/Living Organisms include:
The organizational safety policy and program shall reflect effective and adequate controls
for any hazards associated with animals/living organisms. The plan should also consist
of initial expectations training and periodic retraining. Managers and supervisors must
conduct regular audits. Animal intrusion has caused catastrophic equipment failure,
which can cause serious injury if workers are in the vicinity at the time of the failure
event: This can also be true for the overgrowth of vegetation: Right-of-ways that are too
narrow for the native trees is an example of increased risk of electrical contact.
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Employees shall undergo proper training and have personal protective equipment to
protect themselves from animal encounters. Bears and snakes in remote locations or
underground facilities are a prime example of a dangerous animal encounter. Snake
chaps can prevent strikes below the knee. Poles hollowed out by carpenter ants. Beavers
cut trees; birds build nests that can knock out power, alligators, snakes in hand holes, and
killer bees are a real concern.
Management must ensure the installation of physical protection or guards to keep animals
away from electrical equipment: This involves cost and the electrical outages that may be
necessary for installation of the protective guards and physical protection devices.
Adding more animal guards and insulating material on poles will help save animals and
workers.
Data saturation (solutions to Animals/Living Organisms) occurred. These surrounded
animal guards, prevention measures, assumptions, procedures, training, consultation, work,
personal protective equipment, managers, and supervisors.
Table: Animals/Living Organisms Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Federal animal guard requirements.

Human Resources Frame
Employ both proactive and reactive
controls to address the problem.

Political Frame

Symbolic Frame

Linemen do not like installing animal guards,
because animals cause lots of power outages,
which give linemen lots of overtime pay.

institute procedures to mitigate the impact of
animals/living organisms on electric plant and
systems

For the problem of Hazardous Worksite Conditions: 92.59 % of participants believed that
Hazardous Worksite Conditions could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated
that the solutions to Hazardous Worksite Conditions were desirable; 92 % found them feasible.
In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further
and future accidents. In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric
power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Hazardous Worksite Conditions include:
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Managers and supervisors must continually enforce procedures to identify and control
hazardous and dangerous worksite conditions both proactively and otherwise. Conduct
pre-job briefing training. Promote that as the job commences, the first activity will
always be a job-briefing involving all workers at the job site. Treat job briefings as a
compliance activity before moving into the work.
The organizational safety policy and program must reflect effective and adequate controls
for any hazards associated with dangerous worksite conditions. If this is not so, then
organizational leadership must fix urgently. The plan should also consist of initial
expectations training and periodic retraining. Managers and supervisors must conduct
regular audits.
Employees shall undergo proper training and have personal protective equipment to
protect themselves from hazardous worksite conditions. Situational awareness is key to
identifying and rectifying hazardous situations before commencing and during work
exercises.
Better project management arrangements, managing work programming to lessen
multiple crafts working the same job site, with high consequence work, can mitigate
dangerous worksite conditions. The allowance of sufficient time in project schedules and
a budget for hazard mitigation before construction commencement would prevent
accidents and worker injuries.
Workers must monitor and maintain good housekeeping so that the work site does not
become cluttered with trip hazards: commonly identified as a cause in accident
investigations. These can sometimes be serious or fatal, depending on where the poor
housekeeping is with high energy equipment, or if at an elevation.
Data saturation(solutions to Hazardous Worksite Conditions) occurred. These surrounded
job briefing, project management, unplanned events, work programming, animal guards,
prevention measures, assumptions, procedures, training, consultation, proactive work, personal
protective equipment, high energy equipment, managers, and supervisors.
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Table: Hazardous Worksite Conditions Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Individuals are to make sure the area
is safe before attempting to restore
power.
Political Frame
Employees know the hazards, but do not remove
the hazard from the worksite — laziness and time
constants.

Human Resources Frame
Managers must ensure workplace
training on hazard recognition and
hazard mitigation.

Symbolic Frame
For weather related to ice/snow - issue non-slip
footwear

For the problem of Unplanned Events: 96.3 % of participants believed that Unplanned
Events could be solved. In Round 2, 92 % of participants indicated that the solutions to
Unplanned Events were desirable; 88 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 95.83 % indicated that
it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round
4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not
become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Unplanned Events include:
Conduct thorough job briefings and consider the worst case scenario in pre-job planning.
Workers must receive training skills in situation awareness, better hazard assessment
skills, and to understand that a deviation from the planned work requires another
tailboard discussion before proceeding further. Supervisors must demand full compliance
with this requirement.
Workers must conduct a thorough site-specific risk analysis. Through that arrangement
and practice, workers will develop a culture of hazard identification and mitigation.
Workers must anticipate that unexpected events can occur and cover these assumptions in
the pre-job briefing. Improper pre-job assessments and reviews can contribute to crews
and individuals not adequately prepared for tasks to be completed.
Workers and supervisors must check and confirm switching orders and update future
switching plans as switching operations to accomplish switching exercises as expected.
Organizational safety policies and procedures must sufficiently allow for workers to
address the impact of unplanned events proactively and otherwise. Workers must realize
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that unplanned events frequently occur due to an uncontrolled hazard and they must
update the program to control these possible hazards. Controlling the dangers are not
possible (acts of God and natural disasters are examples), but workers updating the work
program to reduce the effects of these hazards are necessary. Work teams must have
contingency plans in place for unplanned events, should that occur. Not all unanticipated
events can be recognized. Workers shall contact the person in charge or the shift control
personnel in the event of unplanned issues that can impact on the planned job.
Communication is essential during unexpected events. The supervisor or shift control
personnel must expect that individuals experiencing the unplanned event may require
immediate and active support.
Data saturation (solutions to Unplanned Events ) occurred. These surrounded job
briefing, mitigation, work programming, guards, prevention measures, assumptions, procedures,
training, consultation, proactive work, personal protective equipment, high energy equipment,
contingency, situation awareness, managers, and supervisors.
Table: Unplanned Events Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Seat of the pants decisions by workers.

Human Resources Frame
Unplanned events require a regrouped
new specific job brief and hazard
assessment. Often this is not done.

Political Frame

Symbolic Frame

The unexpected, if not identified and a plan
developed to rectify, is a leading cause of injuries.

Safeguard against the same type of failure if
future or subsequent relocation of the work area
is not possible.

For the problem of Inappropriate Work Methods: 96.3 % of participants believed that
Inappropriate Work Methods could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that
the solutions to Inappropriate Work Methods were desirable; 100 % found them feasible. In
Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further
and future accidents. In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric
power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Inappropriate Work Methods include:
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It is almost natural for humans to gravitate towards taking short-cuts. It is akin to an
"automatic" mode. Teach workers to slow down when in their "automatic mode."
Practical drift creates a sense that work methods are okay because individuals are lucky
and have gotten away for a long time. The program should involve initial training and
periodic retraining of all relevant workers and work teams including supervisors and
managers. It must be impossible for untrained workers to operate sophisticated and to
use specialized tools.
Managers and supervisors must conduct periodic audits to confirm compliance,
periodically update the work procedures, and support continuous improvement. Ensure
that procedures for job tasks are optimal and simple to follow. It may be very time
consuming, and employees may still not follow the procedures, especially when
supervisors and managers do not demand and enforce strict compliance. Remove errant
supervisors and managers as well as defaulting workers.
Work teams must always be adequately staffed — with no instances of inexperienced
individuals leading work-teams and supervising work: That may be an opportunity for
supervisors to mentor, coach, and counsel other employees on inappropriate work
methods.
Data saturation (solutions to Inappropriate Work Methods) occurred. These surrounded
untrained workers, worker training, expectation, knowledgeable employees, inappropriate work
methods, inspection, inexperienced, maintenance procedures, supervisors, periodic audits,
compliance, and short-cuts.
Table: Inappropriate Work Methods Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Standardize work methods and
activities, document procedures, train
workers, and monitor work methods.

Human Resources Frame
Field auditing to ensure that workers are
knowledgeable and using proper work
procedures. Challenge - short cutting to save
time, make job easier.

Political Frame
Avoid putting people in places of leadership
that lets this type of behavior go on

Symbolic Frame
Ensure that personnel is trained in how to do
a job; emphasize the importance of not taking
"shortcuts." The challenge is to overcome the
desire of people to get jobs done quickly.
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For the problem of Stakeholder Demands: 81.48 % of participants believed that
Stakeholder Demands could be solved. In Round 2, 80 % of participants indicated that the
solutions to Stakeholder Demands were desirable; 84 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 75 %
indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future
accidents. In Round 4, 82.61 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Stakeholder Demands include:
Managers must actively keep individuals, including supervisors with responsibility for
productivity, answerable and accountable for non-compliance with workplace safety
provisions, worker protection, and decision making to preventing accidents: for
production to occur only under safe conditions and when supervisors are actively
monitoring work operations. Success means meeting stakeholder demands, but only if the
job is safe. If by meeting stakeholder demands, bypassing of safety practices and
procedures occurred, then the individuals involved in doing the work and the
organization has failed. Safely doing work takes precedence over stakeholder demands;
It is, however, no excuse to disregard stakeholder concerns and to perform work tasks in
an inefficient and untimely fashion. Sometimes a job scope is changed because of
demanding stakeholders, but even this compromised work scope and arrangement must
happen while maintaining the safety arrangements. Managers and supervisors must
explain to stakeholders the importance of maintenance, the prevention of equipment
failure and unplanned outages.
Data saturation (solutions to Stakeholder Demands) occurred. These surrounded work
programming, equipment failure, prevention measures, assumptions, consultation, proactive
work, high energy equipment, situation awareness, managers, and supervisors.
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Table: Stakeholder Demands Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Facilities not being updated or tree
trimming being done properly to save
money to keep stakeholders happy.
Political Frame
Have buy-in from stakeholders.

The challenge is that "time is money."

Human Resources Frame
Ensure that stakeholders know that their
demands are secondary to Safety.

Symbolic Frame
Have discussions with stakeholders about setting
realistic and attainable goals to ensure that they
can be met safely. It is the responsibility of the
highest level of leadership to ensure this happens.

For the problem of Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews: 96.30 % of
participants believed that Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews could be solved. In
Round 2, 96 % of participants indicated that the solutions to Poor Judgment by Individuals or
Work Crews were desirable; 92 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was
important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4,
95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not
become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews
include:
Organizations must actively promote a safety-first culture that is intolerant to poor
judgment and which supports its correction. Managers and Supervisors must develop
work procedures and ensure strict adherence by individuals at work. Strict adherence to
well-written procedures can avoid workers having to rely on their judgment. Managing
and enforcing these rules helps workers to focus and guide their actions based on work
procedures and not by individual judgment and analysis. Progressive discipline may
often-times be necessary. Managers and supervisors must set initial expectations if those
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expectations are unmet; defaulters should undergo retraining. If, after that intervention,
expectations are still not met, then it is fair to remove personnel from the team if they are
not willing or able to provide good judgment.
Organizational leaders will encourage superior work performance by instituting a peer
checking arrangement on all jobs with as many workers as possible. For individuals
working alone and an unwillingness of peers to correct each other may be difficult to
manage but managers and supervisors must brainstorm how best to negotiate that
challenge successfully. In a trusting work environment, self-check and peer-check will
result in safe work practice and an absence of accidents. Managers and supervisors must
set initial expectations that nothing is more important than getting the job done safely,
that poor individual judgment is discouraged, and it will result in appropriate actions.
Group decisions are to be encouraged once platformed on job briefing and full
understanding of work tasks and sequence of activities. Organizational leadership should
require managers and supervisors to facilitate this work arrangement. It must be that
once any worker raises an issue and supervisors and management address it, work shall
be in line with the revised arrangements.
Managers and supervisors must do more competency testing of workers. Years of
experience as the primary factor promoting individuals must not be a criterion that
augments proven competence, skills, knowledge, and consistency in decision making.
Managers and supervisors must ensure that individuals at work do not become
complacent in their work, or overconfident in their abilities. These individuals must
undergo retraining to prevent the tendency to disregard safety rules, policies, and
procedures. Managers must support supervisors doing crew audits identifying poor
judgment and addressing it with coaching or counseling. Mentoring programs can be
suitable for this effort.
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews) occurred.
These surrounded self-check, peer-check, enforcing rules, written procedures, supervisors,
coaching, overconfident, experienced, inexperienced, untrained workers, worker training,
expectation, culture, attitudes, behavior, skilled, knowledgeable, inappropriate work methods,
and employee unions.
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Table: Poor Judgment by Individuals or Work Crews Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Conduct initial and reoccurring training
on appropriate work methods. Conduct
observations on ongoing work to make on
the spot corrections and retraining. Apply
progressive discipline up to and including
removal from the team.

Human Resources Frame
Have a human performance
improvement program to address
human errors both proactively and
reactively.

Political Frame

Symbolic Frame

Recognize that humans are fallible and prone
to error.

You ever had a class in "good judgment". If
you were to cite three qualities of good
leadership, they would all be soft skills. We
train our electrical workers in all hard skills
and then make them supervisors and
managers. We need to train our leaders of the
industry in leadership skills and the
mechanics of good judgment..

For the problem of Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews: 88.89 %
of participants believed that Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews could be
solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the solutions to Poor Attitude and
Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews were desirable; 96 % found them feasible. In Round 3,
95.83 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and
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future accidents. In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work
Crews include:
Managers and supervisors must have support from organizational leadership to improve
morale and to address worker dissatisfaction. Organizational leadership and management
can encourage performance improvement techniques and tools such as situational
awareness to promote positive working arrangements. Close oversight and supervisor
presence can help mitigate poor attitude and behavior. More egregious examples would
need to be handled using different methods to avoid these individuals affecting or
influencing other workers.
Organizational leadership must promote a safety first culture where poor attitude and
behavior correction is unaccepted. Managers and supervisors must set initial
expectations that nothing is more important than getting the job done safely and that poor
attitude and behavior are intolerable and can result in dismissal. Progressive discipline
may be necessary. If initial expectations are unachieved, provide retraining. If
expectations are still not met, then remove personnel from the team if they cannot or are
not willing to fit into a safety-first culture.
Management and supervisors must recognize a poor attitude and not allow work to
proceed until that attitude is corrected: despite other work-related pressures to get a
certain amount of work done in a particular time to meet a goal.
Proper management is key to good employee attitudes and behaviors: Make employees
feel appreciated. Manager and supervisor training must include segments to cover this
need.
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews)
occurred. These surrounded individuals working together, training, progressive discipline,
enforcing rules, written procedures, managers, supervisors, coaching, initial expectations,
inexperienced, untrained workers, worker training, expectation, culture, situational awareness,
inappropriate work methods, and employee unions.
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Table: Poor Attitude and Behavior by Individuals or Work Crews Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
More training and oversight; structured
process; Workers hours Workers
dissatisfaction

Political Frame
If the promotion of individuals is not from
within the organization, they are Engineers
and studies show that engineers do not have
the best people skills.

Human Resources Frame
Supervisors identifying and
addressing poor attitudes must be
management supported. Poor
supervision breeds poor crew attitudes
Symbolic Frame
Our brain uses 1 liter of blood per minute. 20
% of the air we create and 25% of the food
we eat is required to operate our brain. When
we are distracted by poor behaviors and poor
attitude we make mistakes.

For the problem of Ineffective or no Workplace Training: 92.59 % of participants
believed that Ineffective or no Workplace Training could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of
participants indicated that the solutions to Ineffective or no Workplace Training were desirable;
96 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these
solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that
if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed
while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Ineffective or no Workplace Training include:

Employees must receive training on how to execute tasks safely to prevent work induced
failures such as accidents, injuries, and death. Despite training costs, organizational
leadership and management must communicate and champion the fact that well-trained
employees are more productive and safer. Management must support organizational
policies, procedures, and resources (budget, time, materials, and staffing) while
maintaining priority on worker training.
Accurate training records and ease of access to those records is a way to ensure that only
trained workers are assigned specific tasks. Engineering/Asset
Management/Operations/Safety should create training programs. Conduct periodic audits
of training effectiveness. Management must periodically review, continuously improve,
and update the safety training program. If hazard assessment conducted by work teams
are not comprehensive, it is easy to miss dangerous conditions and situations, especially
when not thought of or factored as likely to be present or to occur during the work
exercise.
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Trainers must be knowledgeable in the work function; the better the training program, the
better the worker. Training should be ever changing for effectiveness, worker
enlightenment, and where individuals will fully comply with work procedures and rules.
Ineffective training programs can contribute to the workers becoming overconfident and
complacent, and ultimately to possible injury or death.
Data saturation (solutions to Ineffective or no Workplace Training) occurred. These
surrounded hazard assessment, mentoring, knowledge, records, written procedures, managers,
supervisors, overconfidence, initial expectations, inexperienced, untrained workers, culture,
policies, procedures, and resources.
Table: Ineffective or no Workplace Training Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame

Human Resources Frame
Ensuring robust training and also
refresher training can prevent
accidents.
Challenges - Lack of funding for
training

Train workers and evaluate the
effectiveness of training programs.

How do we mitigate hazards involving
the inherent risk humans bring to the
table, if we don't teach it?
Political Frame
Help train the people around you in a manner
that will keep them safe. Training comes from
your experienced people not from a book.

Symbolic Frame
Avoid assigning work to an individual who is
not trained or familiar with a piece of
equipment if it has a high energy hazard
associated with it.

Most training for lineman stops after their
apprenticeship is completed. Training is
costly and utilities are not willing to pay.

For the problem of Poor Supervision: 92.59 % of participants believed that Poor
Supervision could be solved. In Round 2, 92 % of participants indicated that the solutions to
Poor Supervision were desirable; 92 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 95.83 % indicated that
it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round
4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not
become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
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Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Supervision include:
The way that supervisors conduct job site safety exchanges with and how often they
witness employees performing a task can help in preventing accidents. The more often a
supervisor oversees workers’ performing tasks, the less likelihood of errors and
accidents.
Organizational leadership must support a supervisor training program that emphasizes,
technical and supervisory skills competence regardless of sizeable cost and time
commitment. Supervisors are organizational representatives who have important
opportunities to recognize if or when workers encroach into dangerous work zones and
arrangements. Supervisors can, therefore, identify instances and situations where the
possibility of preventing accidents, worker injuries or death is real and active.
Management must set initial expectations with supervisors, emphasizing that nothing is
more important than getting the job done safely and that they need to set the same
expectations with their teams. If those expectations are unmet, management should
provide retraining to the supervisor. If expectations are still not achieved, then remove
supervisors from leading workers and work-teams: especially if they cannot or are not
willing to fit into a safety-first culture.
Supervisors must be empowered to act and to correct violations with impunity, and
without fear of reprisal: especially if disciplinary action is necessary and immediately
administered: A safety-serious management should be willing to support a supervisor
who makes tough decisions against defaulting employees on workplace safety issues and
violations.
Supervisors must master the human relations skills necessary to convince others to do
work in an accident-free environment and without worker injuries or death. Supervisors
are champions of organizational core-values and future leaders; leadership training is an
essential investment. Front line supervisors must to have field experience: It is necessary
for the electric power industry.
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Supervision) occurred. This surrounded leadership,
core values, champions, field experience, certification, knowledge, understanding, maturity,
work together, progressive discipline, enforcing rules, written procedures, coaching, worker
training, expectation, culture, situational awareness, and work methods.
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Table: Poor Supervision Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Supervisors need to be technically
proficient in work tasks and receive
appropriate training.

Human Resources Frame
Supervisors also need to practice
good leadership and need to receive
appropriate training.

Supervisors must be well qualified and
experienced in work at hand.

Managers must set and detail
expectations for supervisors.

Political Frame
Keeping poor supervisors under scrutiny by
management individuals, and providing
frequent feedback, can help guide these
individuals from creating an environment
where accidents can occur.

Supervisors must be well qualified and
experienced in work at hand.
Symbolic Frame
Promote integrity.
Organizations need to create a "Safety First"
culture. Supervisors play an integral role in
creating/maintaining that culture.

Most training for lineman stops after their
apprenticeship is completed. Training is
costly and utilities are not willing to pay.

For the problem of Work Planning: 96.3 % of participants believed that Work Planning
could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the solutions to Work Planning
were desirable; 100 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to
implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4, 95.65 %
expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become
seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Work Planning include:
Managers and supervisors must ensure robust job planning and job briefing to prevent
accidents. Job packages must include job aids such as procedures, job safety analysis
identifying hazards, and information on prior incidents, if available, can help avoid
accidents. A properly planned job includes safety consideration such as correct fall
protection, personal protective equipment, proper isolation, and grounding. Often, these
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items are left to the workers to arrange and decide when they arrive on site. It is
imperative to consider safety when creating a work plan. All parties should provide
feedback about how to best organize the project safely and carefully, given their areas of
expertise. Front line supervision and workers must recognize bad work planning and
provide effective, practical, and useful feedback to supervisors and managers. Managers
and supervisors must then take appropriate action to prevent recurrence of sub-standard
work planning.
Managers, supervisors, and workers must coordinate work planning with work going on
concurrently and which might have an impact on the job activities. Personnel must be
aware when conditions and situations change and require work reassessment strategies
due to the unplanned changes. These must be a deliberate, proactive pre-disposition:
Improper pre-work assessments and reviews contribute to crews and individuals being
improperly prepared for tasks and accident events.
Data saturation (solutions to Work Planning) occurred. This surrounded job planning, job
briefing, safety consideration, actively involve, coordinate, worker training, expectation, culture,
situational awareness, work methods, recognize, field experience, certification, knowledge,
understanding, enforcing rules, written procedures, coaching, managers, and supervisors.
Table: Work Planning Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
OSHA required pre-job briefings.
Knowing the hazards is one thing, but
removing the hazard from the worksite
should be part of the work planning.

Political Frame
I never allowed a lousy plan to affect my work
as a lineman. I just would not do it until there
was a better idea. That said, I became a
foreman after 14 years as a lineman. Now
lineman becomes foreman after 3 years
because of the worker shortage. Less likely to
stand up to or even recognize a bad plan.

Human Resources Frame
Involve crew leader in work planning.
Challenge - time commitment and working
logistics.
Symbolic Frame
None at the start and none on time
Rushing, budget and bonus money.
Profit over safety
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For the problem of Management Priorities: 85.19 % of participants believed that
Management Priorities could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the
solutions to Management Priorities were desirable; 100 % found them feasible. In Round 2,
95.83 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and
future accidents. In Round 2, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Management Priorities include:
Management must create and encourage a safety first culture where nothing is more
important than getting the job done safely: Management must make safety the number
one priority of the organization. Management must genuinely, actively, and repeatedly
communicate this so that workers do not lose focus. Managers must recognize the
challenge of keeping safety as a top priority even in situations where the acute pressure to
get things done is overwhelming, and not to feel pressured to meet other work-related
goals and to compromise safety.
Supervisors must demand strict adherence to procedures to prevent accidents: It is a point
of hypocrisy when supervisors and managers preach that safety practices are foremost,
but then blatantly disregard safety to meet scheduling, production quotas, or alleviate
budgetary concerns.
Managers must be exposed to the fieldwork regularly so they will have a detailed idea
about what they are managing and the individuals doing that work. They must be up-todate or aware of the work activities on projects or jobs, have a full understanding of the
actual work plan, the strategy for getting it done, and HOW best to do it.
Data saturation (solutions to Management Priorities) occurred. This surrounded culture,
priority, safe work, cost, coordinate, customers, stakeholders, situational awareness, work
methods, field experience, knowledge, understanding, enforcing rules, written procedures,
coaching, managers, and supervisors.
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Table: Management Priorities Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
When a Manager steps into a process and
wants to accelerate a job, or change
priorities, a worker can ensure his safety
by strictly adhering to work procedures,
with no "fade."

Political Frame
Production is rewarded more than safety and
workers know that as a fact. Some workers
even choose shortcuts just to get ahead of the
competition and for promotion.

Human Resources Frame
Being rushed.
Get rid of managers that are not on board
with the company’s safety culture.
Symbolic Frame
Slow down and keep employees motivated
Adopt a true safety first value

For the problem of Poor Team Communication: 92.59 % of participants believed that
Poor Team Communication could be solved. In Round 2, 96 % of participants indicated that the
solutions to Poor Team Communication were desirable; 96 % found them feasible. In Round 3,
100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future
accidents. In Round 4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Team Communication include:
The person in charge of a job must be trained in good communication and know the
importance of excellent interpersonal and group communication. Before a job starts, and
while a job is in progress, arrange planned meetings where everyone can be aware of the
actual work progress and planned changes. These meetings must be factored as part of
the job and time must be added to overall job times.
Managers and supervisors must recognize the benefits of and use strategies aimed at
improving human performances by genuinely and meaningfully communicating with
workers on accident prevention efforts. Implement thorough and complete job briefings
before and during the work processes and exercises. Recognize that a common challenge
is that job briefings are not always well conducted: Use effective communication to
prevent misunderstandings.
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Workers mindful of what other workers are doing will help prevent accidents: Managers
and supervisors must facilitate this. By precisely knowing what coworkers are doing, and
when, can avoid an accident caused by actions that interfere with other groups.
Sometimes this can be best handled by having one person/entity in charge of all tasks on
a particular job.
It is imperative that individuals at work and work teams practice effective communication
to drive safe, superior team performance, and work outcomes. Managers and supervisors
must set expectations on effective communication and provide appropriate training to
individuals at work. Managers must also ensure that supervisors are fostering a culture
that supports good communication.
Supervisors must be mindful that by forming work teams, individuals who work well
together is extremely important. If interpersonal issues exist among team members,
managers and supervisors must diagnose and address this issue decisively, even if it
means removing an individual or individuals from the employ altogether or in showing
workers where they may be contributing to the problem or problems. Managers and
employee unions must work together to alleviate possible accidents and worker injuries
that can result from sub-standard conditions due primarily to poor interpersonal
communication.
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Team Communication) occurred. This surrounded
strategies, culture, human performances, tailgate meetings, sub-standard conditions,
complacency, confusion, job briefings, situational awareness, work methods, recognize,
performance, understanding, misunderstandings, written procedures, coaching, managers, and
supervisors.
Table: Poor Team Communication Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Communication deficiencies have been
identified to be a potential cause of
injuries, especially during the
administration of operating orders

Political Frame
If there is bad chemistry on the crew, there
will be poor communication.

Human Resources Frame
Good pre-job briefings: Sometimes a
challenge is language barriers can exist.
Symbolic Frame
Communication is a training topic for all
persons at work.
Establish communication protocols
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For the problem of Willful Disregard for Safety Rules: 81.48 % of participants believed
that Willful Disregard for Safety Rules could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants
indicated that the solutions to Willful Disregard for Safety Rules were desirable; 96 % found
them feasible. In Round 3, 95.83 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions
to prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if
applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while
doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Willful Disregard for Safety Rules include:
Managers and supervisors must recognize possible individual or individuals who may
exhibit a tendency to disregard workplace rules, and get appropriate counseling, or to
keep the errant individual off the job: despite possibly but not deliberately invading the
person's right to privacy.
Managers and supervisors must follow a firm, consistent approach to handing willful
violations – discipline: It is prudent to train supervisors and workers before the working
arrangements get to that point where individuals will willfully disregard safety rules.
Managers must discipline individuals who willfully disregard safety rules. If the
defaulting individual cannot recover, then the only recourse would be that the manager
must remove the person from that job function and all hazardous work tasks. This
removal can mean dismissal from the company.
Supervisors must remain vigilant and seek out workers who take short cuts when
performing work; mostly the result of overconfidence and complacency. Individuals who
are affected by either or both, have a higher tendency to disregard safety in the belief that
nothing will occur since they may have done the same or similar work tasks before
without implementing safety procedures. This removal will save errant individuals from
making mistakes and possibly injuring themselves or others at work.
One reason for willful disregard for safety rules is the quality of accident investigations
where the main focus usually is on determining errors committed by the last individual
before the accident event. To prevent this, organizational leaders must require full
compliance with accident investigation guidelines where human-error would be just one
aspect of the investigation.
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Data saturation (solutions to Willful Disregard for Safety Rules) occurred. This
surrounded focus, strategies, culture, errors, human performances, counseling, tailgate meetings,
sub-standard conditions, complacency, overconfidence, job briefings, situational awareness,
work methods, recognize, performance, understanding, misunderstandings, written procedures,
coaching, managers, and supervisors.
Table: Willful Disregard for Safety Rules Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Willful disregard for safety rules needs to
be corrected.
Set initial expectations that nothing is
more important than getting the job done
Safely and that unsatisfactory behavior
will be addressed.

Political Frame
Linemen have big egos and enjoy living on
the edge. This ego makes them willingly
disregard safety rule.

Human Resources Frame
Progressive discipline is often necessary.
Set the initial expectations. If those
expectations are not met, provide retraining.
If expectations are still not met, then it is fair
to remove personnel from the team if they
cannot or are not willing to fit into a Safety
First culture.
Symbolic Frame
Investigations often produce phrases like,
"total disregard for safety rules, ignoring
PPE requirements etc". Last year in the
United States 45 children died after being
forgotten in the back seat on a hot day. It's
easy to blame the worker by saying "Willful
disregard." The truth is there is always
something more complex at work. If we don't
ask the right questions, we won't find the
answer. Worse we can't change outcomes.
Culture change is needed to develop a
workforce that resists the urge to make willful
violations of safety rules

For the problem of Permit to Work Violations: 81.48 % of participants believed that
Permit to Work Violations could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the
solutions to Permit to Work Violations were desirable; 92 % found them feasible. In Round 3,
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91.67 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and
future accidents. In Round 4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power
industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Permit to Work Violations include:
Managers and supervisors must frequently remind all individuals at work that proper job
briefings at the start of every job, will help prevent permit to work violations. That
reminder must also explain that if an individual chooses to work outside of the scope of
their permit, then that would be an individual responsibility. Managers must stress that a
permit to work is specific where workers have detailed job information, an indication of
the danger in the job activities, and the consequences of work permit violations.
Managers and supervisors must set initial expectations that nothing is more important
than getting the job done safely and that permit to work violations will attract progressive
discipline.
Instructions must be that workers do not work until verification of safe work is possible
after the issuance and acceptance of a permit to work. This arrangement must hold even
at locations where the supervisor is not present in person. The workers at remote
locations must exercise self-discipline and not begin work until permits are received:
Workers must always be reminded that accident victims are usually the individuals at the
front-line. A failure to secure permits can result in improper testing, verification of
conditions, lock out/tag out violations, or other dangerous possibilities that could result in
serious injury, illness, or death. Closed loop communication, clearance, and control
communication, which are necessary, is not known to all front line workers. Working
within the defined scope of an operating order or permit to work is crucial to avoid
injury.
Training in the permit to work processes and procedures shall include hazard analysis and
mitigation techniques and legal provisions on violations to this requirement.
Data saturation (solutions to Permit to Work Violations) occurred. It surrounded focus,
strategies, culture, errors, incompetence, distraction, tailgate meetings, human error,
complacency, overconfidence, job briefings, situational awareness, work methods, testing,
verification, understanding, misunderstandings, written procedures, coaching, discipline,
managers, and supervisors.
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Table: Permit to Work Violations Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Have more accountability for these
permits. They are usually just boxes to
check on a paper. More staff is needed to
ensure rules are followed.

Political Frame
Organizations need to create a train and
document culture.

Human Resources Frame
Supervisors are KEY
Train all frontline workers and
document process
Symbolic Frame
In a "Safety First" culture, permit to work
violations needs to be corrected.

For the problem of Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance: 96.3 % of participants believed
that Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants
indicated that the solutions to Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance were desirable; 100 % found
them feasible. In Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to
prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in
the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing
work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance include:
Managers and supervisors must encourage peer check, and effective communication as
that will alleviate problems regarding instances of lock out tag out violations. In a safetyfirst culture, supported by managers and supervisors, lock-out-tag-out training will set the
initial expectations and, provide a detailed description of why this is necessary and what
will occur if there are procedural violations. Locks with combinations can be handy.
These combinations should be changed periodically, so employees do not memorize
codes to locks. Not complying lock-out-tag-out or not using a lock-out-tag-out procedure
is rooted in a cultural problem and a heuristic trap. Removing the wrong tags can
introduce hazardous conditions.
Remove personnel from work functions where Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance
occurs if they cannot or are not willing to maintain the stringent requirements and
responsibilities that accompany this task. The likelihood of individuals becoming injured
or even killed because of lock-out-tag-out violations are significant. Non-compliance can
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lead to accidental energization of circuits, by others, unaware of what is occurring with
regards to the circuit.
Progressive discipline is often necessary in cases of indifferent lock-out-tag-out behavior.
Managers and supervisors must ensure multiple levels of checking of lock-out-tag-out
arrangements. Sometimes it is that supervising the personnel performing this function is
not always possible because of the geographically spatial electric power network and the
location where lock-out-tag-out operations occur. Technology can assist through
pictures, and existing supervisory control and data acquisition signals. If these are not
available or possible at all lock-out positions, a combination of safe work strategies can
be employed to maintain full compliance.
Data saturation (solutions to Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance) occurred. It surrounded
peer check, unskilled, communication, expectations, training, recognize, focus, strategies,
culture, errors, incompetence, distraction, tailgate meetings, human error, complacency,
overconfidence, job briefings, situational awareness, work methods, recognize, verification,
understanding, written procedures, discipline, managers, and supervisors.
Table : Lock-Out-Tag-Out-non-Compliance Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Non-compliance is often due to a work
plan that is too restrictive or not
workable.

Political Frame
Safety is a must.
If no one observing, workers will take
chances.
Should have field experience and
understanding of circuits and voltages.

Human Resources Frame
Having a detailed and proper review
of a lock-out tag-out plan can help
ensure that it is feasible and workable,
therefore avoiding the need for
workers to feel they need to work
outside of a lock-out tag-out plan.
Symbolic Frame
More accountability is required. A safety
check should confirm and verify lock-out tag
out arrangements after installation and
before work can begin.

For the problem of Organizational Safety Culture: 92.59 % of participants believed that
Organizational Safety Culture could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that
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the solutions to Organizational Safety Culture were desirable; 100 % found them feasible. In
Round 3, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further
and future accidents. In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric
power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Organizational Safety Culture include:
Managers and supervisors must review work procedures and practices that fall under the
banner of That's the way we've always done it..., measure them for continued relevance
and determine if they can reveal that work practices have drifted from accepted
organizational procedures and best safety practices. This drift would fall under a safety
culture that has gone off track. Reigning these practices when discovered can lead to the
reduction of accidents. Safety culture maintenance must be a top priority and
management should ensure that it stays that way. Organizational leadership must support
this direction, not just middle management.
Company leaders must consider work safety issues as equal to profit, system reliability
and production. That push for profit or production must never be over safety: a point of
hypocrisy when company leaders preach that safety practices are foremost, but then
blatantly disregard safety to meet scheduling, production quotas, or alleviate budgetary
concerns. The saying practice what you preach must be an emphasis amongst
management and company executives in all business concerns.
Organizational safety culture begins at the very top. Top management must be safety
trained, communicate safe work expectations and support from those under their
influence.
Data saturation (solutions to Organizational Safety Culture) occurred. It surrounded
communication, expectations, training, recognize, strategies, incompetence, distraction,
human error, situational awareness, work methods, verification, understanding, leaders,
managers, and supervisors.
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Table: Organizational Safety Culture Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
It is important to note that an
organizational safety culture requires
constant maintenance.

Political Frame
This one is a joke.
Electric Utilities brag about their safety
cultures, but numbers lie and liars figure.

Human Resources Frame
Accidents can be prevented by
ensuring that 100% of the workforce
is appropriately trained.
The challenge is to ensure that all are
trained.
Symbolic Frame
Creating a "Safety First" culture needs to be
a collaboration between leadership,
management, and all employees.
Every single Employee needs to buy in.

For the problem of Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence: 92.59 % of participants
believed that Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of
participants indicated that the solutions to Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence were desirable;
100 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 95.83 % indicated that it was important to implement
these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round 4, 95.65 % expressed
confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become seriously
injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence include:
Organizational leaders must support safety culture reinforcement and a zero tolerance for
reckless risk-taking and negligence. Management and supervisors must enforce strict
adherence to rules and procedures, by conducting sufficient and timely audits, which can
help guide workers away from taking risks and being negligent. Sound control is the key
to avoiding risk taking and negligence.
Management and supervisors must encourage workers to follow all steps of an
assignment and abhor a tendency for individuals to want to get things over with, and the
perception of getting things done, quickly, will reap the most significant rewards.
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Managers and supervisors must maintain cognizance that human behavior is
consequence-influenced: When an individual knows the result of personal actions, then it
is conceivable that the individual may be more likely to avoid danger. Front line
supervision and action must always aim at correcting safety-errant behavior.
Data saturation (solutions to Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence) occurred. It
surrounded culture, personal actions, consequence, behavior, understand, communication,
expectations, training, recognize, strategies, incompetence, human error, situational awareness,
work methods, managers, and supervisors.
Table: Individual Risk-Taking and Negligence Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame

Human Resources Frame
Result of overconfidence,
complacency, laziness, or possibly
poor training.

This type of person is very attracted to
line work, but these people are also the
most accident-prone.

Evaluate and coach
Political Frame
Terminate employee contracts when individuals
willfully violate workplace safety arrangements,
procedures, and rules.

Symbolic Frame
Pre-employment testing should be done to
understand the type of people utilities hire
and inextricably are putting into harm's way.

Fire employees who do not do what’s required.

For the problem of Equipment Failure: 92.59 % of participants believed that Equipment
Failure could be solved. In Round 2, 96 % of participants indicated that the solutions to
Equipment Failure were desirable; 96 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 100 % indicated that
it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round
4, 86.96 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not
become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Equipment Failure include:
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Engineering/Asset Management/Operations/Safety must create procedures for
inspections, effective maintenance, and replacement of outdated equipment. The
program should also consist of initial expectations training and periodic retraining.
Managers and supervisors must conduct audits regularly.
A robust preventative maintenance program will help reduce worker injuries and death
due to equipment failures. Electric power utilities perform more energized work to
eliminate service interruptions. With more re-closers installed on the electricity
transmission and distribution systems, enablement of circuit flexibility with re-closer
scenarios occurs. Improperly maintained in-service equipment, inadequate quality
control, poor handling, and shipping conditions for materials and spares are significant
factors that contribute to equipment failure.
Managers, supervisors, and workers must remain mindful that knowing the operating
limits of in-service equipment is essential in the safe management of the electric system.
Understanding how practical drift allows for a stretch of the operating limits of the
material, device or equipment, can provide an understanding of why in-service equipment
fails.
Preventing equipment failure occurs through proper device operation, and adequate
maintenance conducted by following technical standards, manufacturers
recommendation, and within the appropriate period.
Managers must ensure training for employees on new systems, equipment or products
and that the knowledge is practiced and effective.
Data saturation (solutions to Equipment Failure) occurred. It surrounded inspection,
maintenance, work programming, equipment failure, prevention measures, assumptions,
procedures, training, consultation, proactive work, personal protective equipment, high energy
equipment, contingency, practical drift, situation awareness, managers, and supervisors.
Table: Equipment Failure Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Develop and implement work
procedures that protect workers from
failures. Challenge - workers do not
follow procedures
Available preventative maintenance
Political Frame
Certification training is expensive and timeconsuming.

Human Resources Frame
Proper and effective maintenance can
help prevent the failure of equipment,
which can cause harm to individuals in
the vicinity..

Symbolic Frame
Developing a robust preventative maintenance
program can help with equipment failure.
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For the problem of Procedural Error: 88.89 % of participants believed that Procedural
Error could be solved. In Round 2, 100 % of participants indicated that the solutions to
Procedural Error were desirable; 100 % found them feasible. In Round 3, 100 % indicated that
it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round
4, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not
become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Procedural Error include:
Managers and supervisors must effectively train employees to use procedures and audit
the use of workplace procedures. Write clear procedures. Use a step policy and review
before it is too late: A periodic and documented analysis of procedures will help avoid a
sub-processes in a process or method which may not be the best way to perform a task. If
there are errors in a work process, method, or procedure, and the procedure remains
unchanged, the mistake will recur until it is. That usually happens after an accident
where employees were seriously injured or even killed.
Management and supervisors must enforce strict adherence to rules and procedures, by
conducting sufficient and regular audits, to help guide workers away from procedural
errors. Sound control is necessary. Engineering/Asset Management/Operations/Safety
must create procedures emphasizing proper techniques and practices. The program
should also consist of initial expectations training and periodic retraining. Conduct
periodic assessments and continually improve. Examination of procedures must be
through a series of what if questions.
Supervisors must identify and correct all instances of improper training and poor
communication which can cause confusion, misinformation, worker failure to implement
new procedures, and workers’ inability to communicate critical information.
Data saturation (solutions to Procedural Error) occurred. It surrounded culture, audits,
practices, understand, communication, procedures, training, recognize, incompetence, human
error, situational awareness, work methods, managers, and supervisors.
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Table: Procedural Error Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Procedures should be written by experts
in the field and not by procedure writers.

Political Frame
Management inspection can happen with an
unexpected change in the work.

Experienced supervisors monitoring crews
and holding them accountable.

Human Resources Frame
Have a Safety Program that
incorporates human performance
improvement tools and strategies. For
example, require that all procedures
be executed by two Employees who
can verify with each other that
procedures are being implemented
without error.
Symbolic Frame
Recognize that humans are fallible and prone
to error. Have a human performance
improvement program to address human
errors both proactively and reactively.

For the problem of Poor Management Oversight: 88.89 % of participants believed that
Poor Management Oversight could be solved. In Round two, 100 % of participants indicated
that the solutions to Poor Management Oversight were desirable; 100 % found them feasible. In
Round three, 100 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent
further and future accidents. In Round four, 95.65 % expressed confidence that if applied in the
electric power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Management Oversight include:
Management must provide employee oversight. A program in place requiring field visits
by managers and others by supervisors will help to prevent serious accidents. Training
for managers must include techniques for measuring effective compliance and how to
perform job oversight activities. Ensure manager training and appropriate resources
(budget, time, materials, staffing).
Holding individual managers accountable for their actions will prevent accidents caused
by poor management oversight. Individual managers must know that they are
responsible for the work outcome, regardless of whether they supervise the work
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activities directly or through other individuals. Poor management oversight can attract
personal fines and federal sanctions.
Managers must be familiar with what is required to accomplish the work they assign: The
challenge is for managers to be familiar with the work they ascribe to others. Unengaged
supervision, inexperienced supervisors, and management personnel unwilling to call out
safety violators, are significant contributors to this issue and must be removed if that poor
practice continues.
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Management Oversight) occurred. It surrounded
conflicts, inexperienced, accountable, audits, practices, fines, unengaged, procedures, training,
incompetence, work methods, and supervisors.

Table: Procedural Error Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Procedures should be written by experts
in the field and not by procedure writers.

Political Frame
Management inspection can happen with an
unexpected change in the work.

Experienced supervisors monitoring crews
and holding them accountable.

Human Resources Frame
Have a Safety Program that
incorporates human performance
improvement tools and strategies. For
example, require that all procedures
be executed by two Employees who
can verify with each other that
procedures are being implemented
without error.
Symbolic Frame
Recognize that humans are fallible and prone
to error. Have a human performance
improvement program to address human
errors both proactively and reactively.

For the problem of Poor Quality Material: 70.37 % of participants believed that Poor
Quality Material could be solved. In Round two, 92 % of participants indicated that the
solutions to Poor Quality Material were desirable; 92 % found them feasible. In Round three,
79.17 % indicated that it was important to implement these solutions to prevent further and
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future accidents. In Round four, 91.3 % expressed confidence that if applied in the electric
power industry, workers will not become seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Poor Quality Material include:
Organizational leadership and management must demand that purchasing requirements
are fully complied with and there is a good quality assurance program to help prevent
issues caused by poor quality material. When poor quality material gets to the workplace
and discovered, workers and frontline managers and supervisors must provide details to
procurement or purchasing personnel. That feedback is critical to ensure that inferior
quality materials do not end up causing an accident.
It is imperative for engineers and designers to use superior quality materials when
constructing, operating and maintaining equipment to drive actual safety performance.
Purchasing officers must examine reviews which may be available to buyers before
making decisions on purchasing items or materials.
Organizational policies and procedures must always be sufficient to address the impact of
inferior quality materials with both a proactive focus and otherwise. Managers must
maintain a good QA/QC program to ensure the use of high-quality materials and
equipment.
Data saturation (solutions to Poor Quality Material ) occurred. It surrounded assurance,
proactive, purchasing, equipment failure, cost, assumptions, training, consultation, contingency,
situation awareness, managers, and supervisors.
Table: Poor Quality Material Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame

Human Resources Frame

Getting any history on the manufacturer of and
the materials used. A challenge is to buy
something that might be within the budget.

Buy quality not quantity

Political Frame
Materials generally have not been the cause
of accidents I know about. Usually, the issues
occur due to improper installation and
workmanship.

Symbolic Frame
A national registry for defective material.
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For the problem of Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment: 92.59 % of participants
believed that Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment could be solved. In Round two, 100 %
of participants indicated that the solutions to Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment were
desirable; 100 % found them feasible. In Round three, 95.83 % indicated that it was important to
implement these solutions to prevent further and future accidents. In Round four, 91.3 %
expressed confidence that if applied in the electric power industry, workers will not become
seriously injured or killed while doing work.
Solutions identified for the problem of Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment include:
Organizational leaders must create and encourage a safety first culture where non-use of
personal protective equipment is corrected. Managers and supervisors must ensure
personnel training in the use of personal protective equipment; Provide periodic
retraining. The only way to prevent accidents caused by non-use of personal protective
equipment is to enforce the safety rules.
Managers and supervisors must set initial expectations that nothing is more important
than getting the job done safely and that not using personal protective equipment
appropriately are not tolerated: Dismiss defaulters who willfully disregard this
requirement.
Managers and supervisors must enforce work procedures that highlight the consequence
of not wearing personal protective equipment as this can cause a fatal injury. Non-use of
personal protective equipment can be due to complacency and overconfidence.
Inadequate training or non-issuance of personal protective equipment can be a possible
cause. Occasionally workers make excuses for personal protective equipment violations,
usually in regards to working constraints in tight places. Practical drift can occur and are
dangerous: Especially if the worker has gotten away with non-use of personal protective
equipment, or before the teaching or the inadequate application of equipotential
grounding.
Managers and supervisors must enforce full and strict compliance with the use of
personal protective equipment at all times: Personal protective equipment, even if it is
uncomfortable and sometimes restricts natural movement and mobility, is the last line of
defense. Not using it means that the employee is defenseless and this is very likely to
leave the individual susceptible to injury. Supervisors identifying poor behaviors must
hold defaulting individuals accountable.
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Data saturation (solutions to Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment) occurred. It
surrounded conflicts, good fit, accountable, inspections, practices, careless, unengaged,
procedures, training, negligence, work methods, managers, and supervisors.
Table: Non-use of Personal Protective Equipment Responses: Four-Frames
Structural Frame
Safety not followed
More visits by the safety inspector.

Human Resources Frame
Teaching about lessons learned from past
incidents is an effective way of showing
individuals at work the risks of not
complying with safety rules.

Political Frame

Symbolic Frame

Severe discipline for individuals who choose to
not comply with personal protective equipment
rules will send the message that these rules are
not optional.

Good education is the pre-emptive way of
preventing non-compliance.

The design of this study was for a selection of a 3, 4, or a 5 on a 5-point Likert-type Scale
for each item in each of the Delphi rounds resulted in 28 out of the 30 items originally identified
and included in the Round 1 questionnaire remaining relevant throughout the Study. That made
the data analysis and study management much more complex and complicated than originally
anticipated. In the following Table, a comparison of the possible results if the acceptance criteria
was set as a 4 or 5 only for each item in the different questionnaires in this study. Instead of
participants’ responses to 28 items moving from Round 1 to Round 2 as actually occurred in this
study, solutions to 20 items would have remained relevant for later consideration. The reduction
may or may not have impacted on the overall conduct of the study, but this was not assessed in
its entirety.
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% Response >2 on 5-point Likert-type
Scale

1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Round 2 Delphi
Considertation
Poor Design
Management System Flaw
Poor Regulatory Oversight
Poor work ethics; history of
wrongdoing that went
unaddressed
Incorrect labeling
Medical and other personal
issues
Grounding, earthing
failures/errors
Ineffective and inefficient
maintenance
Animals/living organisms
Hazardous work-site
conditions
Unplanned events
Inappropriate work methods
Stakeholder demands
Poor judgment by
individuals or work crews
Poor attitude and or
behavior by individuals or
work crews
Ineffective or no workplace
training
Poor supervision
Work planning
Management priorities
Poor team communication
Willful disregard for safety
rules
Permit to work violations
Lock-out tag-out
noncompliance
Organizational safety culture
Individual risk-taking and
negligence
Equipment failure
Procedural error
Poor management oversight
Poor quality material
Non-use or personal
protective equipment

Des

Feas

Y/N

Total

D
D
ND

F
F
NF

Y
Y
N

D

F

ND

% Response >3 on 5-point Likert-type Scale
Des

Feas

Y/N

Total

Imp

Conf

100
100
64

D
D
ND

NF
F
NF

N
Y
N

68
84
24

XXX
IMP
XXX

XXX
CONF
XXX

96

96

D

F

88

76

IMP

CONF

0

62

100

ND

0

56

64

XXX

XXX

Y

1

96

92

N

0

80

56

XXX

XXX

F

Y

1

100

F

Y

1

96

92

IMP

CONF

D

F

Y

1

D

F

Y

1

92

76

IMP

CONF

D

F

Y

92

ND

NF

N

0

56

44

XXX

XXX

D

F

100

92

D

NF

N

0

88

68

XXX

XXX

D
D
D

1
1
1

92
100
80

88
100
84

D
D
D

NF
F
NF

N
Y
N

0
1
0

84
92
72

56
84
60

XXX
IMP
XXX

XXX
CONF
XXX

Y

1

96

92

D

F

Y

1

92

84

IMP

CONF

F

Y

1

100

96

D

F

Y

1

92

80

IMP

CONF

D

F

Y

1

100

96

D

F

Y

1

88

84

IMP

CONF

D
D
D
D

F
F
F
F

Y
Y
Y
Y

1
1
1
1

92
100
100
96

92
100
100
96

D
D
D
D

F
F
F
F

Y
Y
Y
Y

1
1
1
1

92
92
88
92

88
88
72
88

IMP
IMP
IMP
IMP

CONF
CONF
CONF
CONF

D

F

Y

1

100

96

D

F

Y

1

88

80

IMP

CONF

D

F

Y

1

100

92

D

F

Y

1

92

80

IMP

CONF

D

F

Y

1

100

100

D

F

Y

1

96

92

IMP

CONF

D

F

Y

1

100

100

D

F

Y

1

96

88

IMP

CONF

D

F

Y

1

100

100

D

F

Y

1

92

76

IMP

CONF

D
D
D
D

F
F
F
F

Y
Y
Y
Y

1
1
1
1

96
100
100
92

96
100
96
92

D
D
D
ND

NF
F
F
NF

N
Y
Y
N

0
1
1
0

84
88
92
64

68
84
80
52

XXX
IMP
IMP
XXX

XXX
CONF
CONF
XXX

D

F

Y

1

100

100

D

F

Y

1

96

96

IMP

CONF

Total

28

Total

20

1
1
0

%
D
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100
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Y

1

F

N

D

F

D

%F

%D

%F

0
1
0

84
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24

Y

1

NF

N

D

NF
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D

100
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1

80

Y

1

F
F
F

Y
Y
Y

D

F
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